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Uyghurs - Wikipedia

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(Top)

1Etymology

2Identity

Toggle Identity subsection

2.1Origin of modern nomenclature

3Population

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3.1Population in Xinjiang

3.2Genetics

4History

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4.1Early history

4.2Uyghur Khaganate (8th–9th centuries)

4.3Uyghur kingdoms (9th–11th centuries)

4.4Islamization

4.5Qing rule

4.6Yettishar

4.7Qing reconquest

4.8First East Turkestan Republic

4.9Second East Turkestan Republic

4.10Contemporary era

4.10.1Human rights abuses against Uyghurs in Xinjiang

5Uyghurs of Taoyuan, Hunan

6Culture

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6.1Religion

6.2Language

6.3Literature

6.4Music

6.5Dance

6.6Art

6.7Education

6.8Traditional medicine

6.9Cuisine

6.10Clothing

6.11Traditional handicrafts

6.12Livelihood

6.13Names

7See also

8Explanatory notes

9References

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9.1Citations

9.2General and cited sources

10Further reading

11External links

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Uyghurs

109 languages

AfrikaansالعربيةAragonésԱրեւմտահայերէնAsturianuAzərbaycancaتۆرکجهবাংলাBân-lâm-gúБашҡортсаБеларускаяБеларуская (тарашкевіца)भोजपुरीBikol CentralБългарскиབོད་ཡིགBosanskiCatalàЧӑвашлаČeštinaCymraegDanskDeutschEestiΕλληνικάEspañolEsperantoEuskaraفارسیFrançaisFryskGaeilgeGalego客家語/Hak-kâ-ngî한국어Հայերենहिन्दीHrvatskiBahasa IndonesiaИронÍslenskaItalianoעבריתJawaქართულიҚазақшаKurdîКыргызчаLadinoລາວLatinaLatviešuLietuviųLingua Franca NovaMagyarМакедонскиMalagasyമലയാളംमराठीმარგალურიمصرىBahasa MelayuMinangkabau閩東語 / Mìng-dĕ̤ng-ngṳ̄МонголNederlands日本語НохчийнNorsk bokmålNorsk nynorskOccitanOʻzbekcha / ўзбекчаپنجابیپښتوPolskiPortuguêsQırımtatarcaRomânăRuna SimiРусскийСаха тылаSarduShqipSicilianuSimple EnglishSlovenčinaSlovenščinaکوردیСрпски / srpskiSrpskohrvatski / српскохрватскиSuomiSvenskaTagalogதமிழ்Татарча / tatarçaไทยТоҷикӣTürkçeTürkmençeТыва дылУкраїнськаاردوئۇيغۇرچە / UyghurcheVahcuenghTiếng ViệtWest-Vlams吴语粵語中文

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Turkic ethnic group of Central and East Asia

Not to be confused with Yugurs.

UyghursئۇيغۇرلارУйғурларUyghurlarA Uyghur man in KashgarTotal populationc. 13.5 million[note 1]Regions with significant populationsChina(mainly in Xinjiang)11.8 million[1]Kazakhstan223,100 (2009)[2][3]Pakistan200,000 (2010)[4]Turkey100,000–300,000[5]Kyrgyzstan60,210 (2021)[6]Uzbekistan48,500 (2019)[7]United States8,905 (per US Census Bureau 2015)[8] – 15,000 (per ETGE estimate 2021)[9]Saudi Arabia8,730 (2018)[10]Australia5,000–10,000[11]Russia3,696 (2010)[12]India~3,500[13]Turkmenistan~3,000[14]Afghanistan2,000[15]Japan2,000 (2021)[16]Sweden2,000 (2019)[17]Canada~1,555 (2016)[18]Germany~750 (2013)[19]Finland327 (2021)[20]Mongolia258 (2000)[21]Ukraine197 (2001)[22]LanguagesUyghurÄynu, Mandarin, RussianReligionPredominantly Sunni IslamRelated ethnic groupsUzbeks[23] and other Turkic peoples; Tajiks[24]

UyghursUyghur nameUyghurئۇيغۇرلار‎TranscriptionsLatin YëziqiUyghurlarSiril YëziqiУйғурларUyghur IPA[ujɣurˈlɑr]Chinese nameSimplified Chinese维吾尔Traditional Chinese維吾爾TranscriptionsStandard MandarinHanyu PinyinWéiwú'ěrBopomofoㄨㄟˊ ㄨˊ ㄦˇWade–GilesWei2-wu2-erh3Tongyong PinyinWéi-wú-ěrIPA[wěɪ.ǔ.àɚ]

Part of a series onUyghurs

Timeline

History

Xinjiang

East Turkestan

Flag

Nationalism

Literature

List of Uyghurs

Uyghur language

Alphabets

Dialects

Arabic alphabet

Cyrillic alphabet

Latin alphabet

Grammar

New Script

Phonology

Uyghur culture

Dervishi

Doppa Cultural Festival

Etles silk

The Girl from Dabancheng

Lift Your Veil

Meshrep

Muqam

Qurtulush Yolida

Tianshan Snow Lotus Group

Uyghurlar

Uyghur cuisine

Chorba

Cut cake

Dapanji

Joshpara

Laghman

Manti

Naan

Samsa

Sangza

Tandyr nan

Youtazi

Persecution of Uyghurs in China

China Cables

Civil Servant-Family Pair Up

Xinjiang internment camps

Strike Hard Campaign

Uyghur Tribunal

Uyghurs outside of Xinjiang

Beijing

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Pakistan

Turkey

United States

Uyghur organizations

East Turkistan Government-in-Exile

East Turkistan National Awakening Movement

Uyghur American Association

Uyghur Human Rights Project

World Uyghur Congress

vte

This article contains Uyghur text. Without proper rendering support, you may see unjoined letters or other symbols instead of Uyghur script.

The Uyghurs,[note 2] alternatively spelled Uighurs,[27][28][29] Uygurs or Uigurs, are a Turkic ethnic group originating from and culturally affiliated with the general region of Central and East Asia. The Uyghurs are recognized as the titular nationality of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in Northwest China. They are one of China's 55 officially recognized ethnic minorities.[30] The Uyghurs are recognized by the Chinese government as a regional minority and the titular people of Xinjiang.

The Uyghurs have traditionally inhabited a series of oases scattered across the Taklamakan Desert within the Tarim Basin. These oases have historically existed as independent states or were controlled by many civilizations including China, the Mongols, the Tibetans and various Turkic polities. The Uyghurs gradually started to become Islamized in the 10th century, and most Uyghurs identified as Muslims by the 16th century. Islam has since played an important role in Uyghur culture and identity.

An estimated 80% of Xinjiang's Uyghurs still live in the Tarim Basin.[31] The rest of Xinjiang's Uyghurs mostly live in Ürümqi, the capital city of Xinjiang, which is located in the historical region of Dzungaria. The largest community of Uyghurs living outside of Xinjiang are the Taoyuan Uyghurs of north-central Hunan's Taoyuan County.[32] Significant diasporic communities of Uyghurs exist in other Turkic countries such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turkey.[33] Smaller communities live in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Australia, Russia and Sweden.[34]

Since 2014,[35][36] the Chinese government has been accused by various organizations, such as Human Rights Watch[37] of subjecting Uyghurs living in Xinjiang to widespread persecution, including forced sterilization[38][39] and forced labor.[40][41][42] Scholars estimate that at least one million Uyghurs have been arbitrarily detained in the Xinjiang internment camps since 2017;[43][44][45] Chinese government officials claim that these camps, created under CCP general secretary Xi Jinping's administration, serve the goals of ensuring adherence to Chinese Communist Party (CCP) ideology, preventing separatism, fighting terrorism, and providing vocational training to Uyghurs.[46] Various scholars, human rights organizations and governments consider abuses perpetrated against the Uyghurs to amount to crimes against humanity, or even genocide.

Etymology

In the Uyghur language, the ethnonym is written ئۇيغۇر in Arabic script, Уйғур in Uyghur Cyrillic and Uyghur or Uygur (as the standard Chinese romanization, GB 3304–1991) in Latin;[47] they are all pronounced as [ʔʊjˈʁʊːr].[48][49] In Chinese, this is transcribed into characters as 维吾尔 / 維吾爾, which is romanized in pinyin as Wéiwú'ěr.

In English, the name is officially spelled Uyghur by the Xinjiang government[50] but also appears as Uighur,[51] Uigur[51] and Uygur (these reflect the various Cyrillic spellings Уиғур, Уигур and Уйгур). The name is usually pronounced in English as /ˈwiːɡʊər, -ɡər/ WEE-goor, -⁠gər (and is thus preceded by the indefinite article "a"),[51][52][53][27] although some Uyghurs advocate the use of a more native pronunciation /ˌuːiˈɡʊər/ OO-ee-GOOR instead (which, in contrast, calls for the article "an").[25][26][54]

The term's original meaning is unclear. Old Turkic inscriptions record the word uyɣur[55] (Old Turkic: ); an example is found on the Sudzi inscription, "I am khan ata of Yaglaqar, came from the Uigur land." (Old Turkic: Uyγur jerinte Yaγlaqar qan ata keltim).[56] It is transcribed into Tang annals as 回纥 / 回紇 (Mandarin: Huíhé, but probably *[ɣuɒiɣət] in Middle Chinese).[57] It was used as the name of one of the Turkic polities formed in the interim between the First and Second Göktürk Khaganates (AD 630–684).[58] The Old History of the Five Dynasties records that in 788 or 809, the Chinese acceded to a Uyghur request and emended their transcription to 回鹘 / 回鶻 (Mandarin: Huíhú, but [ɣuɒiɣuət] in Middle Chinese).[59][60]

Modern etymological explanations for the name Uyghur range from derivation from the verb "follow, accommodate oneself"[51] and adjective "non-rebellious" (i.e., from Turkic uy/uð-) to the verb meaning "wake, rouse or stir" (i.e., from Turkic oðğur-). None of these is thought to be satisfactory because the sound shift of /ð/ and /ḏ/ to /j/ does not appear to be in place by this time.[59] The etymology therefore cannot be conclusively determined and its referent is also difficult to fix. The "Huihe" and "Huihu" seem to be a political rather than a tribal designation[61] or it may be one group among several others collectively known as the Toquz Oghuz.[62] The name fell out of use in the 15th century, but was reintroduced in the early 20th century[48][49] by the Soviet Bolsheviks to replace the previous terms Turk and Turki.[63][note 3] The name is currently used to refer to the settled Turkic urban dwellers and farmers of the Tarim Basin who follow traditional Central Asian sedentary practices, distinguishable from the nomadic Turkic populations in Central Asia.

The earliest record of a Uyghur tribe appears in accounts from the Northern Wei (4th–6th century A.D.), wherein they were named 袁紇 Yuanhe (< MC ZS *ɦʉɐn-ɦət) and derived from a confederation named 高车 / 高車 (lit. "High Carts"), read as Gāochē in Mandarin Chinese but originally with the reconstructed Middle Chinese pronunciation *[kɑutɕʰĭa], later known as the Tiele (铁勒 / 鐵勒, Tiělè).[65][66][67] Gāochē in turn has been connected to the Uyghur Qangqil (قاڭقىل or Қаңқил).[68]

Identity

A Uyghur girde naan baker

Uyghur blacksmiths at work. Yengisar, Xinjiang, China. Yengisar is famous for the quality of its knives.

Uyghur man in traditional clothing, playing a tambur, a traditional Uyghur instrument.

Throughout its history, the term Uyghur has had an increasingly expansive definition. Initially signifying only a small coalition of Tiele tribes in northern China, Mongolia and the Altai Mountains, it later denoted citizenship in the Uyghur Khaganate. Finally, it was expanded into an ethnicity whose ancestry originates with the fall of the Uyghur Khaganate in the year 842, causing Uyghur migration from Mongolia into the Tarim Basin. The Uyghurs who moved to the Tarim Basin mixed with the local Tocharians, and converted to the Tocharian religion, and adopted their culture of oasis agriculture.[69][70] The fluid definition of Uyghur and the diverse ancestry of modern Uyghurs create confusion as to what constitutes true Uyghur ethnography and ethnogenesis. Contemporary scholars consider modern Uyghurs to be the descendants of a number of peoples, including the ancient Uyghurs of Mongolia migrating into the Tarim Basin after the fall of the Uyghur Khaganate, Iranic Saka tribes and other Indo-European peoples inhabiting the Tarim Basin before the arrival of the Turkic Uyghurs.[71]

Uyghur activists identify with the Tarim mummies, remains of an ancient people inhabiting the region, but research into the genetics of ancient Tarim mummies and their links with modern Uyghurs remains problematic, both to Chinese government officials concerned with ethnic separatism and to Uyghur activists concerned the research could affect their indigenous claim.[72]

A genomic study published in 2021 found that these early mummies had high levels of Ancient North Eurasian ancestry (ANE, about 72%), with smaller admixture from Ancient Northeast Asians (ANA, about 28%), but no detectable Western Steppe-related ancestry.[73][74] They formed a genetically isolated local population that "adopted neighbouring pastoralist and agriculturalist practices, which allowed them to settle and thrive along the shifting riverine oases of the Taklamakan Desert."[75] These mummified individuals were long suspected to have been "Proto-Tocharian-speaking pastoralists", ancestors of the Tocharians, but the authors of this study found no genetic connection with Indo-European-speaking migrants, particularly the Afanasievo or BMAC cultures.[76]

Origin of modern nomenclature

The Uighurs are the people whom old Russian travelers called "Sart" (a name they used for sedentary, Turkish-speaking Central Asians in general), while Western travelers called them Turki, in recognition of their language. The Chinese used to call them "Ch'an-t'ou" ('Turbaned Heads') but this term has been dropped, being considered derogatory, and the Chinese, using their own pronunciation, now called them Weiwuerh. As a matter of fact there was for centuries no 'national' name for them; people identified themselves with the oasis they came from, such as Kashgar or Turfan.— Owen Lattimore, "Return to China's Northern Frontier." The Geographical Journal, Vol. 139, No. 2, June 1973[77]

The term "Uyghur" was not used to refer to a specific existing ethnicity in the 19th century: it referred to an 'ancient people'. A late-19th-century encyclopedia entitled The Cyclopædia of India and of Eastern and Southern Asia said "the Uigur are the most ancient of Turkish tribes and formerly inhabited a part of Chinese Tartary (Xinjiang), now occupied by a mixed population of Turk, Mongol and Kalmuck".[78] Before 1921/1934,[clarification needed] Western writers called the Turkic-speaking Muslims of the oases "Turki" and the Turkic Muslims who had migrated from the Tarim Basin to Ili, Ürümqi and Dzungaria in the northern portion of Xinjiang during the Qing dynasty were known as "Taranchi", meaning "farmer". The Russians and other foreigners referred to them as "Sart",[79] "Turk" or "Turki".[80][note 3] In the early 20th century they identified themselves by different names to different peoples and in response to different inquiries: they called themselves Sarts in front of Kazakhs and Kyrgyz while they called themselves "Chantou" if asked about their identity after first identifying as a Muslim.[81][82] The term "Chantou" (纏頭; Ch'an-t'ou, meaning "Rag head" or "Turban Head") was used to refer to the Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang,[83][84] including by Hui (Tungan) people.[85] These groups of peoples often identify themselves by their originating oasis instead of an ethnicity;[86] for example those from Kashgar may refer to themselves as Kashgarliq or Kashgari, while those from Hotan identity themselves as "Hotani".[82][87] Other Central Asians once called all the inhabitants of Xinjiang's Southern oases Kashgari,[88] a term still used in some regions of Pakistan.[89] The Turkic people also used "Musulman", which means "Muslim", to describe themselves.[87][90][91]

A possible Tocharian or Sogdian monk (left) with an East Asian Buddhist monk (right). A fresco from the Bezeklik Thousand Buddha Caves, dated to the 9th or 10th century (Kara-Khoja Kingdom).

Rian Thum explored the concepts of identity among the ancestors of the modern Uyghurs in Altishahr (the native Uyghur name for Eastern Turkestan or Southern Xinjiang) before the adoption of the name "Uyghur" in the 1930s, referring to them by the name "Altishahri" in his article Modular History: Identity Maintenance before Uyghur Nationalism. Thum indicated that Altishahri Turkis did have a sense that they were a distinctive group separate from the Turkic Andijanis to their west, the nomadic Turkic Kirghiz, the nomadic Mongol Qalmaq and the Han Chinese Khitay before they became known as Uyghurs. There was no single name used for their identity; various native names Altishahris used for identify were Altishahrlik (Altishahr person), yerlik (local), Turki and Musulmān (Muslim); the term Musulmān in this situation did not signify religious connotations, because the Altishahris exclude other Muslim peoples like the Kirghiz while identifying themselves as Musulmān.[92][93] Dr. Laura J Newby says the sedentary Altishahri Turkic people considered themselves separate from other Turkic Muslims since at least the 19th century.[94]

The name "Uyghur" reappeared after the Soviet Union took the 9th-century ethnonym from the Uyghur Khaganate, then reapplied it to all non-nomadic Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang.[95] It followed western European orientalists like Julius Klaproth in the 19th century who revived the name and spread the use of the term to local Turkic intellectuals[96] and a 19th-century proposal from Russian historians that modern-day Uyghurs were descended from the Kingdom of Qocho and Kara-Khanid Khanate formed after the dissolution of the Uyghur Khaganate.[97] Historians generally agree that the adoption of the term "Uyghur" is based on a decision from a 1921 conference in Tashkent, attended by Turkic Muslims from the Tarim Basin (Xinjiang).[95][98][99][100] There, "Uyghur" was chosen by them as the name of their ethnicity, although they themselves note that they were not to be confused with the Uyghur Empire of medieval history.[79][101] According to Linda Benson, the Soviets and their client Sheng Shicai intended to foster a Uyghur nationality to divide the Muslim population of Xinjiang, whereas the various Turkic Muslim peoples preferred to identify themselves as "Turki", "East Turkestani" or "Muslim".[79]

On the other hand, the ruling regime of China at that time, the Kuomintang, grouped all Muslims, including the Turkic-speaking people of Xinjiang, into the "Hui nationality".[102][103] The Qing dynasty and the Kuomintang generally referred to the sedentary oasis-dwelling Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang as "turban-headed Hui" to differentiate them from other predominantly Muslim ethnicities in China.[79][104][note 4] In the 1930s, foreigners travelers in Xinjiang such as George W. Hunter, Peter Fleming, Ella Maillart and Sven Hedin, referred to the Turkic Muslims of the region as "Turki" in their books. Use of the term Uyghur was unknown in Xinjiang until 1934. The area governor, Sheng Shicai, came to power, adopting the Soviet ethnographic classification instead of the Kuomintang's and became the first to promulgate the official use of the term "Uyghur" to describe the Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang.[79][97][106] "Uyghur" replaced "rag-head".[107]

Sheng Shicai's introduction of the "Uighur" name for the Turkic people of Xinjiang was criticized and rejected by Turki intellectuals such as Pan-Turkist Jadids and East Turkestan independence activists Muhammad Amin Bughra (Mehmet Emin) and Masud Sabri. They demanded the names "Türk" or "Türki" be used instead as the ethnonyms for their people. Masud Sabri viewed the Hui people as Muslim Han Chinese and separate from his people,[108] while Bughrain criticized Sheng for his designation of Turkic Muslims into different ethnicities which could sow disunion among Turkic Muslims.[109][110] After the Communist victory, the Chinese Communist Party under Chairman Mao Zedong continued the Soviet classification, using the term "Uyghur" to describe the modern ethnicity.[79]

In current usage, Uyghur refers to settled Turkic-speaking urban dwellers and farmers of the Tarim Basin and Ili who follow traditional Central Asian sedentary practices, as distinguished from nomadic Turkic populations in Central Asia. However, Chinese government agents[clarification needed] designate as "Uyghur" certain peoples with significantly divergent histories and ancestries from the main group. These include the Lopliks of Ruoqiang County and the Dolan people, thought to be closer to the Oirat Mongols and the Kyrgyz.[111][112] The use of the term Uyghur led to anachronisms when describing the history of the people.[113] In one of his books, the term Uyghur was deliberately not used by James Millward.[114]

Another ethnicity, the Western Yugur of Gansu, identify themselves as the "Yellow Uyghur" (Sarïq Uyghur).[115] Some scholars say the Yugurs' culture, language and religion are closer to the original culture of the original Uyghur Karakorum state than is the culture of the modern Uyghur people of Xinjiang.[116] Linguist and ethnographer S. Robert Ramsey argues for inclusion of both the Eastern and Western Yugur and the Salar as sub-groups of the Uyghur based on similar historical roots for the Yugur and on perceived linguistic similarities for the Salar.[117]

"Turkistani" is used as an alternate ethnonym by some Uyghurs.[118] For example, the Uyghur diaspora in Arabia, adopted the identity "Turkistani". Some Uyghurs in Saudi Arabia adopted the Arabic nisba of their home city, such as "Al-Kashgari" from Kashgar. Saudi-born Uyghur Hamza Kashgari's family originated from Kashgar.[119][120]

Population

Uyghur hunter in Kashgar

The Uyghur population within China generally remains centered in Xinjiang region with some smaller subpopulations elsewhere in the country, such as in Taoyuan County where an estimated 5,000–10,000 live.[121][122]

The size of the Uyghur population, particularly in China, has been the subject of dispute. Chinese authorities place the Uyghur population within the Xinjiang region to be just over 12 million, comprising approximately half of the total regional population.[123] As early as 2003, however, some Uyghur groups wrote that their population was being vastly undercounted by Chinese authorities, claiming that their population actually exceeded 20 million.[124] Population disputes have continued into the present, with some activists and groups such as the World Uyghur Congress and Uyghur American Association claiming that the Uyghur population ranges between 20 and 30 million.[125][126][127][128] Some have even claimed that the real number of Uyghurs is actually 35 million.[129][130] Scholars, however, have generally rejected these claims, with Professor Dru C. Gladney writing in the 2004 book Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland that there is "scant evidence" to support Uyghur claims that their population within China exceeds 20 million.[131]

Population in Xinjiang

Area

1953 Census

1964 Census

1982 Census

1990 Census

2000 Census

2010 Census

Ref.

Total

PCT.

Total

PCT.

Total

PCT.

Total

PCT.

Total

PCT.

Total

PCT.

Ürümqi

28,786

19.11%

56,345

9.99%

121,561

10.97%

266,342

12.79%

387,878

12.46%

[132]

Karamay

Not applicable

23,730

14.54%

30,895

15.09%

37,245

13.78%

44,866

11.47%

[133]

Turpan

139,391

89.93%

170,512

75.61%

294,039

71.14%

351,523

74.13%

385,546

70.01%

429,527

68.96%

[134]

Hami

33,312

41.12%

42,435

22.95%

75,557

20.01%

84,790

20.70%

90,624

18.42%

101,713

17.77%

[135]

Changji

18,784

7.67%

23,794

5.29%

44,944

3.93%

52,394

4.12%

58,984

3.92%

63,606

4.45%

[136]

Bortala

8,723

21.54%

18,432

15.53%

38,428

13.39%

53,145

12.53%

59,106

13.32%

[137]

Bayingolin

121,212

75.79%

153,737

46.07%

264,592

35.03%

310,384

36.99%

345,595

32.70%

406,942

31.83%

[138]

Kizilsu

Not applicable

122,148

68.42%

196,500

66.31%

241,859

64.36

281,306

63.98%

339,926

64.68%

[139]

Ili

568,109

23.99%

667,202

26.87%

Aksu

697,604

98.17%

778,920

80.44%

1,158,659

76.23%

1,342,138

79.07%

1,540,633

71.93%

1,799,512

75.90%

[140]

Kashgar

1,567,069

96.99%

1,671,336

93.63%

2,093,152

87.92%

2,606,775

91.32%

3,042,942

89.35%

3,606,779

90.64%

[141]

Hotan

717,277

99.20%

774,286

96.52%

1,124,331

96.58%

1,356,251

96.84%

1,621,215

96.43%

1,938,316

96.22%

[142]

Tacheng

36,437

6.16%

36,804

4.12%

38,476

3.16%

[143]

Altay

3,622

3.73%

6,471

3.09%

10,255

2.19%

10,688

2.09%

10,068

1.79%

8,703

1.44%

[144]

Shihezi

Not applicable

7,064

1.20%

7,574

1.99%

Aral

Not applicable

9,481

5.78%

Tumxuk

Not applicable

91,472

67.39%

Wujiaqu

Not applicable

223

0.23%

Ref.

[145]

[146]

–

Genetics

A study of mitochondrial DNA (2004) (therefore the matrilineal genetic contribution) found the frequency of Western Eurasian-specific haplogroup in Uyghurs to be 42.6% and East Asian haplogroup to be 57.4%.[147][148] Uyghurs in Kazakhstan on the other hand were shown to have 55% European/Western Eurasian maternal mtDNA.[148]

A study based on paternal DNA (2005) shows West Eurasian haplogroups (J and R) in Uyghurs make up 65% to 70% and East Asian haplogroups (C, N, D and O) 30% to 35%.[149]

Uyghur schoolchildren in Kashgar (2011)

One study by Xu et al. (2008), using samples from Hetian (Hotan) only, found Uyghurs have about an average of 60% European or West Asian (Western Eurasian) ancestry and about 40% East Asian or Siberian ancestry (Eastern Eurasian). From the same area, it is found that the proportion of Uyghur individuals with European/West Asian ancestry ranges individually from 40.3% to 84.3% while their East Asian/Siberian ancestry ranges individually from 15.7% to 59.7%.[150] Further study by the same team showed an average of slightly greater European/West Asian component at 52% (ranging individually from 44.9% to 63.1%) in the Uyghur population in southern Xinjiang but only 47% (ranging individually from 30% to 55%) in the northern Uyghur population.[151]

A different study by Li et al. (2009) used a larger sample of individuals from a wider area and found a higher East Asian component of about 70% on average, while the European/West Asian component was about 30%. Overall, Uyghur show relative more similarity to "Western East Asians" than to "Eastern East Asians". The authors also cite anthropologic studies which also estimate about 30% "Western proportions", which are in agreement with their genetic results.[152]Genetic distance between different Eurasian populations and frequency of West- and East-Eurasian components.[153]

A study (2013) based on autosomal DNA shows that average Uyghurs are closest to other Turkic people in Central Asia and China as well as various Chinese populations. The analysis of the diversity of cytochrome B further suggests Uyghurs are closer to Chinese and Siberian populations than to various Caucasoid groups in West Asia or Europe. However, there is significant genetic distance between the Xinjiang's southern Uyghurs and Chinese population, but not between the northern Uyghurs and Chinese.[154]

A Study (2016) of Uyghur males living in southern Xinjiang used high-resolution 26 Y-STR loci system high-resolution to infer the genetic relationships between the Uyghur population and European and Asian populations. The results showed the Uyghur population of southern Xinjiang exhibited a genetic admixture of Eastern Asian and European populations but with slightly closer relationship with European populations than to Eastern Asian populations.[155]

An extensive genome study in 2017 analyzed 951 samples of Uyghurs from 14 geographical subpopulations in Xinjiang and observed a southwest and northeast differentiation in the population, partially caused by the Tianshan Mountains which form a natural barrier, with gene flows from the east and west. The study identifies four major ancestral components that may have arisen from two earlier admixed groups: one West-Eurasian component, associated with European ancestry (25–37%), one South Asian ancestry component (12–20%), and two East-Eurasian components with Siberian (15–17%) and East Asian ancestries (29–47%). In total, Uyghurs on average range from 44 to 64% Siberian/East Asian, 33.2% European, and 17.9% South Asian. Western Xinjiang shows more West Eurasian components than East Asian. It suggests at least two major waves of admixture, one ~3,750 years ago coinciding with the age range of the mummies with European feature found in Xinjiang, and another occurring around 750 years ago.[156]

A 2018 study of 206 Uyghur samples from Xinjiang, using the ancestry-informative SNP (AISNP) analysis, found that the average genetic ancestry of Uyghurs is 63.7% East Asian-related and 36.3% European-related.[157]

History

Main article: History of the Uyghur people

Uyghur princes from Cave 9 of the Bezeklik Thousand Buddha Caves, Xinjiang, China, 8th–9th century AD, wall painting

The history of the Uyghur people, as with the ethnic origin of the people, is a matter of contention.[158] Uyghur historians viewed the Uyghurs as the original inhabitants of Xinjiang with a long history. Uyghur politician and historian Muhammad Amin Bughra wrote in his book A History of East Turkestan, stressing the Turkic aspects of his people, that the Turks have a continuous 9000-year-old history, while historian Turghun Almas incorporated discoveries of Tarim mummies to conclude that Uyghurs have over 6400 years of continuous history,[159] and the World Uyghur Congress claimed a 4,000-year history in East Turkestan.[160] However, the official Chinese view, as documented in the white paper History and Development of Xinjiang, asserts that the Uyghur ethnic group formed after the collapse of the Uyghur Khaganate in 840, when the local residents of the Tarim Basin and its surrounding areas were merged with migrants from the khaganate.[161] The name "Uyghur" reappeared after the Soviet Union took the 9th-century ethnonym from the Uyghur Khaganate, then reapplied it to all non-nomadic Turkic Muslims of Xinjiang.[162] Many contemporary western scholars, however, do not consider the modern Uyghurs to be of direct linear descent from the old Uyghur Khaganate of Mongolia. Rather, they consider them to be descendants of a number of peoples, one of them the ancient Uyghurs.[71][163][164][165]

Early history

Discovery of well-preserved Tarim mummies of a people European in appearance indicates the migration of a European-looking people into the Tarim area at the beginning of the Bronze Age around 1800 BC. These people may have been of Tocharian origin, and some have suggested them to be the Yuezhi mentioned in ancient Chinese texts.[166][167] The Tocharians are thought to have developed from the Indo-European speaking Afanasevo culture of Southern Siberia (c. 3500–2500 BC).[168] A study published in 2021 showed that the earliest Tarim Basin cultures had high levels of Ancient North Eurasian ancestry, with smaller admixture from Northeast Asians.[169] Uyghur activist Turgun Almas claimed that Tarim mummies were Uyghurs because the earliest Uyghurs practiced shamanism and the buried mummies' orientation suggests that they had been shamanists; meanwhile, Qurban Wäli claimed words written in Kharosthi and Sogdian scripts as "Uyghur" rather than Sogdian words absorbed into Uyghur according to other linguists.[170]

Later migrations brought peoples from the west and northwest to the Xinjiang region, probably speakers of various Iranian languages such as the Saka tribes, who were closely related to the European Scythians and descended from the earlier Andronovo culture,[171] and who may have been present in the Khotan and Kashgar area in the first millennium BC, as well as the Sogdians who formed networks of trading communities across the Tarim Basin from the 4th century AD.[172] There may also be an Indian component as the founding legend of Khotan suggests that the city was founded by Indians from ancient Taxila during the reign of Ashoka.[173][174] Other people in the region mentioned in ancient Chinese texts include the Dingling as well as the Xiongnu who fought for supremacy in the region against the Chinese for several hundred years. Some Uyghur nationalists also claimed descent from the Xiongnu (according to the Chinese historical text the Book of Wei, the founder of the Uyghurs was descended from a Xiongnu ruler),[59] but the view is contested by modern Chinese scholars.[159]

The Yuezhi were driven away by the Xiongnu but founded the Kushan Empire, which exerted some influence in the Tarim Basin, where Kharosthi texts have been found in Loulan, Niya and Khotan. Loulan and Khotan were some of the many city-states that existed in the Xinjiang region during the Han Dynasty; others include Kucha, Turfan, Karasahr and Kashgar. These kingdoms in the Tarim Basin came under the control of China during the Han and Tang dynasties. During the Tang dynasty they were conquered and placed under the control of the Protectorate General to Pacify the West, and the Indo-European cultures of these kingdoms never recovered from Tang rule after thousands of their inhabitants were killed during the conquest.[175] The settled population of these cities later merged with the incoming Turkic people, including the Uyghurs of Uyghur Khaganate, to form the modern Uyghurs. The Indo-European Tocharian language later disappeared as the urban population switched to a Turkic language such as the Old Uyghur language.[176]

The early Turkic peoples descended from agricultural communities in Northeast Asia who moved westwards into Mongolia in the late 3rd millennium BC, where they adopted a pastoral lifestyle.[177][178][179][180][181] By the early 1st millennium BC, these peoples had become equestrian nomads.[177] In subsequent centuries, the steppe populations of Central Asia appear to have been progressively Turkified by East Asian nomadic Turks, moving out of Mongolia.[182][183]

Uyghur Khaganate (8th–9th centuries)

Main articles: Uyghur Khaganate and Toquz Oghuz

Bögü Qaghan, the third Khagan of the Uyghur Khaganate, in a suit of armour; 8th century Manichean manuscript (MIK III 4979)

The Uyghurs of the Uyghur Khaganate were part of a Turkic confederation called the Tiele,[184] who lived in the valleys south of Lake Baikal and around the Yenisei River. They overthrew the First Turkic Khaganate and established the Uyghur Khaganate.

The Uyghur Khaganate lasted from 744 to 840.[71] It was administered from the imperial capital Ordu-Baliq, one of the biggest ancient cities built in Mongolia. In 840, following a famine and civil war, the Uyghur Khaganate was overrun by the Yenisei Kirghiz, another Turkic people. As a result, the majority of tribal groups formerly under Uyghur control dispersed and moved out of Mongolia.

Uyghur kingdoms (9th–11th centuries)

Uyghur Khaganate in geopolitical context c. 820 AD

The Uyghurs who founded the Uyghur Khaganate dispersed after the fall of the Khaganate, to live among the Karluks and to places such as Jimsar, Turpan and Gansu.[185][note 5] These Uyghurs soon founded two kingdoms and the easternmost state was the Ganzhou Kingdom (870–1036) which ruled parts of Xinjiang, with its capital near present-day Zhangye, Gansu, China. The modern Yugurs are believed to be descendants of these Uyghurs. Ganzhou was absorbed by the Western Xia in 1036.

The second Uyghur kingdom, the Kingdom of Qocho ruled a larger section of Xinjiang, also known as Uyghuristan in its later period, was founded in the Turpan area with its capital in Qocho (modern Gaochang) and Beshbalik. The Kingdom of Qocho lasted from the ninth to the fourteenth century and proved to be longer-lasting than any power in the region, before or since.[71] The Uyghurs were originally Tengrists, shamanists, and Manichaean, but converted to Buddhism during this period. Qocho accepted the Qara Khitai as its overlord in the 1130s, and in 1209 submitted voluntarily to the rising Mongol Empire. The Uyghurs of Kingdom of Qocho were allowed significant autonomy and played an important role as civil servants to the Mongol Empire, but was finally destroyed by the Chagatai Khanate by the end of the 14th century.[71][187]

Islamization

Main article: Turkic settlement of the Tarim Basin

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In the tenth century, the Karluks, Yagmas, Chigils and other Turkic tribes founded the Kara-Khanid Khanate in Semirechye, Western Tian Shan, and Kashgaria and later conquered Transoxiana. The Karakhanid rulers were likely to be Yaghmas who were associated with the Toquz Oghuz and some historians therefore see this as a link between the Karakhanid and the Uyghurs of the Uyghur Khaganate, although this connection is disputed by others.[188]

The Karakhanids converted to Islam in the tenth century beginning with Sultan Satuq Bughra Khan, the first Turkic dynasty to do so.[189] Modern Uyghurs see the Muslim Karakhanids as an important part of their history; however, Islamization of the people of the Tarim Basin was a gradual process. The Indo-Iranian Saka Buddhist Kingdom of Khotan was conquered by the Turkic Muslim Karakhanids from Kashgar in the early 11th century, but Uyghur Qocho remained mainly Buddhist until the 15th century, and the conversion of the Uyghur people to Islam was not completed until the 17th century.

Chagatai Khanate (Moghulistan) in 1490

The 12th and 13th century saw the domination by non-Muslim powers: first the Kara-Khitans in the 12th century, followed by the Mongols in the 13th century. After the death of Genghis Khan in 1227, Transoxiana and Kashgar became the domain of his second son, Chagatai Khan. The Chagatai Khanate split into two in the 1340s, and the area of the Chagatai Khanate where the modern Uyghurs live became part of Moghulistan, which meant "land of the Mongols". In the 14th century, a Chagatayid khan Tughluq Temür converted to Islam, Genghisid Mongol nobilities also followed him to convert to Islam.[190] His son Khizr Khoja conquered Qocho and Turfan (the core of Uyghuristan) in the 1390s, and the Uyghurs there became largely Muslim by the beginning of the 16th century.[188] After being converted to Islam, the descendants of the previously Buddhist Uyghurs in Turfan failed to retain memory of their ancestral legacy and falsely believed that the "infidel Kalmuks" (Dzungars) were the ones who built Buddhist structures in their area.[191]

From the late 14th through 17th centuries, the Xinjiang region became further subdivided into Moghulistan in the north, Altishahr (Kashgar and the Tarim Basin), and the Turfan area, each often ruled separately by competing Chagatayid descendants, the Dughlats, and later the Khojas.[188]

Islam was also spread by the Sufis, and branches of its Naqshbandi order were the Khojas who seized control of political and military affairs in the Tarim Basin and Turfan in the 17th century. The Khojas however split into two rival factions, the Aqtaghlik ("White Mountainers") Khojas (also called the Afaqiyya) and the Qarataghlik ("Black Mountainers") Khojas (also called the Ishaqiyya). The legacy of the Khojas lasted until the 19th century. The Qarataghlik Khojas seized power in Yarkand where the Chagatai Khans ruled in the Yarkent Khanate, forcing the Aqtaghlik Afaqi Khoja into exile.

Qing rule

Uyghur General Khojis (−1781), governor of Us-Turfan, who later resided at the Qing court in Beijing. Painting by a European Jesuit artist at the Chinese court in 1775.[192]

In the 17th century, the Buddhist Dzungar Khanate grew in power in Dzungaria. The Dzungar conquest of Altishahr ended the last independent Chagatai Khanate, the Yarkent Khanate, after the Aqtaghlik Afaq Khoja sought aid from the 5th Dalai Lama and his Dzungar Buddhist followers to help him in his struggle against the Qarataghlik Khojas. The Aqtaghlik Khojas in the Tarim Basin then became vassals to the Dzungars.

The expansion of the Dzungars into Khalkha Mongol territory in Mongolia brought them into direct conflict with Qing China in the late 17th century, and in the process also brought Chinese presence back into the region a thousand years after Tang China lost control of the Western Regions.[193]

Minaret of Turpan ruler Emin Khoja, built by his son and successor Suleiman in 1777 in the memory of his father (tallest minaret in China)

The Dzungar–Qing War lasted a decade. During the Dzungar conflict, two Aqtaghlik brothers, the so-called "Younger Khoja" (Chinese: 霍集佔), also known as Khwāja-i Jahān, and his sibling, the Elder Khoja (Chinese: 波羅尼都), also known as Burhān al-Dīn, after being appointed as vassals in the Tarim Basin by the Dzungars, first joined the Qing and rebelled against Dzungar rule until the final Qing victory over the Dzungars, then they rebelled against the Qing in the Revolt of the Altishahr Khojas (1757–1759), an action which prompted the invasion and conquest of the Tarim Basin by the Qing in 1759. The Uyghurs of Turfan and Hami such as Emin Khoja were allies of the Qing in this conflict, and these Uyghurs also helped the Qing rule the Altishahr Uyghurs in the Tarim Basin.[194][195]

The final campaign against the Dzungars in the 1750s ended with the Dzungar genocide. The Qing "final solution" of genocide to solve the problem of the Dzungar Mongols created a land devoid of Dzungars, which was followed by the Qing sponsored settlement of millions of other people in Dzungaria.[196][197] In northern Xinjiang, the Qing brought in Han, Hui, Uyghur, Xibe, Daurs, Solons, Turkic Muslim Taranchis and Kazakh colonists, with one third of Xinjiang's total population consisting of Hui and Han in the northern area, while around two thirds were Uyghurs in southern Xinjiang's Tarim Basin.[198] In Dzungaria, the Qing established new cities like Ürümqi and Yining.[199] The Dzungarian basin itself is now inhabited by many Kazakhs.[200] The Qing therefore unified Xinjiang and changed its demographic composition as well.[201]: 71 The crushing of the Buddhist Dzungars by the Qing led to the empowerment of the Muslim Begs in southern Xinjiang, migration of Muslim Taranchis to northern Xinjiang, and increasing Turkic Muslim power, with Turkic Muslim culture and identity was tolerated or even promoted by the Qing.[201]: 76 It was therefore argued by Henry Schwarz that "the Qing victory was, in a certain sense, a victory for Islam".[201]: 72

In Beijing, a community of Uyghurs was clustered around the mosque near the Forbidden City, having moved to Beijing in the 18th century.[202]

The Ush rebellion in 1765 by Uyghurs against the Manchus occurred after several incidents of misrule and abuse that had caused considerable anger and resentment.[203][204][205] The Manchu Emperor ordered that the Uyghur rebel town be massacred, and the men were executed and the women and children enslaved.[206]

Uyghur chieftain from Wushi, Kucha and Aksu, with his wife. Huang Qing Zhigong Tu, 1769.[207]

Uyghur commoners from Wushi, Kucha and Aksu. Huang Qing Zhigong Tu, 1769.[208]

Uyghur people from Hami, in Anxi subprefecture. Huang Qing Zhigong Tu, 1769.[209]

Uyghur people from Ili, Taleqi, Chahan and Wusu. Huang Qing Zhigong Tu, 1769.[210]

Yettishar

During the Dungan Revolt (1862–1877), Andijani Uzbeks from the Khanate of Kokand under Buzurg Khan and Yaqub Beg expelled Qing officials from parts of southern Xinjiang and founded an independent Kashgarian kingdom called Yettishar ("Country of Seven Cities"). Under the leadership of Yaqub Beg, it included Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Aksu, Kucha, Korla, and Turpan.[citation needed] Large Qing dynasty forces under Chinese General Zuo Zongtang attacked Yettishar in 1876.

Qing reconquest

After this invasion, the two regions of Dzungaria, which had been known as the Dzungar region or the Northern marches of the Tian Shan,[211][212] and the Tarim Basin, which had been known as "Muslim land" or southern marches of the Tian Shan,[213] were reorganized into a province named Xinjiang, meaning "New Territory".[214][215]

First East Turkestan Republic

In 1912, the Qing Dynasty was replaced by the Republic of China. By 1920, Pan-Turkic Jadidists had become a challenge to Chinese warlord Yang Zengxin, who controlled Xinjiang. Uyghurs staged several uprisings against Chinese rule. In 1931, the Kumul Rebellion erupted, leading to the establishment of an independent government in Khotan in 1932,[216] which later led to the creation of the First East Turkestan Republic, officially known as the Turkish Islamic Republic of East Turkestan. Uyghurs joined with Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz and successfully declared their independence on 12 November 1933.[217] The First East Turkestan Republic was a short-lived attempt at independence around the areas encompassing Kashgar, Yarkent, and Khotan, and it was attacked during the Qumul Rebellion by a Chinese Muslim army under General Ma Zhancang and Ma Fuyuan and fell following the Battle of Kashgar (1934). The Soviets backed Chinese warlord Sheng Shicai's rule over East Turkestan/Xinjiang from 1934 to 1943. In April 1937, remnants of the First East Turkestan Republic launched an uprising known as the Islamic Rebellion in Xinjiang and briefly established an independent government, controlling areas from Atush, Kashgar, Yarkent, and even parts of Khotan, before it was crushed in October 1937, following Soviet intervention.[218] Sheng Shicai purged 50,000 to 100,000 people, mostly Uyghurs, following this uprising.[218]

Second East Turkestan Republic

The oppressive reign of Sheng Shicai fueled discontent by Uyghur and other Turkic peoples of the region, and Sheng expelled Soviet advisors following U.S. support for the Kuomintang of the Republic of China.[219] This led the Soviets to capitalize on the Uyghur and other Turkic people's discontent in the region, culminating in their support of the Ili Rebellion in October 1944. The Ili Rebellion resulted in the establishment of the Second East Turkestan Republic on 12 November 1944, in the three districts of what is now the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture.[220] Several pro-KMT Uyghurs like Isa Yusuf Alptekin, Memet Emin Bugra, and Mesut Sabri opposed the Second East Turkestan Republic and supported the Republic of China.[221][222][223] In the summer of 1949, the Soviets purged the thirty top leaders of the Second East Turkestan Republic[224] and its five top officials died in a mysterious plane crash on 27 August 1949.[225] On 13 October 1949, the People's Liberation Army entered the region and the East Turkestan National Army was merged into the PLA's 5th Army Corps, leading to the official end of the Second East Turkestan Republic on 22 December 1949.[226][227][228]

Contemporary era

Further information: Xinjiang conflict

Historical populationYearPop.±% p.a.1990[229]7,214,431— 20008,405,416+1.54%201010,069,346+1.82%Figures from Chinese Census

Ethnolinguistic map of Xinjiang in 1967

Map showing the distribution of ethnicities in Xinjiang according to census figures from 2000, the prefectures with Uyghur majorities are in blue.

Mao declared the founding of the People's Republic of China on 1 October 1949. He turned the Second East Turkistan Republic into the Ili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, and appointed Saifuddin Azizi as the region's first Communist Party governor. Many Republican loyalists fled into exile in Turkey and Western countries. The name Xinjiang was changed to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, where Uyghurs are the largest ethnicity, mostly concentrated in the south-western Xinjiang.[230]

The Xinjiang conflict is a separatist conflict in China's far-west province of Xinjiang, whose northern region is known as Dzungaria and whose southern region (the Tarim Basin) is known as East Turkestan. Uyghur separatists and independence groups claim that the Second East Turkestan Republic was illegally incorporated by China in 1949 and has since been under Chinese occupation.

Uyghur identity remains fragmented, as some support a Pan-Islamic vision, exemplified by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, while others support a Pan-Turkic vision, such as the East Turkestan Liberation Organization. A third group which includes the Uyghur American Association supports a western liberal vision and hopes for a US-led intervention into Xinjiang.[231] Some Uyghur fighters in Syria have also studied Zionism as a model for their homeland.[232][233] As a result, "no Uyghur or East Turkestan group speaks for all Uyghurs", and Uyghurs in Pan-Turkic and Pan-Islamic camps have committed violence including assassinations on other Uyghurs who they think are too assimilated to Chinese society.[231] Uyghur activists like Rebiya Kadeer have mainly tried to garner international support for Uyghurs, including the right to demonstrate, although China's government has accused her of orchestrating the deadly July 2009 Ürümqi riots.[234]

Eric Enno Tamm's 2011 book stated that "authorities have censored Uyghur writers and 'lavished funds' on official histories that depict Chinese territorial expansion into ethnic borderlands as 'unifications (tongyi), never as conquests (zhengfu) or annexations (tunbing)' "[235]

Human rights abuses against Uyghurs in Xinjiang

Main articles: Xinjiang internment camps and Persecution of Uyghurs in China

In 2014, the Chinese government announced a "people's war on terror". Since then, Uyghurs in Xinjiang have been affected by extensive controls and restrictions which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese government has imposed upon their religious, cultural, economic and social lives.[236][237][238][239] In order to forcibly assimilate them, the government has arbitrarily detained more than an estimated one million Uyghurs in internment camps.[240][241] Human Rights Watch says that the camps have been used to indoctrinate Uyghurs and other Muslims since 2017.[242][243]

Leaked Chinese government operating procedures state that the main feature of the camps is to ensure adherence to CCP ideology, with the inmates being continuously held captive in the camps for a minimum of 12 months depending on their performance on Chinese ideology tests.[244] The New York Times has reported inmates are required to "sing hymns praising the Chinese Communist Party and write 'self-criticism' essays," and that prisoners are also subjected to physical and verbal abuse by prison guards.[245] Chinese officials have sometimes assigned to monitor the families of current inmates, and women have been detained due to actions by their sons or husbands.[245]

Other policies have included forced labor,[246][247] suppression of Uyghur religious practices,[248] political indoctrination,[249] severe ill-treatment,[250] forced sterilization,[251] forced contraception,[252][253] and forced abortion.[254][255] According to German researcher Adrian Zenz, hundreds of thousands of children have been forcibly separated from their parents and sent to boarding schools.[256][257] The Australian Strategic Policy Institute estimates that some sixteen thousand mosques have been razed or damaged since 2017.[258] Associated Press reported that from 2015 to 2018, birth rates in the mostly Uyghur regions of Hotan and Kashgar fell by more than 60%,[251] compared to a decrease by 9.69% in the whole country.[259] The allegation of Uyghur birth rates being lower than those of Han Chinese have been disputed by pundits from Pakistan Observer,[260] Antara,[261] and Detik.com.[262] Protesters in Amsterdam with the Flag of East TurkestanThe policies have drawn widespread condemnation, with some characterizing them as a genocide. In an assessment by the UN Human Rights Office, the United Nations (UN) stated that China's policies and actions in the Xinjiang region may be crimes against humanity, although it did not use the term genocide.[263][264] The United States[265] and legislatures in several countries have described the policies as a genocide. The Chinese government denies having committed human rights abuses in Xinjiang.[266][267]

Uyghurs of Taoyuan, Hunan

Around 5,000 Uyghurs live around Taoyuan County and other parts of Changde in Hunan province.[268][269] They are descended from Hala Bashi, a Uyghur leader from Turpan (Kingdom of Qocho), and his Uyghur soldiers sent to Hunan by the Ming Emperor in the 14th century to crush the Miao rebels during the Miao Rebellions in the Ming Dynasty.[32][270] The 1982 census recorded 4,000 Uyghurs in Hunan.[271] They have genealogies which survive 600 years later to the present day. Genealogy keeping is a Han Chinese custom which the Hunan Uyghurs adopted. These Uyghurs were given the surname Jian by the Emperor.[272] There is some confusion as to whether they practice Islam or not. Some say that they have assimilated with the Han and do not practice Islam anymore and only their genealogies indicate their Uyghur ancestry.[273] Chinese news sources report that they are Muslim.[32]

The Uyghur troops led by Hala were ordered by the Ming Emperor to crush Miao rebellions and were given titles by him. Jian is the predominant surname among the Uyghur in Changde, Hunan. Another group of Uyghur have the surname Sai. Hui and Uyghur have intermarried in the Hunan area. The Hui are descendants of Arabs and Han Chinese who intermarried and they share the Islamic religion with the Uyghur in Hunan. It is reported that they now number around 10,000 people. The Uyghurs in Changde are not very religious and eat pork. Older Uyghurs disapprove of this, especially elders at the mosques in Changde and they seek to draw them back to Islamic customs.[274]

In addition to eating pork, the Uyghurs of Changde Hunan practice other Han Chinese customs, like ancestor worship at graves. Some Uyghurs from Xinjiang visit the Hunan Uyghurs out of curiosity or interest. Also, the Uyghurs of Hunan do not speak the Uyghur language, instead, they speak Chinese[clarification needed] as their native language and Arabic for religious reasons at the mosque.[274]

Culture

Religion

A Uyghur mosque in Khotan

The ancient Uyghurs believed in many local deities. These practices gave rise to shamanism and Tengrism. Uyghurs also practiced aspects of Zoroastrianism such as fire altars, and adopted Manichaeism as a state religion for the Uyghur Khaganate,[275] possibly in 762 or 763. Ancient Uyghurs also practiced Buddhism after they moved to Qocho, and some believed in Church of the East.[276][277][278][279]

People in the Western Tarim Basin region began their conversion to Islam early in the Kara-Khanid Khanate period.[189] Some pre-Islamic practices continued under Muslim rule; for example, while the Quran dictated many rules on marriage and divorce, other pre-Islamic principles based on Zoroastrianism also helped shape the laws of the land.[280] There had been Christian conversions in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, but these were suppressed by the First East Turkestan Republic government agents.[281][282][283] Because of persecution, the churches were destroyed and the believers were scattered.[284] According to the national census, 0.5% or 1,142 Uyghurs in Kazakhstan were Christians in 2009.[285]

Modern Uyghurs are primarily Muslim and they are the second-largest predominantly Muslim ethnicity in China after the Hui.[286] The majority of modern Uyghurs are Sunnis, although additional conflicts exist between Sufi and non-Sufi religious orders.[286] While modern Uyghurs consider Islam to be part of their identity, religious observance varies between different regions. In general, Muslims in the southern region, Kashgar in particular, are more conservative. For example, women wearing the veil (a piece of cloth covering the head completely) are more common in Kashgar than some other cities.[287] The veil, however, has been banned in some cities since 2014 after it became more popular.[288]

There is also a general split between the Uyghurs and the Hui Muslims in Xinjiang and they normally worship in different mosques.[289] The Chinese government discourages religious worship among the Uyghurs,[290] and there is evidence of thousands of Uyghur mosques including historic ones being destroyed.[291] According to a 2020 Australian Strategic Policy Institute report, Chinese authorities since 2017 have destroyed or damaged 16,000 mosques in Xinjiang.[292][293]

In the early 21st century, a new trend of Islam, Salafism, emerged in Xinjiang, mostly among the Turkic population including Uyghurs, although there are Hui Salafis. These Salafis tended to demonstrate pan-Islamism and abandoned nationalism in favor of a caliphate to rule Xinjiang in the event of independence from China.[294][295] Many Uyghur Salafis have allied themselves with the Turkistan Islamic Party in response to growing repression of Uyghurs by China.[296]

Language

Main article: Uyghur language

Map of language families in Xinjiang

The ancient people of the Tarim Basin originally spoke different languages, such as Tocharian, Saka (Khotanese), and Gandhari. The Turkic people who moved into the region in the 9th century brought with them their languages, which slowly supplanted the original tongues of the local inhabitants. In the 11th century, Mahmud al-Kashgari noted that the Uyghurs (of Qocho) spoke a pure Turkic language, but they also still spoke another language among themselves and had two different scripts. He also noted that the people of Khotan did not know Turkic well and had their own language and script (Khotanese).[297] Writers of the Karakhanid period, Al-Kashgari and Yusuf Balasagun, referred to their Turkic language as Khāqāniyya (meaning royal) or the "language of Kashgar" or simply Turkic.[298][299]

The modern Uyghur language is classified under the Karluk branch of the Turkic language family. It is closely related to Äynu, Lop, Ili Turki and Chagatay (the East Karluk languages) and slightly less closely to Uzbek (which is West Karluk). The Uyghur language is an agglutinative language and has a subject-object-verb word order. It has vowel harmony like other Turkic languages and has noun and verb cases but lacks distinction of gender forms.[300]

Modern Uyghurs have adopted a number of scripts for their language. The Arabic script, known as the Chagatay alphabet, was adopted along with Islam. This alphabet is known as Kona Yëziq (old script). Political changes in the 20th century led to numerous reforms of the scripts, for example the Cyrillic-based Uyghur Cyrillic alphabet, a Latin Uyghur New Script and later a reformed Uyghur Arabic alphabet, which represents all vowels, unlike Kona Yëziq. A new Latin version, the Uyghur Latin alphabet, was also devised in the 21st century.

In the 1990s, many Uyghurs in parts of Xinjiang could not speak Mandarin Chinese.[301]

Literature

Main article: Uyghur literature

Leaf from an Uyghur-Manichaean version of the Arzhang.

The literary works of the ancient Uyghurs were mostly translations of Buddhist and Manichaean religious texts,[302] but there were also narrative, poetic and epic works apparently original to the Uyghurs. However it is the literature of the Kara-Khanid period that is considered by modern Uyghurs to be the important part of their literary traditions. Amongst these are Islamic religious texts and histories of Turkic peoples, and important works surviving from that era are Kutadgu Bilig, "Wisdom of Royal Glory" by Yusuf Khass Hajib (1069–70), Mahmud al-Kashgari's Dīwānu l-Luġat al-Turk, "A Dictionary of Turkic Dialects" (1072) and Ehmed Yükneki's Etebetulheqayiq. Modern Uyghur religious literature includes the Taẕkirah, biographies of Islamic religious figures and saints.[303][92][304] The Turki language Tadhkirah i Khwajagan was written by M. Sadiq Kashghari.[305] Between the 1600s and 1900s many Turki-language tazkirah manuscripts devoted to stories of local sultans, martyrs and saints were written.[306] Perhaps the most famous and best-loved pieces of modern Uyghur literature are Abdurehim Ötkür's Iz, Oyghanghan Zimin, Zordun Sabir's Anayurt and Ziya Samedi's novels Mayimkhan and Mystery of the years.[citation needed]

Exiled Uyghur writers and poets, such as Muyesser Abdul'ehed, use literature to highlight the issues facing their community.[307]

Music

Uyghur Meshrep musicians in Yarkand

Uyghur folk music with modern influence

An example of modern Uyghur music

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Muqam is the classical musical style. The 12 Muqams are the national oral epic of the Uyghurs. The muqam system was developed among the Uyghur in northwestern China and Central Asia over approximately the last 1500 years from the Arabic maqamat modal system that has led to many musical genres among peoples of Eurasia and North Africa. Uyghurs have local muqam systems named after the oasis towns of Xinjiang, such as Dolan, Ili, Kumul and Turpan. The most fully developed at this point is the Western Tarim region's 12 muqams, which are now a large canon of music and songs recorded by the traditional performers Turdi Akhun and Omar Akhun among others in the 1950s and edited into a more systematic system. Although the folk performers probably improvized their songs, as in Turkish taksim performances, the present institutional canon is performed as fixed compositions by ensembles.

The Uyghur Muqam of Xinjiang has been designated by UNESCO as part of the Intangible Heritage of Humanity.[308]

Amannisa Khan, sometimes called Amanni Shahan (1526–1560), is credited with collecting and thereby preserving the Twelve Muqam.[309] Russian scholar Pantusov writes that the Uyghurs manufactured their own musical instruments, they had 62 different kinds of musical instruments, and in every Uyghur home there used to be an instrument called a "duttar".

Uzbek composer Shakhida Shaimardanova uses themes from Uyghur folk music in her compositions.[310]

Dance

Sanam is a popular folk dance among the Uyghur people.[311] It is commonly danced by people at weddings, festive occasions, and parties.[312] The dance may be performed with singing and musical accompaniment. Sama is a form of group dance for Newruz (New Year) and other festivals.[312] Other dances include the Dolan dances, Shadiyane, and Nazirkom.[313] Some dances may alternate between singing and dancing, and Uyghur hand-drums called dap are commonly used as accompaniment for Uyghur dances.

Art

Wall painting at Bezeklik caves in Flaming Mountains, Turpan Depression.

Xinjiang carpet factory

During the late-19th and early-20th centuries, scientific and archaeological expeditions to the region of Xinjiang's Silk Road discovered numerous cave temples, monastery ruins, and wall paintings, as well as miniatures, books, and documents. There are 77 rock-cut caves at the site. Most have rectangular spaces with round arch ceilings often divided into four sections, each with a mural of Buddha. The effect is of an entire ceiling covered with hundreds of Buddha murals. Some ceilings are painted with a large Buddha surrounded by other figures, including Indians, Persians and Europeans. The quality of the murals vary with some being artistically naïve while others are masterpieces of religious art.[314]

Education

Historically, the education level of Old Uyghur people was higher than the other ethnicities around them. The Buddhist Uyghurs of Qocho became the civil servants of Mongol Empire and Old Uyghur Buddhists enjoyed a high status in the Mongol empire. They also introduced the written script for the Mongolian language. In the Islamic era, education was provided by the mosques and madrassas. During the Qing era, Chinese Confucian schools were also set up in Xinjiang[315] and in the late 19th century Christian missionary schools.[316]

In the late nineteenth and early 20th century, schools were often located in mosques and madrassas. Mosques ran informal schools, known as mektep or maktab, attached to the mosques,[317] The maktab provided most of the education and its curriculum was primarily religious and oral.[318] Boys and girls might be taught in separate schools, some of which offered modern secular subjects in the early 20th century.[315][316][319] In madrasas, poetry, logic, Arabic grammar and Islamic law were taught.[320] In the early 20th century, the Jadidists Turkic Muslims from Russia spread new ideas on education[321][322][323][324] and popularized the identity of "Turkestani".[325]

In more recent times, religious education is highly restricted in Xinjiang and the Chinese authority had sought to eradicate any religious school they considered illegal.[326][327] Although Islamic private schools (Sino-Arabic schools (中阿學校)) have been supported and permitted by the Chinese government among Hui Muslim areas since the 1980s, this policy does not extend to schools in Xinjiang due to fear of separatism.[328][329][330]

Beginning in the early 20th century, secular education became more widespread. Early in the communist era, Uyghurs had a choice of two separate secular school systems, one conducted in their own language and one offering instructions only in Chinese.[331] Many Uyghurs linked the preservation of their cultural and religious identity with the language of instruction in schools and therefore preferred the Uyghur language school.[316][332] However, from the mid-1980s onward, the Chinese government began to reduce teaching in Uyghur and starting mid-1990s also began to merge some schools from the two systems. By 2002, Xinjiang University, originally a bilingual institution, had ceased offering courses in the Uyghur language. From 2004 onward, the government policy has been that classes should be conducted in Chinese as much as possible and in some selected regions, instruction in Chinese began in the first grade.[333] A special senior-secondary boarding school program for Uyghurs, the Xinjiang Class, with course work conducted entirely in Chinese was also established in 2000.[334] Many schools have also moved toward using mainly Chinese in the 2010s, with teaching in the Uyghur language limited to only a few hours a week.[335] The level of educational attainment among Uyghurs is generally lower than that of the Han Chinese; this may be due to the cost of education, the lack of proficiency in the Chinese language (now the main medium of instruction) among many Uyghurs, and poorer employment prospects for Uyghur graduates due to job discrimination in favor of Han Chinese.[336][337] Uyghurs in China, unlike the Hui and Salar who are also mostly Muslim, generally do not oppose coeducation,[338] however girls may be withdrawn from school earlier than boys.[316]

Traditional medicine

Uyghur traditional medicine is known as Unani (طب یونانی), as historically used in the Mughal Empire.[339] Sir Percy Sykes described the medicine as "based on the ancient Greek theory" and mentioned how ailments and sicknesses were treated in Through Deserts and Oases of Central Asia.[340] Today, traditional medicine can still be found at street stands. Similar to other traditional medicine, diagnosis is usually made through checking the pulse, symptoms and disease history and then the pharmacist pounds up different dried herbs, making personalized medicines according to the prescription. Modern Uyghur medical hospitals adopted modern medical science and medicine and applied evidence-based pharmaceutical technology to traditional medicines. Historically, Uyghur medical knowledge has contributed to Chinese medicine in terms of medical treatments, medicinal materials and ingredients and symptom detection.[341]

Cuisine

Main article: Uyghur cuisine

Uyghur polu (پولۇ, полу)

Uyghur food shows both Central Asian and Chinese elements. A typical Uyghur dish is polu (or pilaf), a dish found throughout Central Asia. In a common version of the Uyghur polu, carrots and mutton (or chicken) are first fried in oil with onions, then rice and water are added and the whole dish is steamed. Raisins and dried apricots may also be added. Kawaplar (Uyghur: Каваплар) or chuanr (i.e., kebabs or grilled meat) are also found here. Another common Uyghur dish is leghmen (لەغمەن, ләғмән), a noodle dish with a stir-fried topping (säy, from Chinese cai, 菜) usually made from mutton and vegetables, such as tomatoes, onions, green bell peppers, chili peppers and cabbage. This dish is likely to have originated from the Chinese lamian, but its flavor and preparation method are distinctively Uyghur.[342]

Uyghur food (Uyghur Yemekliri, Уйғур Йәмәклири) is characterized by mutton, beef, camel (solely bactrian), chicken, goose, carrots, tomatoes, onions, peppers, eggplant, celery, various dairy foods and fruits.

A Uyghur-style breakfast consists of tea with home-baked bread, hardened yogurt, olives, honey, raisins and almonds. Uyghurs like to treat guests with tea, naan and fruit before the main dishes are ready.

Sangza (ساڭزا, Саңза) are crispy fried wheat flour dough twists, a holiday specialty. Samsa (سامسا, Самса) are lamb pies baked in a special brick oven. Youtazi is steamed multi-layer bread. Göshnan (گۆشنان, Гөшнан) are pan-grilled lamb pies. Pamirdin (Памирдин) are baked pies stuffed with lamb, carrots and onions. Shorpa is lamb soup (شۇرپا, Шорпа). Other dishes include Toghach (Тоғач) (a type of tandoor bread) and Tunurkawab (Тунуркаваб). Girde (Гирде) is also a very popular bagel-like bread with a hard and crispy crust that is soft inside.

A cake sold by Uyghurs is the traditional Uyghur nut cake.[343][344][345]

Clothing

Doppa Maker, traditional Uyghur hats, Kashgar

Chapan, a coat, and doppa, a type of hat for men, is commonly worn by Uyghurs. Another type of headwear, salwa telpek (salwa tälpäk, салва тәлпәк), is also worn by Uyghurs.[346]

In the early 20th century, face covering veils with velvet caps trimmed with otter fur were worn in the streets by Turki women in public in Xinjiang as witnessed by the adventurer Ahmad Kamal in the 1930s.[347] Travelers of the period Sir Percy Sykes and Ella Sykes wrote that in Kashghar women went into the bazar "transacting business with their veils thrown back" but mullahs tried to enforce veil wearing and were "in the habit of beating those who show their face in the Great Bazar".[348] In that period, belonging to different social statuses meant a difference in how rigorously the veil was worn.[349]

Uyghur man having his head shaved in a bazaar. Shaving of head is now seen mostly among the older generations.

Uyghur girl in clothing made of fabric with design distinctive to the Uyghurs

Muslim Turkestani men traditionally cut all the hair off their head.[350] Sir Aurel Stein observed that the "Turki Muhammadan, accustomed to shelter this shaven head under a substantial fur-cap when the temperature is so low as it was just then".[351] No hair cutting for men took place on the ajuz ayyam, days of the year that were considered inauspicious.[352]

Traditional handicrafts

Yengisar is famous for manufacturing Uyghur handcrafted knives.[353][354][355] The Uyghur word for knife is pichaq (پىچاق, пичақ) and the word for knifemaking (cutler) is pichaqchiliq (پىچاقچىلىقى, пичақчилиқ).[356] Uyghur artisan craftsmen in Yengisar are known for their knife manufacture. Uyghur men carry such knives as part of their culture to demonstrate the masculinity of the wearer,[357] but it has also led to ethnic tension.[358][359] Limitations were placed on knife vending due to concerns over terrorism and violent assaults.[360]

Livelihood

Uyghur women on their way to work in Kashgar, 2011

Most Uyghurs are agriculturists.[citation needed] Cultivating crops in an arid region has made the Uyghurs excel in irrigation techniques. This includes the construction and maintenance of underground channels called karez that brings water from the mountains to their fields. A few of the well-known agricultural goods include apples (especially from Ghulja), sweet melons (from Hami), and grapes from Turpan. However, many Uyghurs are also employed in the mining, manufacturing, cotton, and petrochemical industries. Local handicrafts like rug-weaving and jade-carving are also important to the cottage industry of the Uyghurs.[361]

Some Uyghurs have been given jobs through Chinese government affirmative action programs.[362] Uyghurs may also have difficulty receiving non-interest loans (per Islamic beliefs).[363] The general lack of Uyghur proficiency in Mandarin Chinese also creates a barrier to access private and public sector jobs.[364]

Names

Since the arrival of Islam, most Uyghurs have used "Arabic names", but traditional Uyghur names and names of other origin are still used by some.[365] After the establishment of the Soviet Union, many Uyghurs who studied in Soviet Central Asia added Russian suffixes to Russify their surnames.[366] Names from Russia and Europe are used in Qaramay and Ürümqi by part of the population of city-dwelling Uyghurs. Others use names with hard-to-understand etymologies, with the majority dating from the Islamic era and being of Arabic or Persian derivation.[367] Some pre-Islamic Uyghur names are preserved in Turpan and Qumul.[365] The government has banned some two dozen Islamic names.[290]

Who are the Uyghurs and why is China being accused of genocide? - BBC News

are the Uyghurs and why is China being accused of genocide? - BBC NewsBBC HomepageSkip to contentAccessibility HelpYour accountHomeNewsSportBusinessInnovationCultureTravelMore menuMore menuSearch BBCHomeNewsSportBusinessInnovationCultureTravelEarthVideoLiveClose menuBBC NewsMenuHomeIsrael-Gaza warWar in UkraineClimateVideoWorldAsiaUKBusinessTechMoreScienceEntertainment & ArtsHealthWorld News TVIn PicturesBBC VerifyNewsbeatAsiaChinaIndiaWho are the Uyghurs and why is China being accused of genocide?Published24 May 2022Shareclose panelShare pageCopy linkAbout sharingImage source, Getty ImagesImage caption, The Uyghurs are the largest minority ethnic group in China's north-western province of XinjiangChina has been accused of committing crimes against humanity and possibly genocide against the Uyghur population and other mostly-Muslim ethnic groups in the north-western region of Xinjiang.Human rights groups believe China has detained more than one million Uyghurs against their will over the past few years in a large network of what the state calls "re-education camps", and sentenced hundreds of thousands to prison terms.A series of police files obtained by the BBC in 2022 has revealed details of China's use of these camps and described the routine use of armed officers and the existence of a shoot-to-kill policy for those trying to escape.The US is among several countries to have previously accused China of committing genocide in Xinjiang. The leading human rights groups Amnesty and Human Rights Watch have published reports accusing China of crimes against humanity.China denies all allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang. The Chinese government - speaking after details of the Xinjiang Police Files were published - said the peace and prosperity brought to Xinjiang as a result of its anti-terrorism measures were the best response to "all sorts of lies".Image source, GoogleImage caption, Satellite images show rapid construction of camps in Xinjiang, like this one near DabanchengWho are the Uyghurs?There are about 12 million Uyghurs, mostly Muslim, living in Xinjiang, which is officially known as the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).The Uyghurs speak their own language, which is similar to Turkish, and see themselves as culturally and ethnically close to Central Asian nations. They make up less than half of the Xinjiang population.Recent decades have seen a mass migration of Han Chinese (China's ethnic majority) into Xinjiang, allegedly orchestrated by the state to dilute the minority population there.China has also been accused of targeting Muslim religious figures and banning religious practices in the region, as well as destroying mosques and tombs.Uyghur activists say they fear that the group's culture is under threat of erasure.More on this storyImams targeted in China's Xinjiang crackdownUighur camp detainees allege systematic rapeThe cost of speaking up against ChinaChina 'has created dystopian hellscape in Xinjiang'China's 'tainted' cotton Where is Xinjiang?Xinjiang lies in the north-west of China and is the country's largest region. Like Tibet, it is autonomous, meaning - in theory - it has some powers of self-governance. But in practice, both regions are subjected to major restrictions by the central government.Xinjiang is a mostly desert region and produces about a fifth of the world's cotton. Human rights groups have voiced concerns that much of that cotton export is picked by forced labour, and in 2021 some Western brands removed Xinjiang cotton from their supply chains, leading to a backlash against the brands from Chinese celebrities and netizens.In December 2020, research seen by the BBC showed that up to half a million people were being forced to pick cotton in Xinjiang. There is evidence that new factories have been built within the grounds of the re-education camps. The region is also rich in oil and natural gas and because of its proximity to Central Asia and Europe is seen by Beijing as an important trade link.In the early 20th Century, the Uyghurs briefly declared independence for the region but it was brought under the complete control of China's new Communist government in 1949.Image source, Getty ImagesImage caption, Uyghur women pick cotton in Xinjiang. Rights groups have voiced concerns about forced labour in the regionWhat are the allegations against China?Several countries, including the US, UK, Canada and the Netherlands, have accused China of committing genocide - defined by international convention as the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group".The declarations follow reports that, as well as interning Uyghurs in camps, China has been forcibly mass sterilising Uyghur women to suppress the population, separating children from their families, and attempting to break the cultural traditions of the group.The US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, has said China is committing "genocide and crimes against humanity".The UK parliament declared in April 2021 that China was committing a genocide in Xinjiang.A UN human rights committee in 2018 said it had credible reports that China was holding up to a million people in "counter-extremism centres" in Xinjiang.The Australian Strategic Policy Institute found evidence in 2020 of more than 380 of these "re-education camps" in Xinjiang, an increase of 40% on previous estimates.Analysis of data contained in the latest police documents, called the Xinjiang Police Files, showed that almost 23,000 residents - or more than 12% of the adult population of one county - were in a camp or prison in the years 2017 and 2018. If applied to Xinjiang as a whole, the figures would mean the detention of more than 1.2 million Uyghur and other Turkic minority adults.The UK Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said the files contained "shocking details of China's human rights violations".This video can not be playedTo play this video you need to enable JavaScript in your browser.Media caption, In 2018, the BBC found all reporting was tightly controlledEarlier, leaked documents known as the China Cables made clear that the camps were intended to be run as high security prisons, with strict discipline and punishments.People who have managed to escape the camps have reported physical, mental and sexual torture. Women have spoken of mass rape and sexual abuse.What was the build-up to the crackdown?Anti-Han and separatist sentiment rose in Xinjiang from the 1990s, sometimes flaring into violence. In 2009 about 200 people died in clashes in Xinjiang, which the Chinese blamed on Uyghurs who wanted their own state. But in recent years a massive security crackdown has crushed dissent.Xinjiang is now covered by a pervasive network of surveillance, including police, checkpoints, and cameras that scan everything from number plates to individual faces. According to Human Rights Watch, police are also using a mobile app to monitor people's behaviour, such as how much electricity they are using and how often they use their front door. Since 2017, when President Xi Jinping issued an order saying all religions in China should be Chinese in orientation, there have been further crackdowns. Campaigners say China is trying to eradicate Uyghur culture.The Xinjiang Police Files, which all date from before 2019, shed further light on Uyghurs being punished for alleged crimes that took place years ago. Many appear to have been targeted for their mobile phone use, for listening to "illegal lectures" or not using their phones enough, which is regarded as a sign the user is trying to evade digital surveillance. This video can not be playedTo play this video you need to enable JavaScript in your browser.Media caption, China's ambassador: "There is no such concentration camp in Xinjiang"What does China say?China denies all allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang. In response to the Xinjiang Police Files, China's foreign ministry spokesman told the BBC that the documents were "the latest example of anti-China voices trying to smear China". He said Xinjiang enjoyed stability and prosperity and residents were living happy, fulfilled lives.China says the crackdown in Xinjiang is necessary to prevent terrorism and root out Islamist extremism and the camps are an effective tool for re-educating inmates in its fight against terrorism. It insists that Uyghur militants are waging a violent campaign for an independent state by plotting bombings, sabotage and civic unrest, but it is accused of exaggerating the threat in order to justify repression of the Uyghurs.China has dismissed claims it is trying to reduce the Uyghur population through mass sterilisations as "baseless", and says allegations of forced labour are "completely fabricated". Related TopicsXinjiangReligionUyghursMore on this storyChina 'has created dystopian hellscape' in XinjiangPublished10 June 2021Uyghur imams targeted in China's Xinjiang crackdownPublished13 May 2021The cost of speaking up against ChinaPublished31 March 2021Uighur camp detainees allege systematic rapePublished2 February 2021Top StoriesRosenberg: Russia's stage-managed electionPublished8 hours ago'Every day felt like an eternity' - freed Israeli hostage. 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Who The Uyghurs Are And Why China Is Targeting Them NPR's history podcast Throughline bring us the story of why the Uyghur people have become the target of what many are calling a genocide in China.

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Who The Uyghurs Are And Why China Is Targeting Them

May 31, 20214:25 PM ET

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Ramtin Arablouei

Rund Abdelfatah

Who The Uyghurs Are And Why China Is Targeting Them

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TranscriptNPR's history podcast Throughline bring us the story of why the Uyghur people have become the target of what many are calling a genocide in China. MARY LOUISE KELLY, HOST: The Uyghurs are a Muslim minority in China, living in Xinjiang province at a crossroads of culture and empire. Today it's estimated that more than 1 million Uyghur people have been detained in camps, camps where they have been subjected to torture, forced labor, religious restrictions, even forced sterilization. Rund Abdelfatah and Ramtin Arablouei, the hosts of NPR's history podcast Throughline, bring us the story of why the Uyghur people have become the target of what many are calling a genocide. We start with 9/11.(SOUNDBITE OF ARCHIVED NPR BROADCAST)ABDUWELI AYUP: One Chinese girl, about 8 years old - she said, are you Osama bin Laden?RUND ABDELFATAH: This is Abduweli Ayup, a Uyghur activist and poet.AYUP: I just looked at her. Like, her eyes are very innocent. And I ask that, why do you say that? And she said, you are different with us. You look different. You look like bin Laden. I explained to her, even though she's young. I explained that, no, I'm not bin Laden. Bin Laden is far away. He's in Afghanistan. And he's Arab, and he's extremist. And I'm a university professor. For me, before Chinese public, they misunderstood Uyghur. It's because of ignorance. They don't know. They are innocent. But after the September 11, it changed their mindset. And in their mindset, Uyghur represented terrorist.ABDELFATAH: Nine-eleven - the day we here in the United States know all too well. But what's easy to forget is that the event didn't just impact the U.S. or Afghanistan or the Middle East. In China, 9/11 triggered a major shift in the Chinese Communist Party's view of the Uyghur people.SEAN ROBERTS: Almost immediately after September 11, the Chinese government produced a lot of documents suggesting that it faced a serious terrorist threat from Uyghurs.RAMTIN ARABLOUEI: This is Sean Roberts. He's a professor at George Washington University and author of the book "The War On The Uyghurs."ROBERTS: These documents were somewhat fanciful and unbelievable. They tried to link about 40 diaspora groups from Europe, U.S. and Turkey to a network of terrorists funded by al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden. For about a year, the U.S. and other countries mostly ignore these claims. In fact, the U.S. even pushes back on them, saying, you know, the Uyghur issue is not a counterterrorism issue. It's an issue about minority rights and human rights. But suddenly, in the summer of 2002, the U.S. recognizes one group from this litany of diaspora organizations in the Chinese government documents as being a terrorist organization linked with Osama bin Laden and al-Qaida.ARABLOUEI: The Uyghurs were not only othered. They found themselves on the receiving end of China's war on terror.ROBERTS: You do see after that kind of a license given to the state to more overtly kind of use this idea of counterterrorism as justifying their policies in the region.ARABLOUEI: The CCP started a campaign in Xinjiang against what they called the three evils.AYUP: Terrorism, extremism and separatism.ARABLOUEI: Terrorism, extremism and separatism - that last one, separatism, it also included a subtle but important twist.AYUP: Ideological separatism.ARABLOUEI: Ideological separatism - that allowed the government to cast any acts of Uyghur cultural expression as separatism. This meant there would be...AYUP: Ideological surveillance - for example, restrict books about Uyghur history and Uyghur culture and restrict the songs and expression about - promote Uyghur culture and Uyghur language.ARABLOUEI: This continued throughout the 2000s until...AYUP: What happened? July 5 happened.ROBERTS: There's these ethnic riots that break out in the capital of this region in Urumqi in the summer of 2009.ARABLOUEI: Riots between Uyghurs and Han Chinese, China's ethnic and cultural majority, sparked by an incident at a toy factory.AYUP: Uyghur workers and the Chinese workers - there's a clash happen. Uyghur died.ROBERTS: And they're killed by a mob of Han workers who are influenced by an unsubstantiated rumor on the internet that Uyghurs had raped a Han woman in the factory.AYUP: And then Uyghur students in Xinjiang University, they posted that we are going to demonstrate.ROBERTS: They hold a protest in Urumqi asking for justice be given to these Uyghurs who had been killed.(SOUNDBITE OF PROTEST AMBIENCE)ROBERTS: What happens next is the security forces come in and suppress those protests. And gradually, it spirals out of control into ethnic violence on both sides. So you have Uyghur-on-Han violence and Han-on-Uyghur violence that continues for about three days in July of 2009.ARABLOUEI: Government reports say at least 192 people died and more than a thousand were injured. And as a result of this incident, the CCP began a more brutal crackdown on the Uyghurs.ROBERTS: And the government is looking for people who are religious nationalists, identifying them as the problem.ARABLOUEI: These policies help continue the cycle of violence - repression from the government, violence from some Uyghurs. There was a series of terrorist attacks in the mid-2010s. Then in 2017, reports started coming out that there was something new happening in Xinjiang, something darker than what had come before. There were allegations that camps were established by the CCP where thousands of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities were being detained.ABDELFATAH: Today it is widely reported that over a million Uyghur and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang have been, quote-unquote, "re-educated" at internment camps. The United States recently sanctioned Chinese government officials over the treatment of the Uyghur people.ROBERTS: I refer to it as cultural genocide because they essentially are trying to sever this group's attachment to the territory so the state can develop this area and breaking the solidarity of the people and erasing their culture so that, in effect, they're destroying the people as we know them.KELLY: That was Sean Roberts speaking with Throughline hosts Rund Abdelfatah and Ramtin Arablouei. You can listen to the whole episode wherever you listen to podcasts.Copyright © 2021 NPR. All rights reserved. Visit our website terms of use and permissions pages at www.npr.org for further information.NPR transcripts are created on a rush deadline by an NPR contractor. This text may not be in its final form and may be updated or revised in the future. Accuracy and availability may vary. The authoritative record of NPR’s programming is the audio record.FacebookFlipboardEmailRead & ListenHomeNewsCultureMusicPodcasts & ShowsConnectNewslettersFacebookInstagramPressPublic EditorCorrectionsContact & HelpAbout NPROverviewDiversityNPR NetworkAccessibilityEthicsFinancesGet InvolvedSupport Public RadioSponsor NPRNPR CareersNPR ShopNPR EventsNPR ExtraTerms of UsePrivacyYour Privacy ChoicesText Only Sponsor MessageBecome an NPR sponsor<h2>Persecution of Uyghurs in China - Wikipedia</h2>Persecution of Uyghurs in China - WikipediaJump to contentMain menuMain menumove to sidebarhide Navigation Main pageContentsCurrent eventsRandom articleAbout WikipediaContact usDonate Contribute HelpLearn to editCommunity portalRecent changesUpload fileSearchSearchCreate accountLog inPersonal tools Create account Log in Pages for logged out editors learn moreContributionsTalkContentsmove to sidebarhide(Top)1BackgroundToggle Background subsection1.1Uyghur identity1.2Xinjiang conflict1.2.1Imperial China1.2.2Republican Era (1912–1949)1.2.3People's Republic of China (1949–present)2Government policiesToggle Government policies subsection2.1Initial "Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism"2.2Regulations since 20172.3Propaganda campaign2.3.1Counter-terrorism justification3Cultural effectsToggle Cultural effects subsection3.1Mosques3.2Education3.3Detained academics and religious figures3.4Cemeteries3.5Marriage3.6Clothing3.7Children's names4Human rights abusesToggle Human rights abuses subsection4.1Inside internment camps4.1.1Mass detention4.1.2Torture4.1.3Compulsory sterilizations and contraception4.1.4Brainwashing4.1.5Forced labor4.1.6Medical experiments4.1.7Organized mass rape and sexual torture4.2Outside internment camps4.2.1IUDs and birth control4.2.2Forced cohabitation, co-sleeping, rape, and abortion4.2.3Organ harvesting allegations and concerns4.2.4Forced labor4.3Outside China5Use of biometric and surveillance technologyToggle Use of biometric and surveillance technology subsection5.1Biometric data5.2GPS tracking of cars6Classification of abusesToggle Classification of abuses subsection6.1Ethnocide or cultural genocide6.2Genocide6.3Crimes against humanity6.4Settler colonialism6.5View of discourse7International responsesToggle International responses subsection7.1Reactions by supranational organizations7.1.1Reactions at the United Nations7.1.2Reactions at the European Union7.2Reactions by country7.2.1Africa7.2.2Americas7.2.2.1Canada7.2.2.2United States7.2.3Asia7.2.3.1Middle East7.2.4Qatar7.2.5Israel7.2.5.1Post-Soviet states7.2.5.2South Asia7.2.5.2.1Pakistan7.2.5.3Southeast Asia7.2.5.4Turkey7.2.6Europe7.2.6.1Belgium7.2.6.2Czech Republic7.2.6.3France7.2.6.4Finland7.2.6.5Lithuania7.2.6.6Netherlands7.2.6.7Ukraine7.2.6.8United Kingdom7.2.7Oceania7.2.7.1Australia7.2.7.2New Zealand7.3Other reactions7.3.1Domestic reaction7.3.2Non-governmental organizations and research institutions7.3.3Uyghur Tribunal7.3.4Multinational corporations7.3.5Religious groups7.3.6Protests7.3.6.12022 Winter Olympics Boycott7.3.7Legal cases7.3.8Publications8Denial of abuses9See also10Explanatory notes11ReferencesToggle References subsection11.1Citations11.2General and cited sources12External linksToggle the table of contentsPersecution of Uyghurs in China39 languagesالعربيةAzərbaycancaتۆرکجهCatalàČeštinaCymraegDeutschΕλληνικάEspañolفارسیFrançais한국어ՀայերենBahasa IndonesiaItalianoעבריתҚазақшаNederlands日本語Oʻzbekcha / ўзбекчаپنجابیPolskiPortuguêsРусскийSarduSimple EnglishSlovenščinaŚlůnskiSuomiSvenskaதமிழ்ไทยTürkçeУкраїнськаاردوئۇيغۇرچە / UyghurcheTiếng Việt粵語中文Edit linksArticleTalkEnglishReadView sourceView historyToolsToolsmove to sidebarhide Actions ReadView sourceView history General What links hereRelated changesUpload fileSpecial pagesPermanent linkPage informationCite this pageGet shortened URLDownload QR codeWikidata item Print/export Download as PDFPrintable version In other projects Wikimedia CommonsFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaSeries of human rights abuses against an ethnic group in Western China"Xinjiang genocide" redirects here. For the 1750s genocide that also occurred in Xinjiang, see Dzungar genocide.Persecution of Uyghurs in ChinaPart of the Xinjiang conflictDetainees listening to speeches in a camp in Lop County, Xinjiang, April 2017Xinjiang, highlighted red, shown within ChinaLocationXinjiang, ChinaDate2014–presentTargetUyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other Turkic MuslimsAttack typeInternment, forced abortion, forced sterilization, forced birth control, forced labor, torture, brainwashing, alleged rape (including gang rape)Victimsest. ≥1 million detainedPerpetratorGovernment of the People's Republic of ChinaMotiveCounterterrorism (official)Sinicization, Islamophobia,[1] and suppression of political dissentPart of a series onGenocideIssuesList of genocidesGenocides in historyEffects on youthDenialMassacreRapeIncitementIn relation to Colonialism / WarPerpetrators, victims, and bystandersPreventionPsychologyRecognition politicsRisk factorsStagesTypesAnti-IndigenousCulturalUtilitarianStudiesOutlineBibliography15th–19th century genocidesTaínoDzungarCircassianBlack WarMorioriNative AmericanCaliforniaPutumayoSelk'namEarly 20th century genocidesHerero and NamaGreekDiyarbekirSayfoArmenianLibyanWorld War II (1939–1945)The HolocaustRomaniPolesSerbsCroats and MuslimsCold War (1940s–1991)BangladeshIkizaEast TimorCambodianGuatemalanIsaaqContemporary genocidesBosnianRwandanEffacer le tableauDarfurYazidiIraqi TurkmenRohingyaRelated topicsAnfal campaignAnti-communist mass killingsIndonesia 1965–66Atrocities in the Congo Free StateCompulsory sterilizationDemocideEthnic cleansingEthnocideForced assimilationMass killings under communist regimesHolodomor / genocide questionMassacre of Arabs during the Zanzibar RevolutionGukurahundiMassacres of Hutus during the First Congo War2023 Israeli genocide accusationPalestinian genocide accusation2023 Israeli attack on GazaPersecution of Uyghurs in ChinaPredictions of a genocide in 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benchesInternmentJewish quotaLaw for Protection of the NationMSM blood donation restrictionsNonpersonsNumerus clausus (as religious or racial quota)One-drop ruleRacial quotaRacial segregationJim Crow lawsNuremberg LawsRacial steeringRedliningSame-sex marriage (laws and issues prohibiting)SegregationageracialreligioussexualSocial exclusionSodomy lawState atheismState religionUgly lawVoter suppressionCountermeasuresAffirmative actionAnti-discrimination lawCultural assimilationCultural pluralismDiversity trainingEmpowermentFat acceptance movementFeminismFighting DiscriminationHate speech laws by countryHuman rightsIntersex human rightsLGBT rightsMasculismMulticulturalismNonviolenceRacial integrationReappropriationSelf-determinationSocial integrationTolerationRelated topicsAllophiliaAmatonormativityBiasChristian privilegeCivil libertiesDehumanizationDiversityEthnic penaltyEugenicsFigleafHeteronormativityInternalized oppressionIntersectionalityMale privilegeMasculismMedical model of disabilityautismMulticulturalismNet biasNeurodiversityOikophobiaOppressionPolice brutalityPolitical correctnessPolyculturalismPower distancePrejudicePrisoner abuseRacial bias in criminal news in the United StatesRacism by countryReligious intoleranceSecond-generation gender biasSnobberySocial exclusionSocial identity threatSocial model of disabilitySocial stigmaSpeciesismStereotypethreatThe talkWhite privilegevteHistory of thePeople's Republic of China1949–1976Mao eraRevolutionProclamationKorean WarLand Reform MovementZhen FanThree-anti and Five-antiFive Principles of Peaceful CoexistenceBandung ConferenceSufanHundred FlowersAnti-RightistTwo Bombs, One SatelliteGreat Leap Forward(Great Chinese Famine)Seven Thousand Cadres ConferenceSocialist Education MovementCultural RevolutionRestoring legitimate seat in the UN1972 visit by Richard Nixon to China1976–1989Transition and Deng eraArrest of the Gang of FourBoluan Fanzheng1978 Truth Criterion ControversyMessage to Compatriots in Taiwan [zh]Reforms and Opening-upEstablishment of China-US Relations (Three Communiques)Four ModernizationsSino-Vietnamese WarBeijing SpringStrike Hard Anti-crime CampaignSino-British Joint DeclarationCampaign against spiritual pollutionBourgeois liberalizationAnti-bourgeois liberalization863 Program1986 Chinese student demonstrationsSino-Portuguese Joint DeclarationRevolutions of 19891989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre1989–2002Jiang and the third generationDeng Xiaoping's southern tour1992 consensusOne country, two systems Hong KongMacau1998 China floodsEmbassy in Belgrade BombedPersecution of Falun GongChina Western DevelopmentHainan Island incidentBidding Beijing 2008Joining WTO2002–2012Hu and the fourth generation2002–2004 SARS outbreakShenzhou 5South–North Water Transfer ProjectQinghai-Tibet RailwaySichuan earthquakeBeijing OlympicsShanghai 2010 ExpoThree Gorges DamWest–East Gas PipelineChinese High-speed RailwayLiaoning Aircraft Carrier2012–present Xi and the fifth generationAnti-corruption campaignBelt and Road InitiativeChang'e 3China SupercomputingXinjiang internment campsPersecution of Uyghurs in ChinaChina–United States trade warChinese Space Station2019–20 Hong Kong protestsCOVID-19 pandemicHong Kong national security law2020–2021 reform spreeBeijing 2022 Winter Olympic GamesHistory ofChinaPRC constitutionBeijingShanghaiCultureEconomyEducationGeographyPolitics China portalvtePart of a series on theHistory of XinjiangAncient periodTochariansYuezhiXiongnuWestern Regions(Han Protectorate; Chief Officials)Kingdom of KhotanFormer LiangFormer QinLater LiangWestern LiangGaochangRouranFirst Turkic KhaganateWestern Turkic KhaganateEastern Turkic KhaganateSecond Turkic KhaganateMedieval and early modern periodTang Protectorates (West; Beiting)Tibetan EmpireUyghur KhaganateKara-Khanid KhanateKingdom of QochoQara KhitaiMongol Empire (Yuan; Chagatai Khanate)Moghulistan (Turpan; Yarkent)Ming ruled Kara DelDzungar KhanateKumul KhanateYettisharQing rule(Dzungar genocideDungan RevoltQing reconquest)Modern periodXinjiang Province, Republic of China(Xinjiang clique1st East Turkestan Republic2nd East Turkestan Republic)Xinjiang Province, People's Republic of ChinaXinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region(Production and Construction CorpsXinjiang conflictXinjiang internment camps / Persecution of Uyghurs in China)vtePart of a series onUyghursTimelineHistoryXinjiangEast TurkestanFlagNationalismLiteratureList of UyghursUyghur language Alphabets Dialects Arabic alphabet Cyrillic alphabet Latin alphabet Grammar New Script PhonologyUyghur culture Dervishi Doppa Cultural Festival Etles silk The Girl from Dabancheng Lift Your Veil Meshrep Muqam Qurtulush Yolida Tianshan Snow Lotus Group UyghurlarUyghur cuisine Chorba Cut cake Dapanji Joshpara Laghman Manti Naan Samsa Sangza Tandyr nan YoutaziPersecution of Uyghurs in China China Cables Civil Servant-Family Pair Up Xinjiang internment camps Strike Hard Campaign Uyghur TribunalUyghurs outside of Xinjiang Beijing Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Pakistan Turkey United StatesUyghur organizations East Turkistan Government-in-Exile East Turkistan National Awakening Movement Uyghur American Association Uyghur Human Rights Project World Uyghur CongressvteThe Chinese government is committing a series of ongoing human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in Xinjiang that is often characterized as persecution or as genocide. Beginning in 2014, the Chinese government, under the administration of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping, incarcerated more than an estimated one million Turkic Muslims without any legal process in internment camps. Operations from 2016 to 2021 were led by Xinjiang CCP Secretary Chen Quanguo.[2] It is the largest-scale detention of ethnic and religious minorities since World War II.[3][4] The Chinese government began to wind down the camps in 2019. Amnesty International states that detainees have been increasingly transferred to the formal penal system.In addition to the arbitrary detention of Uyghurs in state-sponsored camps, government policies have included forced labor,[5][6] suppression of Uyghur religious practices,[7] political indoctrination,[8] forced sterilization,[9] forced contraception,[10][11] and forced abortion.[12][13] Experts estimate that, since 2017, some sixteen thousand mosques have been razed or damaged,[2] and hundreds of thousands of children have been forcibly separated from their parents and sent to boarding schools.[14][15] Chinese government statistics reported that from 2015 to 2018, birth rates in the mostly Uyghur regions of Hotan and Kashgar fell by more than 60%.[9] In the same period, the birth rate of the whole country decreased by 9.69%.[16] Chinese authorities acknowledged that birth rates dropped by almost a third in 2018 in Xinjiang, but denied reports of forced sterilization and genocide.[17] Birth rates in Xinjiang fell a further 24% in 2019, compared to a nationwide decrease of 4.2%.[9]These actions have been described as the forced assimilation of Xinjiang, or as an ethnocide or cultural genocide,[18][19] or as genocide. Those accusing China of genocide point to intentional acts committed by the Chinese government that they say run afoul of Article II of the Genocide Convention,[20][21][22] which prohibits "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part," a "racial or religious group" including "causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" and "measures intended to prevent births within the group".[23]The Chinese government denies having committed human rights abuses in Xinjiang.[3][24] In an assessment by the UN Human Rights Office, the United Nations (UN) stated that China's policies and actions in the Xinjiang region may be crimes against humanity, although it did not use the term genocide.[25][26] International reactions have varied. In 2020, 39 UN member states issued statements to the United Nations Human Rights Council criticizing China's policies, while 45 countries supported China's "deradicalization measures in Xinjiang" and opposed "the politicization of human rights issues and double standards".[27] In December 2020, a case brought to the International Criminal Court was dismissed because the crimes alleged appeared to have been "committed solely by nationals of China within the territory of China, a State which is not a party to the Statute", meaning the ICC could not investigate them.[28][29] The United States has declared the human rights abuses a genocide, announcing its finding on January 19, 2021, though the United States Department of State found that there is insufficient evidence to support that characterization.[30][31] Legislatures in several countries have since passed non-binding motions describing China's actions as genocide, including the House of Commons of Canada,[32] the Dutch parliament,[33] the House of Commons of the United Kingdom,[34] the Seimas of Lithuania,[35] and the French National Assembly.[36] Other parliaments, such as those in New Zealand,[37] Belgium,[38] and the Czech Republic condemned the Chinese government's treatment of Uyghurs as "severe human rights abuses" or crimes against humanity.[39]BackgroundSee also: Islam in China, History of Xinjiang, and East Turkestan independence movementA Uyghur man from Kashgar, a city in Xinjiang, China.Uyghur identityMain article: UyghursSee also: Racism in ChinaUyghurs are a Turkic ethnic group native to Xinjiang. They are distinct from the Han Chinese, the predominant ethnic group in China.[40] Uyghurs are the second-largest predominantly Muslim ethnicity in China, after the Hui, and Sunni Islam is an important aspect of Uyghur identity.[40] The Uyghur language has around 10 million speakers and is shared with other minority groups in the region.[41]Xinjiang conflictMain article: Xinjiang conflictBoth Uyghurs and the predominantly Han government lay claim to Xinjiang.[42] This prompted an ethnic conflict featuring resistance and sporadic violence as Uyghurs sought greater autonomy.[43] Sinologists Anna Hayes and Michael Clarke have described Xinjiang as undergoing a process of transition as the Chinese government attempted to transform it from a frontier region to an "integral" province of a unitary Chinese state.[44]Imperial ChinaFurther information: Xinjiang under Qing ruleHistorically, certain Chinese dynasties exerted control over parts of modern-day Xinjiang.[45] The region came under Chinese rule as a result of the westward expansion of the Manchu-led Qing dynasty during the 1700s, which also saw the conquests of Tibet and Mongolia.[46] Xinjiang was a peripheral part of the Qing empire and briefly regained independence during the Dungan Revolt (1862–1877).[47] The Uyghur population participated in the Dzungar genocide, resulting in the Qianlong emperor granting them permission to resettle in the former territories of Dzungaria.[48][49]Republican Era (1912–1949)The region was semi-autonomous during the Republic of China's Warlord Era (1916–1928), with parts controlled by the Kumul Khanate, the Ma Clique and later the warlord Jin Shuren.[50][page needed] In 1933, the breakaway First East Turkestan Republic was established in the Kumul Rebellion,[51] but was conquered the following year by warlord Sheng Shicai with the help of Soviet aid.[52] In 1944, the Ili Rebellion led to the establishment of the Second East Turkestan Republic, which was dependent on the Soviet Union until it was absorbed into the People's Republic of China in 1949.[53]People's Republic of China (1949–present)Present day map of Xinjiang and its internal and external bordersFrom the 1950s to the 1970s, the Chinese government sponsored a mass migration of Han Chinese to Xinjiang and introduced policies designed to suppress cultural identity and religion in the region.[54] During this period, Uyghur independence organizations emerged with some support from the Soviet Union, with the East Turkestan People's Party being the largest in 1968.[55] During the 1970s, the Soviets supported the United Revolutionary Front of East Turkestan (URFET) against the Han Chinese.[56]During the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping, the PRC pursued a new policy of cultural liberalization in Xinjiang and adopted a flexible language policy nationally.[57] Despite a positive response among party officials and minority groups, the Chinese government viewed this policy as unsuccessful and from the mid-1980s its official pluralistic language policy became increasingly subordinate to a covert policy of minority assimilation motivated by geopolitical concerns.[58] Consequently, and in Xinjiang particularly, multilingualism and cultural pluralism were restricted to favor a "monolingual, monocultural model", which in turn helped to embed and strengthen an oppositional Uyghur identity.[59] Attempts by the Chinese state to encourage economic development in the region by exploiting natural resources led to ethnic tension and discontent within Xinjiang over the region's lack of autonomy.[60] In April 1990, a violent uprising in Barin, near Kashgar, was suppressed by the People's Liberation Army (PLA), involving a large number of deaths.[60][2][61] Writing in 1998, political scientist Barry Sautman considered policies designed to reduce inequality between Han Chinese and ethnic minorities in Xinjiang unsuccessful at eliminating conflicts because they were shaped by the "paternalistic and hierarchical approach to ethnic relations adopted by the Chinese government".[62]In February 1997, a police roundup and execution of 30 suspected "separatists" during Ramadan led to large demonstrations, which led to a PLA crackdown on protesters resulting in at least nine deaths in what became known as the Ghulja incident.[63] The Ürümqi bus bombings later that month killed nine people and injured 68, with Uyghur exile groups claiming responsibility.[64] In March 1997, a bus bomb killed two people, with responsibility claimed by Uyghur separatists and the Turkey-based "Organisation for East Turkistan Freedom".[65]The July 2009 Ürümqi riots, which resulted in over one hundred deaths, broke out in response to the Shaoguan incident, a violent dispute between Uyghur and Han Chinese factory workers.[66] Following the riots, Uyghur terrorists killed dozens of Han Chinese in coordinated attacks from 2009 to 2016.[67][68] These included the September 2009 Xinjiang unrest,[69] the 2011 Hotan attack,[70] the 2014 Kunming attack,[71] the April 2014 Ürümqi attack,[72] and the May 2014 Ürümqi attack.[73] The attacks were conducted by Uyghur separatists, with some orchestrated by the Turkistan Islamic Party (a UN-designated terrorist organization, formerly called the East Turkistan Islamic Movement).[74]Following the Ürümqi riots, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan denounced the "savagery" being inflicted on the Uyghur community and called for an end of the Chinese government's attempts to forcibly assimilate the community. Later at the Group of Eight summit in Italy, Erdogan called upon Chinese authorities to intervene to protect the community and stated that "The incidents in China are, simply put, a genocide. There's no point in interpreting this otherwise."[75][76] As a result of Erdogan's statements, China's relations with Turkey deteriorated temporarily.[77][78]Government policiesXinjiang police job advertisements by yearNumber of "re-education" related government procurement bids in XinjiangInitial "Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism"Main article: Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent TerrorismDuring the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Chinese state began to emphasize weiwen (stability maintenance) which led to an intensification of repression across the country. Some within the Party warned that increased action to combat instability which might not even exist could lead to a spiral of repression and unrest.[2]In April 2010, after the July 2009 Ürümqi riots, Zhang Chunxian replaced the former CCP secretary Wang Lequan, who had been behind religious policies in Xinjiang for 14 years.[79] Following the unrest, party theorists began to call for implementing a more monocultural society with a single "state-race" which would allow China to become "a new type of superpower". Policies to further this goal were first implemented by Zhang Chunxian. Following an attack in Yunnan Province, Xi Jinping told the politburo "We should unite the people to build a copper and iron wall against terrorism", and "Make terrorists like rats scurrying across the street, with everybody shouting, 'Beat them!'" In April 2014, Xi traveled to Xinjiang and told police in Kashgar that "We must be as harsh as them, and show absolutely no mercy." A suicide bombing occurred in Ürümqi on the last day of his visit.[2]In 2014, a secret meeting of CCP leadership was held in Beijing to find a solution to the problem, which would become known as the Strike Hard Campaign Against Violent Terrorism.[2] In May 2014, China publicly launched the campaign in Xinjiang in response to growing tensions between the Han Chinese and the Uyghur populations of Xinjiang.[80][81] In announcing the campaign, CCP general secretary Xi Jinping stated that "practice has proved that our party's ruling strategy in Xinjiang is correct and must be maintained in the long run".[82]In 2016, there was a brief window of opportunity for Uyghurs with passports to leave China; many did so but had to leave relatives and children without passports behind. Many of these families have not been reunited.[83]Following guidance from Beijing, CCP leadership in Xinjiang commenced a "People's War" against the "Three Evil Forces" of separatism, terrorism, and extremism. They deployed two hundred thousand party cadres to Xinjiang and launched the Civil Servant-Family Pair Up program. Xi was dissatisfied with the initial results of the People's War and replaced Zhang Chunxian with Chen Quanguo in 2016. Following his appointment Chen oversaw the recruitment of tens of thousands of additional police officers and the division of society into three categories: trusted, average, and untrustworthy. He instructed his subordinates to "Take this crackdown as the top project", and "to preempt the enemy, to strike at the outset".[2]Regulations since 2017Further information: Xinjiang internment campsFollowing a meeting with Xi in Beijing, Chen Quanguo held a rally in Ürümqi with ten thousand troops, helicopters, and armored vehicles. As they paraded he announced a "smashing, obliterating offensive," and declared that they would "bury the corpses of terrorists and terror gangs in the vast sea of the People's War." He ordered them to "Round up everyone who should be rounded up," and by April 2017 mass arrests had begun.[2]New bans and regulations were implemented on April 1, 2017. Abnormally long beards and the wearing of veils in public were both banned. Not watching state-run television or listening to radio broadcasts, refusing to abide by family planning policies, or refusing to allow one's children to attend state-run schools were all prohibited.[84]In 2017, China's Ministry of Public Security began to procure race-based monitoring systems which could reportedly identify whether or not an individual was Uyghur. Despite its questionable accuracy, this allowed a "Uyghur alarm" to be added to surveillance systems. Enhanced border controls were also implemented with guilt being presumed in the absence of evidence, according to Zhu Hailun, who said, "If suspected terrorism cannot be ruled out, then a border control should be implemented to insure the person's arrest".[2]In 2017, 73% of foreign journalists in China reported being restricted or prohibited from reporting in Xinjiang, up from 42% in 2016.[85]Alleged "re-education" efforts began in 2014 and were expanded in 2017.[86][87] Chen ordered that the camps "be managed like the military and defended like a prison".[2] At this time, internment camps were built for the housing of students of the "re-education" programs, most of whom were Uyghurs. The Chinese government did not acknowledge their existence until 2018 and called them "vocational education and training centers".[86][88] From 2019, the government began referring to them as "vocational training centers". The camps tripled in size from 2018 to 2019 despite the Chinese government stating that most of the detainees had been released.[86]The use of these centers appears to have ended in 2019 following international pressure.[89] Academic Kerry Brown attributes their closures beginning in late 2019 to the expense required to operate them.[90]: 138 Although no comprehensive independent surveys of such centers have been performed as of October 2022, spot checks by journalists have found such sites converted or abandoned.[89] In 2022, a Washington Post reporter checked a dozen sites previously identified as reeducation centers and found "[m]ost of them appeared to be empty or converted, with several sites labeled as coronavirus quarantine facilities, teachers' schools and vocational schools."[89]Propaganda campaignThe Chinese government has engaged in a propaganda campaign to defend its actions in Xinjiang.[91][92][93][94] China initially denied the existence of the Xinjiang internment camps and attempted to cover up their existence.[95] In 2018, after widespread reporting forced it to admit that the Xinjiang internment camps exist, the Chinese government initiated a campaign to portray the camps as humane and to deny that human rights abuses occurred in Xinjiang.[96] In 2020 and 2021, the propaganda campaign expanded due to rising international backlash against government policies in Xinjiang,[97] with the Chinese government worrying that it no longer had control of the narrative.[95]Chinese authorities have responded to allegations of abuse by Uyghur women by mounting attacks on their credibility and character. This included the disclosure of confidential medical data and personal information in an attempt to slander witnesses and undermine their testimony.[98] The goal of these attacks appeared to be to silence further criticism, rather than to refute specific claims made by critics.[99] Presentations given by Xinjiang's publicity department and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to dispel allegations of abuse are closed to foreign journalists and feature pre-recorded questions as well as pre-recorded monologues from people in Xinjiang, including relatives of witnesses.[98]Chinese government propaganda attacks have also targeted international journalists covering human rights abuses in Xinjiang.[100][101][102] After providing coverage critical of Chinese government abuses in Xinjiang, BBC News reporter John Sudworth was subjected to a campaign of propaganda and harassment by Chinese state-affiliated and CCP-affiliated media.[100][103][104] The public attacks resulted in Sudworth and his wife Yvonne Murray, who reports for Raidió Teilifís Éireann, fleeing China for Taiwan fearing for their safety.[103][105]The Chinese government has used social media as a part of its extensive propaganda campaign.[92][106][107][108] China has spent heavily to purchase Facebook advertisements in order to spread propaganda designed to incite doubt on the existence and scope of human rights violations occurring within Xinjiang.[92][108][109] Douyin, the mainland Chinese sister app to ByteDance-owned social media app TikTok, presents users with significant amounts of Chinese state propaganda pertaining to the human rights abuses in Xinjiang.[106][110][111] Between July 2019 and early August 2019, CCP-owned tabloid the Global Times paid Twitter to promote tweets that denied that the Chinese government was committing human rights abuses in Xinjiang; Twitter later banned advertising from state-controlled media outlets on August 19 after removing large numbers of pro-Beijing bots from the social network.[112][113]In April 2021, the Chinese government released 5 propaganda videos titled, "Xinjiang is a Wonderful Land", and released a musical titled "The Wings of Songs" which portrayed Xinjiang as harmonious and peaceful.[91][93][114] The Wings of Songs portrays "a rural idyll of ethnic cohesion devoid of repression, mass surveillance" and without Islam.[115]In June 2021, ProPublica documented a Chinese government-backed propaganda campaign on Twitter and YouTube involving more than 5000 videos analysed. The videos showed Uyghurs in Xinjiang denying abuses and scolding foreign officials and multinational corporations who had questioned China's human rights record in the province. Some of the videos' accounts were removed on YouTube as part of the company's efforts to combat spam and influence operations.[116]In October 2022, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute documented a number of CCP-backed Uyghur influencers in Xinjiang posting propaganda videos on Chinese and Western social media which pushed back against abuse allegations. Some of the influencers' accounts were suspended on Twitter for alleged inauthenticity.[117]On 30 October 2023, the Chinese embassy in France posted a photo on X comparing the buildings in Xinjiang, which were standing intact, with buildings in Gaza that had been destroyed in the Israel-Hamas war.[118] The photo was criticised as propaganda by East Turkestan Government in Exile leader Salih Hudayar, and Uyghur lawyer Rayhan Asat who both argued that China's crackdown was more pervasive than the situation in Gaza.[118][119]Counter-terrorism justificationChina has used the global "war on terror" of the 2000s to frame "separatist" and ethnic unrest as acts of Islamist terrorism to legitimize its policies in Xinjiang.[120] Scholars such as Sean Roberts and David Tobin have described Islamophobia and fear of terrorism as discourses that have been used within China to justify repressive policies targeting Uyghurs, arguing that violence against Uyghurs should be seen in the context of Chinese colonialism, rather than exclusively as a part of an anti-terrorism campaign.[121] According to academic David Tobin, since 2012, "Chinese education about Uyghurs tends to frame Uyghur identities as racialised, culturally external existential threats to be defeated by state violence or teaching them to be Chinese."[122]Arienne Dwyer has written that the US war on terror gave China an opportunity to characterise and "conflate" Uyghur nationalism with terrorism, particularity through the use of state-run media. Dwyer argues that the influence of fundamentalist forms of Islam such as Salafism within Xinjiang is overstated by China as it is tempered by Uyghur Sufism.[57]In December 2015, the Associated Press reported that China had effectively expelled Ursula Gauthier, a French journalist, "for questioning the official line equating ethnic violence in the western Muslim region with global terrorism".[123] Gauthier, who was the first foreign journalist forced to leave China since 2012, was subject to what the AP described as an "abusive and intimidating campaign" by Chinese state media that accused her of "having hurt the feelings of the Chinese people" and that a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman accused her of emboldening terrorism.[123]In August 2018, the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination decried the "broad definition of terrorism and vague references to extremism" used by Chinese legislation, noting that there were numerous reports of detention of large numbers of ethnic Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities on the "pretext of countering terrorism".[124]In 2019, the editorial board of The Wall Street Journal, Sam Brownback, and Nathan Sales each said that the Chinese government consistently misused "counterterrorism" as a pretext for cultural suppression and human rights abuses.[125][126]In 2021, Shirzat Bawudun, the former head of the Xinjiang department of justice, and Sattar Sawut, the former head of the Xinjiang education department, were sentenced to death with two years reprieve on terrorism and extremism charges.[127] Three other educators and two textbook editors were given lesser sentences.[128]Cultural effectsSee also: Islam in China (1911–present) and Islamophobia in ChinaMosquesMosque in Tuyoq, Xinjiang (2005)Mosques, Muslim shrines, and cemeteries in Xinjiang have been the target of systematic destruction.[2][129] An estimated 16,000 mosques have been destroyed or damaged, minarets have been knocked down and "decorative features scrubbed away or painted over".[2]In 2005, Human Rights Watch reported that "information scattered in official sources suggests that retaliation" against mosques not sponsored by the Chinese state was prevalent and that the Xinjiang Party Secretary expressed that Uyghurs "should not have to build new places for religious activities".[130] The Chinese government prohibited minors from participating in religious activities in Xinjiang in a manner that, according to Human Rights Watch, "has no basis in Chinese law".[130]According to an analysis from The Guardian, over one-third of mosques and religious sites in China suffered "significant structural damage" between 2016 and 2018, with nearly one-sixth of all mosques and shrines completely razed.[131] This included the tomb of Imam Asim, a mud tomb in the Taklamakan Desert, and the Ordam shrine at the mazar of Ali Arslan Khan.[132] According to The Guardian, Uyghur Muslims believe that repeated pilgrimages to these tombs fulfill a Muslim's obligation to complete the Hajj.[131] In 2019, Bellingcat reported that "there is systematic repression and imprisonment of the Muslim Uighur minority in Xinjiang, and the destruction of cultural and religiously significant Islamic buildings in this province may be a further part of this ongoing repression."[129] In the same year, Indonesian scholar Said Aqil Siradj disputed that Uyghurs faced persecution, saying there was an increasing number of mosques being built and repaired in Xinjiang.[133][134]Id Kah Mosque in Xinjiang is China's largest.[135] Radio Free Asia, a United States government-funded broadcaster, reported that in 2018, a plaque containing Quranic scriptures, that had long hung outside the front entrance of the mosque, had been removed by the authorities. Turghunjan Alawudun, director of the World Uyghur Congress, said the plaque was removed as "one aspect of the Chinese regime's evil policies meant to eliminate the Islamic faith among Uyghurs... and Uyghurs themselves".[136] Anna Fifield of The Independent wrote in 2020 that Kashgar no longer had any working mosques,[137] while The Globe and Mail reported that the only services at the Id Kah mosque, which had been turned into a tourist attraction, were staged to give foreign visitors the impression that religion was being practiced freely and that mosque attendance numbered only in the dozens.[138][139] Indonesian outlet Antara released a video in 2021 documenting that 800 worshipers were in the mosque, but also that there was no iftar ritual due to pandemic restrictions.[140]Radio Free Asia reported that starting from early 2020, in response to international criticism, Chinese authorities started limited easing of religious restrictions in Xinjiang, reopening some mosques that were closed down.[141] However, the broadcaster said that most Uyghurs have not returned to the mosques, fearful of their experiences in the previous crackdowns. It also said that Hui Muslims were given greater leeway than Uyghur Muslims.[141]EducationEntrance to a school in Turpan, a Uyghur-majority city in Xinjiang, in 2018. The sign at the gate, written in Chinese, reads: "[You are] entering the school grounds. Please speak Guoyu ["the national language", i.e. Mandarin Chinese]"In 2011, schools in Xinjiang transitioned to what officials called a policy of bilingual education. The primary medium of instruction is Standard Chinese, with only a few hours a week devoted to Uyghur literature. Despite this policy, few Han children are taught to speak Uyghur.[142]Uyghur students are increasingly attending residential schools far from their home communities where they cannot speak Uyghur.[143] According to a 2020 report from Radio Free Asia (RFA), monolingual Chinese language education has been introduced in an influential high school in Kashgar that formerly provided bilingual education.[144]Sayragul Sauytbay, an ethnic Kazakh teacher who later fled China, described how she was forced to teach at an internment camp, saying the camp was "cramped and unhygienic" with her detainee students given only basic sustenance. Sauytbay added that authorities forced the detainees to learn Chinese, sit through indoctrination classes, and make public confessions. She mentioned that rape and torture were commonplace and that authorities forced detainees to take a medicine that left some individuals sterile or cognitively impaired.[145]In 2021, the standard Uyghur language textbooks used in Xinjiang since the early 2000s were outlawed and their authors and editors sentenced to death or life imprisonment on separatism charges. The textbooks had been created and approved by relevant government officials; however, according to the AP in 2021, the Chinese government said that the "2003 and 2009 editions of the textbooks contained 84 passages preaching ethnic separatism, violence, terrorism and religious extremism and that several people were inspired by the books to participate in a bloody anti-government riot in the regional capital Urumqi in 2009".[128]Detained academics and religious figuresUyghur economist Ilham TohtiIn 2019 the Uyghur Human Rights Project identified 386 Uyghur intellectuals who had been imprisoned, detained, or disappeared since early 2017.[146]Uyghur economist Ilham Tohti was sentenced to life in prison in 2014. Amnesty International called his sentence unjustified and deplorable.[147] Rahile Dawut, a prominent Uyghur anthropologist who studied and preserved Islamic shrines, traditional songs, and folklore, disappeared.[148]RFA reported that the Chinese government jailed Uyghur Imam Abduheber Ahmet after he took his son to a religious school not sanctioned by the state.[149] They reported that Ahmet had previously been lauded by China as a "five-star" imam but was sentenced in 2018 to over five years in prison for his action.[149]CemeteriesIn September 2019, Agence France-Presse (AFP) visited 13 destroyed cemeteries across four cities and witnessed exposed bones remaining in four of them. Through an examination of satellite images, the press agency determined that the grave destruction campaign had been ongoing for more than a decade.[150] According to a previous AFP report, three cemeteries in Xayar County were among dozens of Uyghur cemeteries destroyed in Xinjiang between 2017 and 2019. The unearthed human bones from the cemeteries in Xayar County were discarded.[151][152] In January 2020, a CNN report based on an analysis of Google Maps satellite imagery said that Chinese authorities had destroyed more than 100 graveyards in Xinjiang, primarily Uyghur ones. CNN linked the destruction of the cemeteries to the government's campaign to control the Uyghurs and Muslims more broadly. The Chinese government claimed that the cemetery and tomb destruction were relocations due to lack of maintenance and that the dead were re-interred in new standardized cemeteries.[153][154]This is all part of China's campaign to effectively eradicate any evidence of who we are, to effectively make us like the Han Chinese. ... That's why they're destroying all of these historical sites, these cemeteries, to disconnect us from our history, from our fathers and our ancestors.— Salih Hudayar, whose great-grandparents' graveyard was demolished[151][152]Among the destroyed cemeteries is Sultanim Cemetery (37°07′02″N 79°56′04″E / 37.11722°N 79.93444°E / 37.11722; 79.93444), the central Uyghur historical graveyard with generations of burials, and the most sacred shrine in Hotan city, which was demolished and converted into a parking lot between 2018 and 2019.[155][156][157][158][159] China Global Television Network (CGTN), a Chinese state-owned international channel affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, said that the graves were relocated.[160]MarriageAccording to gender studies expert Leta Hong Fincher, the Chinese government offered Uyghur couples incentives to have fewer children, and for women to marry non-Uyghurs.[161] According to the outreach coordinator for the U.S.-based Uyghur Human Rights Project,[162] Zubayra Shamseden, the Chinese government "wants to erase Uighur culture and identity by remaking its women."[163]Marriages between Uyghurs and Han are encouraged with government subsidies. In August 2014, local authorities in Cherchen County (Qiemo County) announced, "Incentive Measures Encouraging Uighur-Chinese Intermarriage," including a 10,000 CNY (US$1,450) cash reward per annum for the first five years to such intermarried couples as well as preferential treatment in employment and housing plus free education for the couples, their parents and offspring. County CCP Secretary Zhu Xin remarked:[164]Our advocacy of intermarriage is promoting positive energy ... Only by promoting the establishment of a social structure, and community environment in which all ethnic groups are embedded in each other ... can we boost the great unity, ethnic fusion, and development of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang, and finally realize our China dream of the great rejuvenation of our Chinese nationIn October 2017, the marriage of a Han man from Henan Province to a Uyghur woman from Lop County was celebrated on the county's social media page:[165]They will let ethnic unity forever bloom in their hearts,Let ethnic unity become one's own flesh and blood.University of Washington anthropologist and China expert Darren Byler said that a social media campaign in 2020 to marry off 100 Uyghur women to Han men indicated that, "a certain racialized power dynamic is a part of this process," commenting, "It does seem as though this is an effort to produce greater assimilation and diminish ethnic difference by pulling Uighurs into Han-dominated relationships."[164]According to RFA reports, in March 2017 Salamet Memetimin, an ethnic Uyghur and the Communist Party Secretary for Chaka township's Bekchan village in Qira County, Hotan Prefecture, was relieved of her duties for taking her nikah marriage vows at her home.[166] In interviews with RFA in 2020, residents and officials of Shufu County (Kona Sheher), Kashgar Prefecture (Kashi) stated that it was no longer possible to perform traditional Uyghur nikah marriage rites in the county.[167]ClothingA Uyghur woman wearing a hijab in XinjiangChinese authorities discourage the wearing of headscarves, veils, and other customary Islamic attire. On May 20, 2014, a protest broke out in Alakaga (Alaqagha, Alahage), Kuqa (Kuchar, Kuche), Aksu Prefecture when 25 women and schoolgirls were detained for wearing headscarves. According to a local official, two died and five were injured when police fired on protesters. Subsequently, a Washington Post team was detained in Alakaga and ultimately deported from the region.[168][169][170][171]Documents leaked from the Xinjiang internment camps have noted that some inmates have been detained for wearing traditional clothing.[172]Children's namesFurther information: Naming laws in ChinaRFA reported that in 2015, a list of banned names for children called "Naming Rules for Ethnic Minorities", was promulgated in Hotan, banning potential names including "Islam", "Quran", "Mecca", "Jihad", "Imam", "Saddam", "Hajj", and "Medina". Use of the list was later extended throughout Xinjiang.[173][174] Legislation in 2017 made it illegal to give children names that the Chinese government deemed to "exaggerate religious fervor".[84][173] This prohibition included a ban on naming children "Muhammad".[173]Human rights abusesFurther information: Human rights in China § UyghursInside internment campsMain article: Xinjiang internment campsMass detentionEspecially since 2016, internment camps have been a part of the Chinese government's strategy to govern Xinjiang[175] through the detention of ethnic minorities en masse.[176] According to Adrian Zenz, a researcher on the camps, the mass internments peaked in 2018 and have abated since then, with officials shifting focus towards forced labor programs.[177] In September 2023, Amnesty International said that they were "witnessing more and more arbitrary detention", but that detained individuals were being moved from the camps into Chinese "formal prisons".[178]In 2021, CNN published an interview with a former Xinjiang police officer identified as "Jiang", who said that, when the police planned to raid a Uyghur village, they would sometimes arrange for the entire village to gather for a meeting with their chief so that the police could show up and arrest everyone, while on other occasions the police would go door-to-door with rifles and pull all the residents from their homes overnight. Once the police had arrested people, they would interrogate and beat every man, woman, and child over age 14 "until they kneel on the floor crying."[179]Researchers and organizations have made various estimates of the number of Xinjiang internment camp detainees. In 2018, United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination vice chairperson Gay McDougall indicated that around 1 million Uyghurs were being held in internment camps.[180] While McDougall did not cite sources for her statement, it was consistent with a report submitted to the committee by the Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders.[180] Other estimates submitted to the committee were more careful, with Human Rights Watch estimating at least tens of thousands and Amnesty International estimating tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of detainees.[180] In September 2020, a Chinese government white paper stated that an average of 1.29 million workers went through "vocational training" per year between 2014 and 2019, though it does not specify how many of the people received the training in camps or how many times they went through training. Adrian Zenz stated that this "gives us a possible scope of coercive labor" occurring in Xinjiang.[181] There have been multiple reports that mass deaths have occurred inside the camps.[182][183][184]In March 2019, Adrian Zenz told the United Nations that 1.5 million Uyghurs had been detained in camps, saying that the number accounted for the increases in the size and scope of detention in the region and public reporting on the stories of Uyghur exiles with family in interment camps.[185] In July 2019, Zenz wrote in a paper published by the Journal of Political Risk that 1.5 million Uyghurs had been extrajudicially detained, which he described as being "an equivalent to just under one in six adult members of a Turkic and predominantly Muslim minority group in Xinjiang."[186] In November 2019, Zenz estimated that the number of internment camps in Xinjiang had surpassed 1,000.[187] In July 2020, Zenz wrote in Foreign Policy that his estimate had increased since November 2019, estimating that a total of 1.8 million Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities had been extrajudicially detained in what he described as "the largest incarceration of an ethnoreligious minority since the Holocaust", arguing that the Chinese Government was engaging in policies in violation of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.[188]According to 2020 study by Joanne Smith Finley, "political re-education involves coercive Sinicization, deaths in the camps through malnutrition, unsanitary conditions, withheld medical care, and violence (beatings); rape of male and female prisoners; and, since the end of 2018, transfers of the most recalcitrant prisoners – usually young, religious males – to high-security prisons in Xinjiang or inner China. Other camp 'graduates' have been sent into securitized forced labour. Those who remain outside the camps have been terrified into religious and cultural self-censorship through the threat of internment."[3]Ethan Gutmann estimated in December 2020 that 5 to 10 percent of detainees had died each year in the camps.[189] Russian-American scholar Gene Bunin[190] created the Xinjiang Victims Database which had documented 12,050 victims in April 2021,[191] and 225 deaths for those serving official prison sentences as of November 2023.[192] The database drew ridicule online after it included photos of Hong Kong actors Andy Lau and Chow Yun-fat in a list of police officers allegedly responsible for the crackdowns.[193][194][195]TortureMihrigul Tursun, a former detainee of the Xinjiang internment campsRights groups and others have reported that Uyghurs living in Xinjiang have been subject to torture by authorities.[196][197][198] A former Chinese police detective, exiled in Europe, revealed to CNN in 2021 details of the systematic torture of Uyghurs in detention camps in Xinjiang, acts in which he had participated, and the fear of his own arrest had he dissented while in China.[179][199]: 24 [failed verification]Mihrigul Tursun, a young Uyghur mother, said that she was "tortured and subjected to other brutal conditions."[200] In 2018, Tursun gave an interview[201][202] during which she described her experience while at the camps; she was drugged, interrogated for days without sleep, subjected to intrusive medical examinations, and strapped in a chair and received electric shocks. It was her third time being sent to a camp since 2015. Tursun told reporters that she remembered interrogators tell her "Being a Uighur is a crime."[200] A spokesperson for the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Hua Chunying, has stated that Tursun was taken into custody by police on "suspicion of inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination" for a period lasting 20 days, but denies that Tursun was ever detained in an internment camp.[202][203][204]Another past detainee, Kayrat Samarkand, said that "[t]hey made me wear what they called 'iron clothes,' a suit made of metal that weighed over 50 pounds [23 kg]... It forced my arms and legs into an outstretched position. I couldn't move at all, and my back was in terrible pain...They made people wear this thing to break their spirits. After 12 hours, I became so soft, quiet and lawful."[205]Waterboarding is reportedly among the forms of torture which have been used as part of the indoctrination process.[206]Compulsory sterilizations and contraceptionIn 2019, reports of forced sterilization in Xinjiang began to surface.[207][208][209] Zumrat Dwut, a Uyghur woman, says that she was forcibly sterilized by tubal ligation during her time in a camp before her husband was able to get her out through requests to Pakistani diplomats.[17][210] The Xinjiang regional government denies that she was forcibly sterilized.[17]In 2020, the Associated Press interviewed seven former detainees from internment camps who said they had been forced to take birth control pills or injected with fluids without explanation, which caused women to stop getting periods. The AP suggested the fluid may have been the hormonal medication Depo-Provera, which is commonly used in Xinjiang hospitals for birth control.[9]In April 2021, exiled Uyghur doctor Gülgine reported that forced sterilization of ethnic Uyghurs persisted since the 1980s.[211] Since 2014, there was an indication for a sharp increase in sterilization of Uyghur women to ensure that Uyghurs would remain a minority in the region.[211] Gülgine said "On some days there were about 80 surgeries to carry out forced sterilizations". She presented intrauterine devices (IUDs) and remarked that "these devices were inserted into women's wombs" to forcibly cause infertility.[211]BrainwashingFormer detainee Kayrat Samarkand described his camp routine in an article for NPR in 2018: "In addition to living in cramped quarters, he says inmates had to sing songs praising Chinese leader Xi Jinping before being allowed to eat. He says detainees were forced to memorize a list of what he calls '126 lies' about religion: 'Religion is opium, religion is bad, you must believe in no religion, you must believe in the Communist Party,' he remembers. 'Only [the] Communist Party could lead you to the bright future.'"[205]Documents which were leaked to The New York Times by an anonymous Chinese official advised that "Should students ask whether their missing parents had committed a crime, they are to be told no, it is just that their thinking has been infected by unhealthy thoughts. Freedom is only possible when this 'virus' in their thinking is eradicated and they are in good health."[212]The Heritage Foundation reported that "children whose parents are detained in the camps are often sent to state-run orphanages and brainwashed to forget their ethnic roots. Even if their parents are not detained, Uyghur children need to move to inner China and immerse themselves into the Han culture under the Chinese government's 'Xinjiang classrooms' policy."[213]In 2021, Gulbahar Haitiwaji reported being coerced into denouncing her family after her daughter had been photographed at a protest in Paris.[214]Forced laborFurther information: Xinjiang cotton industryAccording to Quartz, the Xinjiang region is described by the Uyghur Human Rights Project as a "'cotton gulag' where prison labor is present in all steps of the cotton supply chain..."[215]Tahir Hamut, a Uyghur, worked in a labor camp during elementary school when he was a child, and he later worked in a labor camp as an adult, performing tasks such as picking cotton, shoveling gravel, and making bricks. "Everyone is forced to do all types of hard labor or face punishment," he said. "Anyone unable to complete their duties will be beaten."[216]BuzzFeed News reported in December 2020 that "[f]orced labor on a vast scale is almost certainly taking place" inside the Xinjiang internment camps, with 135 factory facilities identified within the camps covering over 21 million square feet (2.0 km2) of land.[217] The report noted that "[f]ourteen million square feet of new factories were built in 2018 alone" within the camps and that "former detainees said they were never given a choice about working, and that they earned a pittance or no pay at all".[217]A Chinese website hosted by Baidu has posted job listings for transferring Uyghur laborers in batches of 50 to 100 people.[218] The 2019 Five Year Plan of the Xinjiang government has an official "labour transfer programme" "to provide more employment opportunities for the surplus rural labour force".[218] These batches of Uyghurs are under "half-military" style management and direct supervision. A seafood processing plant owner said that the Uyghur workforce in his factory had left for Xinjiang due to the COVID-19 pandemic and were paid and housed properly.[218] At least 83 companies were found to have profited from Uyghur labor. Company responses included pledges of ensuring that it does not happen again by checking supply lines, such as Marks & Spencer. Samsung said that it would ensure that previous controls ensured good work conditions under its code of conduct. Apple, Esprit, and Fila did not offers responses to related inquiries.[219]The Chinese government is reported to have pressured foreign companies to reject claims of abuses.[220] Apple was asked by the Chinese government to censor Uyghur-related news apps among others, on its devices sold in China.[221] Companies such as Nike and Adidas were boycotted in China after they criticized the treatment of Uyghurs, which resulted in significant drop in sales.[222]Medical experimentsFormer inmates have said that they were subjected to medical experimentation.[223][224]Organized mass rape and sexual tortureBBC News and other sources reported accounts of organized mass rape and sexual torture carried out by Chinese authorities in the internment camps.[225][226][227][228][229][230]Multiple women who were formerly detained in the Xinjiang internment camps have publicly made accusations of systemic sexual abuse, including rape, gang rape, and sexual torture, such as forced vaginal and anal penetrations with electric batons,[231] and rubbing chili pepper paste on genitals.[232][233] Sayragul Sauytbay, a teacher who was forced to work in the camps, told the BBC that employees of the internment camp in which she was detained conducted rapes en masse, saying that camp guards "picked the girls and young women they wanted and took them away".[227] She also told the BBC of an organized gang rape, in which a woman around age 21 was forced to make a confession in front of a crowd of 100 other women detained in the camps, before being raped by multiple policemen in front of the assembled crowd.[227] In 2018, a Globe and Mail interview with Sauytbay indicated that she did not personally see violence at the camp, but did witness malnourishment and a complete lack of freedom.[234] Tursunay Ziawudun, a woman who was detained in the internment camps for a period of nine months, told the BBC that women were removed from their cells every night to be raped by Chinese men in masks and that she was subjected to three separate instances of gang rape while detained.[227] In an earlier interview, Ziawudun reported that while she "wasn't beaten or abused" while in the camps, she was instead subjected to long interrogations, forced to watch propaganda, had her hair cut, was under constant surveillance, and kept in cold conditions with poor food, leading to her developing anemia.[235] Qelbinur Sedik, an Uzbek woman from Xinjiang, has stated that Chinese police sexually abused detainees during electric shock tortures, saying that "there were four kinds of electric shock... the chair, the glove, the helmet, and anal rape with a stick".[227]Chinese government officials deny all allegations that there have been any human rights abuses within the internment camps.[227] Reuters reported in March 2021 that Chinese government officials also disclosed personal medical information of women witnesses in an effort to discredit them.[236]In February 2021, the BBC released an extensive report which alleged that systematic sexual abuse was taking place within the camps.[237] The gang rapes and sexual torture were alleged to be part of a systemic rape culture which included both policemen and those from outside the camps who pay for time with the prettiest girls.[226] CNN reported in February 2021 about a worker and several former female inmates which survived the camps; they provided details about murder, torture and rape in the camps, which they described as routinely occurring.[238]Outside internment campsIUDs and birth controlChina performs regular pregnancy checks on minority women within Xinjiang.[9] Some CCP officials have spoken about the "demographic imbalance" in southern Xinjiang; Liu Yilei, deputy secretary-general of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps CCP Committee, said that the "proportion of the Han population in southern Xinjiang is too low, less than 15 percent. The problem of demographic imbalance is southern Xinjiang's core issue."[239]Zenz reported that 80% of "new" Chinese IUD placements (defined in his study as total IUD placements minus IUD removals) in 2018 occurred in Xinjiang, despite the region constituting only 1.8% of the country's population.[240][241][242] Assessing Zenz's analysis, Xinjiang University Professor Lin Fangfei argued that the appropriate measure is that 8.7% of IUD operations were performed in Xinjiang, adding that the Uyghur population growth was bigger than the Han population growth in the region.[243][244]Zenz reported that birth rates in counties whose majority population consists of ethnic minorities began to fall in 2015, "the very year that the government began to single out the link between population growth and 'religious extremism'".[240]: 8 Prior to the recent drops in birth rates, the Uyghur population had had a growth rate 2.6 times that of the Han between 2005 and 2015.[240]: 5 According to Zenz's analysis of Chinese government documents, the Chinese government had planned to sterilize between 14% and 34% of childbearing-age married women in two predominantly Uyghur counties in 2019, while seeking to sterilize 80% of childbearing-age women in four rural prefectures in Xinjiang's south that are primarily inhabited by ethnic minorities.[245]According to a fax provided to CNN by the Xinjiang regional government, birth rates in Xinjiang fell by 32.68% from 2017 to 2018.[17] In 2019, the birth rates fell by 24% year over year, a significantly greater drop than the 4.2% decline in births experienced across the entire People's Republic of China.[9][17][246] According to Zenz, population growth rates in the two largest Uyghur prefectures in Xinjiang, Kashgar and Hotan, fell by 84% between 2015 and 2018.[11][247]According to Adrian Zenz, Chinese government documents mandate that birth control violations of Uyghurs are punishable by extrajudicial internment.[248] Official records from Karakax County between 2017 and 2019 leaked to the Financial Times showed that the most common reason for detaining Uyghurs in camps was violation of family planning policies, with the second most common reason being for practising Islam. A 2018 Karakax government report said it had implemented "maximally strict family planning policies".[249]The Heritage Foundation reported in 2019 that officials forced Uyghur women to take unknown drugs and liquids that caused them to lose consciousness, and sometimes caused them to stop menstruating.[213] In 2020, an Associated Press investigation reported that forced birth control in Xinjiang was "far more widespread and systematic than previously known", and that Chinese authorities had forced IUD insertions, sterilization and abortions upon "hundreds of thousands" of Uyghur and other minority women.[9] Many women stated that they were forced to receive contraceptive implants.[13][232] The full scale of forced sterilization in Xinjiang is unknown, partly because of the Chinese government's failure to collect or share data, as well as the reluctance of victims to come forward due to stigma.[250] The measures have been compared to China's past one-child policy targeting its Han population.[251][252]According to CNN, regional authorities do not dispute the decrease in birth rates but deny that genocide and forced sterilization is occurring; Xinjiang authorities maintain that the decrease in birth rates is due to "the comprehensive implementation of the family planning policy."[17] The Chinese Embassy in the United States said the policy was positive and empowering for Uyghur women, writing that, "in the process of eradicating extremism, the minds of Uygur women were emancipated and gender equality and reproductive health were promoted, making them no longer baby-making machines. They are more confident and independent." Twitter removed the tweet for violating its policies.[98][253]Forced cohabitation, co-sleeping, rape, and abortionFurther information: Civil Servant-Family Pair UpBeginning in 2018,[254] over one million Chinese government workers began forcibly living in the homes of Uyghur families to monitor and assess resistance to assimilation, as well as to watch for frowned-upon religious and cultural practices.[255]The "Pair Up and Become Family" program assigned Han Chinese men to monitor the homes of Uyghurs and sleep in the same beds as Uyghur women.[256][257] According to Radio Free Asia, these Han Chinese government workers were trained to call themselves "relatives" and forcibly engaged in co-habitation of Uyghur homes for the purpose of promoting "ethnic unity".[255] Radio Free Asia reports that these men "regularly sleep in the same beds as the wives of men detained in the region's internment camps."[258] Chinese officials maintained that co-sleeping is acceptable, provided that a distance of one meter is maintained between the women and the "relative" assigned to the Uyghur home.[256][258] Uyghur activists state that no such restraint takes place, citing pregnancy and forced marriage numbers, and name the program a campaign of "mass rape disguised as 'marriage'."[256] Human Rights Watch has condemned the program as a "deeply invasive forced assimilation practice", while the World Uyghur Congress states that it represents the "total annihilation of the safety, security and well-being of family members."[258]A 37-year-old pregnant woman from the Xinjiang region said that she attempted to give up her Chinese citizenship to live in Kazakhstan but was told by the Chinese government that she needed to come back to China to complete the process. She alleges that officials seized the passports of her and her two children before coercing her into receiving an abortion to prevent her brother from being detained in an internment camp.[259]A book from Chandos Publishing authored by Guo Rongxing stated that the 1990 Barin uprising were the result of 250 forced abortions imposed upon local Uyghur women by the Chinese government.[260]Organ harvesting allegations and concernsSee also: Organ harvesting in ChinaEthan Gutmann[261] states that organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience became prevalent when members of the Uyghur ethnic group were targeted in security crackdowns and "strike hard campaigns" during the 1990s. According to Gutmann, organ harvesting from Uyghur prisoners dropped off by 1999 with members of the Falun Gong religious group overtaking the Uyghurs as a source of organs.[262][263][264]In the 2010s, concerns about organ harvesting from Uyghurs resurfaced.[265][266][267] According to a unanimous determination by the China Tribunal in May 2020, China has persecuted and medically tested Uyghurs. Its report expressed concerns that Uyghurs were vulnerable to being subject to organ harvesting but did not yet have evidence of its occurrence.[268][269][270][271] In November 2020, Gutmann told RFA that a former hospital in Aksu, China, which had been converted into a Xinjiang internment camp, would allow local officials to streamline the organ harvesting process and provide a steady stream of harvested organs from Uyghurs.[272] In a December 2020 Haaretz article, Gutmann stated he believed at least 25,000 people were being killed in Xinjiang for their organs each year, claiming that "fast lanes" had been created for the movement of organs in local airports and crematoria had recently built in the province in order to more easily dispose of victims' bodies.[261][273]In 2020, a Chinese woman alleged that Uyghurs were killed to provide halal organs for primarily Saudi customers. She also alleged that in one such instance in 2006, 37 Saudi clients received organs from killed Uyghurs at the Department of Liver Transplantation of Tianjin Taida Hospital. Dr. Enver Tohti, a former oncology surgeon in Xinjiang, thought the allegation was credible.[274][275][276]Forced laborThroughout the COVID-19 pandemic, the Chinese government has imposed forced labor conditions on Uyghurs.[277][278]In January 2020, videos began to surface on Douyin showing large numbers of Uyghurs being placed into airplanes, trains, and busses for transportation to forced factory labor programs.[279] In March 2020, the Chinese government was found to be using the Uyghur minority as forced sweatshop labor. According to a report published by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), no fewer than around 80,000 Uyghurs were forcibly removed from Xinjiang for purposes of forced labor in at least twenty-seven factories around China.[280] According to the Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, a UK-based charity, corporations such as Abercrombie & Fitch, Adidas, Amazon, Apple, BMW, Fila, Gap, H&M, Inditex, Marks & Spencer, Nike, North Face, Puma, PVH, Samsung, and Uniqlo sourced from these factories.[11][281] Over 570,000 Uyghurs are forced to pick cotton by hand in Xinjiang.[282][283] According to an archived report from Nankai University, the Chinese forced labor system is designed to reduce Uyghur population density.[284]In total, by 2021, the Chinese government had relocated more than 600,000 Uyghurs to industrial workplaces as a part of their forced labor programs.[279][278]Outside ChinaChina has been accused of coordinating efforts to coerce Uyghurs living overseas into returning to China, using family still in China to pressure members of the diaspora. Chinese officials dismiss the accusations as fabrications.[285]China's robust surveillance system extends overseas, with a special emphasis placed on monitoring the Uyghur diaspora.[286] According to the MIT Technology Review "China's hacking of Uyghurs is so aggressive that it is effectively global, extending far beyond the country's own borders. It targets journalists, dissidents, and anyone who raises Beijing's suspicions of insufficient loyalty."[287]In March 2021 Facebook reported that hackers based in China had been conducting cyberespionage against members of the Uyghur diaspora.[288][289]Uyghurs in the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have been detained and deported back to China, sometimes separating families.[290][291] CNN reported in June 2021 that "rights activists fear that even as Western nations take China to task over its treatment of Uyghurs, countries in the Middle East and beyond will increasingly be willing to acquiesce to its crackdown on members of the ethnic group at home and abroad."[290] According to the Associated Press, "Dubai also has a history as a place where Uyghurs are interrogated and deported back to China."[292]A joint report from the Uyghur Human Rights Project and the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs found 1,546 cases of Uyghurs being detained and deported at the behest of Chinese authorities in 28 countries from 1997 to March 2021.[293]Use of biometric and surveillance technologyChinese authorities use biometric technology to track individuals.[254] According to Yahir Imin, Chinese authorities drew his blood, scanned his face, recorded his fingerprints, and documented his voice.[254] China collects genetic material from millions of Uyghurs. China uses facial recognition technology to sort people by ethnicity, and uses DNA to tell if an individual is a Uyghur. China has been accused of creating "technologies used for hunting people."[294]In 2017, security-related construction tripled in Xinjiang. Charles Rollet stated, "projects include not only security cameras but also video analytics hubs, intelligent monitoring systems, big data centers, police checkpoints, and even drones."[295][296] Drone manufacturer DJI began providing surveillance drones to local police in 2017.[297] According to ASPI, the Ministry of Public Security invested billions of dollars in two government plans: the Skynet project (天网工程) and the Sharp Eyes project (雪亮工程).[296] These two projects attempted to use facial recognition to "resolutely achieve no blind spots, no gaps, no blank spots" by 2020.[2] A report by ASPI highlighted Morgan Stanley's claim that, by 2020, 400 million surveillance cameras were to be operating.[296] Chinese companies including SenseTime, CloudWalk, Yitu, Megvii, and Hikvision built algorithms to allow the Chinese government to track the Muslim minority group.[298]In July 2020, the United States Department of Commerce sanctioned 11 Chinese firms, including two subsidiaries of BGI Group, for violating the human rights of Uyghur Muslims, by exploiting their DNA.[299] BGI Group along with Abu Dhabi-based AI and cloud computing firm Group 42 – accused of espionage in 2019 – were named by the US departments of Homeland Security and State in an October 2020 warning issued to Nevada against the use of the 200,000 COVID-19 test kits donated by UAE under the partnership of G42 and the BGI Group. US intelligence agencies warned foreign powers who were exploiting patients' medical samples to dig into their medical history, genetic traits, and illnesses.[300]Biometric dataWhile he was Xinjiang Party secretary, Chen Quanguo launched "Physicals for All", purportedly a medical care program. "Every Xinjiang resident between the ages of twelve and 65" was required to provide DNA samples. Also collected were data on "blood types, fingerprints, voice-prints, iris patterns".[2] Officials in Tumxuk gathered hundreds of blood samples.[294] Tumxuk was named a "major battlefield for Xinjiang's security work" by the state news media.[294] In January 2018, a forensic DNA lab overseen by the Institute of Forensic Science of China was built there.[294] Lab documents showed that it used software created by Thermo Fisher Scientific, a Massachusetts company.[294] This software was used in correspondence to create genetic sequencers, helpful in analyzing DNA. In response, Thermo Fisher declared in February that it would cease sales to the Xinjiang region as a result of "fact-specific assessments".[294]GPS tracking of carsSecurity officials ordered residents in China's northwest region to install GPS tracking devices in their vehicles, allowing authorities to track their movements. Authorities said that it "is necessary to counteract the activities of Islamist extremists and separatists". An announcement from officials in Bayingolin Mongol Autonomous Prefecture proclaimed that "there is a severe threat from international terrorism, and cars have been used as a key means of transport for terrorists as well as constantly serving as weapons. It is, therefore, necessary to monitor and track all vehicles in the prefecture."[301]Classification of abusesSee also: Xinjiang papers, China Cables, and Xinjiang internment camps § International reactionsPages from the China CablesSpecial purpose tribunals, scholars, commentators, journalists, governments, politicians, and diplomats from many countries have labeled China's actions variously as genocide, cultural genocide, ethnocide, settler colonialism, and/or crimes against humanity.Ethnocide or cultural genocideIn 2008, Michael Clarke, an Australian terrorism scholar, noted that "there has emerged within the Uighur émigré community a tendency to portray the Uighurs as experiencing a form of 'cultural genocide'", citing as an example a 2004 speech by World Uyghur Congress president Erkin Alptekin.[302] In a 2012 Wall Street Journal op-ed, Uyghur activist Rebiya Kadeer described the CCP following "policies of Uighur cultural genocide".[303][304] In 2018, UCL human rights scholar Kate Cronin-Furman argued in 2018 that the Chinese state policies constituted cultural genocide.[305][306]In July 2019, German academic Adrian Zenz wrote in the Journal of Political Risk that the situation in Xinjiang constituted a cultural genocide;[307] his research was later cited by BBC News and other news organizations.[308] James Leibold, a professor at Australia's La Trobe University, called that same month the treatment of Uyghurs by the Chinese government a "cultural genocide", and stated that "in their own words, party officials are 'washing brains' and 'cleansing hearts' to 'cure' those bewitched by extremist thoughts."[309][310][311] The term was used in editorials, such as in The Washington Post, at this point.[312]Since the release of the Xinjiang papers and the China Cables in November 2019, various journalists and researchers have called the Chinese government's treatment of Uyghurs an ethnocide or a cultural genocide. In November 2019, Zenz described the classified documents as confirming "that this is a form of cultural genocide".[313] Foreign Policy published an article by Azeem Ibrahim in which he called the Chinese treatment of Uyghurs a "deliberate and calculated campaign of cultural genocide" after the release of the Xinjiang papers and China Cables.[314]In 2020, scholars, commentators, and lawyers were increasingly referred to the human rights situation in Xinjiang as a genocide, rather than a cultural genocide.[3]GenocideIn April 2019, Cornell University anthropologist Magnus Fiskesjö wrote in Inside Higher Ed that mass arrests of ethnic minority academics and intellectuals in Xinjiang indicated that "the Chinese regime's current campaign against the native Uighur, Kazakh and other peoples is already a genocide."[315] Later, in 2020, Fiskejö wrote in academic journal Monde Chinois that "[t]he evidence for genocide is thus already massive, and must, at the very least, be regarded as sufficient for prosecution under international law... the number of competent authorities around the world concurring that this is indeed genocide are increasing."[316]In June 2020, after an Associated Press investigation found that Uyghurs were being subjected to mass forced sterilizations and forced abortions in Xinjiang, scholars increasingly have referred to the abuses in Xinjiang as a genocide.[3]In July 2020, Zenz said an interview with National Public Radio (NPR) that he had previously argued that the actions of the Chinese government are a cultural genocide, not a "literal genocide", but that one of the five criteria from the Genocide Convention was satisfied by more recent developments concerning the suppression of birth rates so "we do need to probably call it a genocide".[317] The same month, the last colonial governor of British Hong Kong, Chris Patten, said that the "birth control campaign" was "arguably something that comes within the terms of the UN views on sorts of genocide".[318]Although China is not a member of the International Criminal Court, on 6 July 2020 the self-proclaimed East Turkistan Government-in-Exile and the East Turkistan National Awakening Movement filed a complaint with the ICC calling for it to investigate PRC officials for crimes against Uyghurs including allegations of genocide.[319][320][321] The ICC responded in December 2020 and "asked for more evidence before it will be willing to open an investigation into claims of genocide against Uighur people by China, but has said it will keep the file open for such further evidence to be submitted."[322]An August 2020 Quartz article reported that some scholars hesitate to label the human rights abuses in Xinjiang as a "full-blown genocide", preferring the term "cultural genocide", but that increasingly many experts were calling them "crimes against humanity" or "genocide".[319] In August 2020 the spokesperson for Joe Biden's presidential campaign described China's actions as genocide.[323]In October 2020, the U.S. Senate introduced a bipartisan resolution designating the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Chinese government against the Uyghur people and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang as genocide.[324] Around the same time, the House of Commons of Canada issued a statement that its Subcommittee on International Human Rights of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development was persuaded that the Chinese Communist Party's actions in Xinjiang constitute genocide as laid out in the Genocide Convention.[225] The 2020 annual report by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China referred to the Chinese government's treatment of Uyghurs as "crimes against humanity and possibly genocide."[325][326]In January 2021, U.S. secretary of state Mike Pompeo officially declared that China was committing genocide against the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities living in Xinjiang.[327] This declaration, which came in the final hours of the Trump administration, had not been made earlier due to a worry that it could disrupt trade talks between the US and China. On the allegations of crimes against humanity Pompeo asserted that "These crimes are ongoing and include: the arbitrary imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty of more than one million civilians, forced sterilization, torture of a large number of those arbitrarily detained, forced labor and the imposition of draconian restrictions on freedom of religion or belief, freedom of expression and freedom of movement."[328]On 19 January 2021, incoming U.S. president Joe Biden's secretary of state nominee Antony Blinken was asked during his confirmation hearings whether he agreed with Pompeo's conclusion that the CCP had committed genocide against the Uyghurs, he contended "That would be my judgment as well."[329] During her confirmation hearings Joe Biden's nominee to be the US ambassador to the United Nations Linda Thomas-Greenfield stated that she believed what was currently happening in Xinjiang was a genocide, adding "I lived through and experienced and witnessed a genocide in Rwanda."[330]The US designation was followed by Canada's House of Commons and the Dutch parliament, each passing a non-binding motion in February 2021 to recognize China's actions as genocide.[32][33]In January 2021, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum initially stated that, "[t]here is a reasonable basis to believe that the government of China is committing crimes against humanity."[206][331] In November 2021, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum revised its stance to state that the "Chinese government may be committing genocide against the Uyghurs."[332]In February 2021, a report released by the Essex Court Chambers concluded that "there is a very credible case that acts carried out by the Chinese government against the Uighur people in Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region amount to crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide, and describes how the minority group has been subject to "enslavement, torture, rape, enforced sterilisation and persecution." "Victims have been "forced to remain in stress positions for an extended period of time, beaten, deprived of food, shackled and blindfolded", it said. The legal team stated that they had seen "prolific credible evidence" of sterilisation procedures carried out on women, including forced abortions, saying the human rights abuses "clearly constitute a form of genocidal conduct".[333]On 13 February 2021, The Economist wrote that while China's treatment and persecution of Uyghurs is "horrific" and a crime against humanity, "genocide" is the wrong word for China's actions due to China not engaging in mass murder.[334]According to a March 2021 Newlines Institute report that was written by over 50 global China, genocide, and international law experts,[335][336] the Chinese government breached every article in the Genocide Convention, writing, "China's long-established, publicly and repeatedly declared, specifically targeted, systematically implemented, and fully resourced policy and practice toward the Uyghur group is inseparable from 'the intent to destroy in whole or in part' the Uyghur group as such."[337][338][339] The report cited credible reports of mass deaths under the mass internment drive, while Uighur leaders were selectively sentenced to death or sentenced to long-term imprisonment. "Uyghurs are suffering from systematic torture and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, including rape, sexual abuse, and public humiliation, both inside and outside the camps", the report stated. The report argued that these policies are directly orchestrated by the highest levels of state, including Xi and the top officials of the Chinese Communist Party in Xinjiang.[182] It also reported that the Chinese government gave explicit orders to "eradicate tumours", "wipe them out completely", "destroy them root and branch", "round up everyone", and "show absolutely no mercy", in regards to Uyghurs,[182][336] and that camp guards reportedly follow orders to uphold the system in place until "Kazakhs, Uyghurs, and other Muslim nationalities, would disappear...until all Muslim nationalities would be extinct".[340] According to the report "Internment camps contain designated "interrogation rooms" where Uyghur detainees are subjected to consistent and brutal torture methods, including beatings with metal prods, electric shocks, and whips."[341]In June 2021, the Canadian Anthropology Society issued a statement on Xinjiang in which the organization stated, "expert testimony and witnessing, and irrefutable evidence from the Chinese Government's own satellite imagery, documents, and eyewitness reports, overwhelmingly confirms the scale of the genocide."[342]In August 2022, the U.S. State Department published a report PRC Efforts to Manipulate Global Public Opinion on Xinjiang on the Chinese government's global efforts "to discredit independent sources that report ongoing genocide and crimes against humanity" in Xinjiang.[343][344]A 2023 academic book by political theorists Alain Brossat and Juan Alberto Ruiz Casado labeled the accusation of genocide as unsubstantiated.[345] They described the information used to apply the label as misleading and coming "exclusively from a few sources, for the most part overwhelmingly and openly partisan in their anti-China crusade"; they especially criticize Adrian Zenz's 2018 detainee study and 2019 sterilization study as "academically flimsy" and containing misleading or directly false claims, respectively.[345]Academics Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung write that their research has found no evidence that Xi Jinping advocates genocide against Uyghurs.[346]: 203 Tsang and Cheung conclude that China's policies subordinate identity based on culture, religion, or minority language in an effort to establish a national identity based on Han heritage, language, and Xi Jinping Thought.[346]: 203 Crimes against humanityIn June 2019, the China Tribunal, an independent judicial investigation into forced organ transplantation in China concluded that crimes against humanity had been committed beyond reasonable doubt against China's Uyghur Muslim and Falun Gong populations.[347][348]The Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect at the University of Queensland concluded in November that evidence of atrocities in Xinjiang "likely meets the requirements of the following crimes against humanity: persecution, imprisonment, enforced disappearance, torture, forced sterilisation, and enslavement" and that "It is arguable that genocidal acts have occurred in Xinjiang, in particular acts of imposing measures to prevent births and forcible transfers."[349] In December, lawyers David Matas and Sarah Teich wrote in Toronto Star that "One distressing present day example [of genocide] is the atrocities faced by the Uighur population in Xinjiang, China."[350]In 2021 the U.S. State Department's Office of the Legal Advisor concluded that although the situation in Xinjiang amounted to crimes against humanity, there was insufficient evidence to prove genocide.[351]Settler colonialismIn addition to other classifications, some academics and researchers have also termed the abuses as part of an ongoing project of Han settler colonialism.[352][353][354][355][356]View of discourseWriting in 2023, academic and former UK diplomat Kerry Brown observes that the clash of labels between western and Chinese discourse on the issue of Xinjiang makes it nearly impossible to reach an empirical or neutral description of China's actions in Xinjiang.[90]: 136 According to American academic Darren Byler, discourses about Uyghurs in Xinjiang typically revolve around Uyghurs as either potential terrorists and resisters (from the view of the Chinese state) or objects of pity to be rescue (in western discourses), with little focus on Uyghurs as autonomous actors.[90]: 136 International responsesFurther information: Xinjiang internment camps § International reactionsReactions by supranational organizationsReactions at the United NationsProtesters at the United Nations with the flag of East TurkestanIn July 2019, 22 countries[note 1] issued a joint letter to the 41st session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), condemning China's mass detention of Uyghurs and other minorities, calling upon China to "refrain from the arbitrary detention and restrictions on freedom of movement of Uyghurs, and other Muslim and minority communities in Xinjiang".[357][358][359] In the same session, 50 countries[note 2] issued a joint letter supporting China's Xinjiang policies,[357][360] criticizing the practice of "politicizing human rights issues". The letter stated, "China has invited a number of diplomats, international organizations officials and journalist to Xinjiang" and that "what they saw and heard in Xinjiang completely contradicted what was reported in the media."[360]In October 2019, 23 countries[note 3] issued a joint statement to the UN urging China to "uphold its national and international obligations and commitments to respect human rights".[361] In response, 54 countries[note 4] (including China itself) issued a joint statement supporting China's Xinjiang policies. The statement "spoke positively of the results of counter-terrorism and de-radicalization measures in Xinjiang and noted that these measures have effectively safeguarded the basic human rights of people of all ethnic groups."[362]In February 2020, the UN demanded unobstructed access in advance of a proposed fact-finding visit to the region.[363]In October 2020, more countries at the UN joined the condemnation of China over human rights abuses in Xinjiang with German Ambassador Christoph Heusgen speaking on behalf of the group.[27][364][365] The total number of countries that condemned China increased to 39,[note 5] while the total number of countries that defended China decreased to 45.[note 6] Sixteen countries[note 7] that defended China in 2019 did not do so in 2020.[27]The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) began to discuss the possibility of a visit to Xinjiang with China in order to examine "the impact on human rights of its policies" in September 2020.[366] Since then, the HCHR's office has since been negotiating terms of access to China, but the High Commissioner has not visited the country.[367] In a February 2021 speech to the UNHRC, the Chinese Foreign Minister stated that Xinjiang is "always open" and the country "welcomes the High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) to visit Xinjiang".[367] At a March 2021 meeting of the UNHRC, the United States ambassador condemned China's human rights abuses in Xinjiang as "crimes against humanity and genocide".[368][369]China has turned down multiple requests from the UN HCHR to investigate the region.[370] In January 2022, unidentified sources told the South China Morning Post that UN rights chief Michelle Bachelet had secured a visit to Xinjiang, not to be framed as an investigation, some time during the first half of the year, as long as her office doesn't agree to the U.S. request of publishing its Xinjiang report ahead of the Beijing Winter Olympics.[371] The visit occurred in May 2022.[372] In a statement released by the UN, Bachelet said that she raised concerns in Xinjiang about the broad application of counter-terrorism and de-radicalisation measures (including their impacts on Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities) and encouraged the government to review such policies to ensure they fully comply with international human rights standards.[372] Bachelet stated that while she was unable to investigate the full scale of the vocational educational and training centres (VETC), she raised with the Chinese government concerns about the lack of independent judicial oversight for the program, and said that the government provided assurances that the VETC system had been dismantled.[372] U.S. rights advocates criticized Bachelet's visit as a propaganda victory for Beijing.[373] The World Uyghur Congress and the Washington D.C.-based Campaign for Uyghurs called for her to resign,[374] and Bachelet announced in June 2022 that she would step down from her role as UN human rights chief.[375]On August 31, 2022, Bachelet released a report on China's treatment of Uyghur Muslims and other Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang, the OHCHR Assessment of human rights concerns in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, People's Republic of China. The report found that China's treatment of these groups may amount to crimes against humanity. The report concludes that "serious human rights violations have been committed" in the province, which the report attributes to China's "application of counter-terrorism and counter-'extremism' strategies" targeting Uyghur Muslims and other Muslim minority groups. The report also said that "Allegations of patterns of torture or ill-treatment, including forced medical treatment and adverse conditions of detention, are credible, as are allegations of individual incidents of sexual and gender-based violence". China opposed the release of the report and claimed that it is based on "disinformation and lies". China also claimed that "All ethnic groups, including the Uygur, are equal members of the Chinese nation. Xinjiang has taken actions to fight terrorism and extremism in accordance with the law, effectively curbing the frequent occurrences of terrorist activities".[376][377] On October 6, 2022, the UNHCR voted down a proposal to debate the alleged human rights abuses in Xinjiang.[378]At its 108th session in November 2022, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) adopted a decision under its early warning and urgent action procedure - urging the Chinese government to release all individuals arbitrarily detained in Xinjiang, to provide relatives of detained or disappeared individuals with detailed information about their status and well-being, and to cease all intimidation and reprisals against Uyghur and other Muslim ethnic minority communities from China as well as those who speak out in their defence.[379]In March 2024, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk, called on China to implement the recommendations in the 2022 UN Human Rights Office report on Xinjiang.[380]Reactions at the European UnionIn 2019, the European Parliament awarded its Sakharov Prize for Freedom and Thought to Ilham Tohti, a Uyghur intellectual and activist who had been sentenced to life in prison on charges pertaining to Uyghur separatism.[381][382][383] As of March 2021, China has prohibited European Union diplomats from visiting Tohti.[384][385] The European Union has called upon China to release Tohti from his detention in prison.[386]In March 2021, European Union ambassadors agreed on sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, against four Chinese officials and one Chinese entity for human rights abuses against Uyghurs.[386] Among those sanctioned by the EU was Zhu Hailun who was described as the architect of the indoctrination program.[387] In the same month, negotiations for a group of ambassadors from European Union countries to visit Xinjiang stalled due to the Chinese government's denial of their request to visit Ilham Tohti, an imprisoned Uyghur scholar.[388]On June 9, 2022, the European Parliament adopted a motion condemning measures taken against the Uyghur community in China, stating that "credible evidence about birth prevention measures and the separation of Uyghur children from their families amount to crimes against humanity and represent a serious risk of genocide" and calling on authorities "to cease all government-sponsored programmes of forced labour and mass forced sterilisation and to put an immediate end to any measures aimed at preventing births in the Uyghur population, including forced abortions or sanctions for birth control violations".[389]Reactions by countryAfricaSeveral African countries, including Algeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Nigeria, and Somalia, signed a July 2019 letter that publicly praised China's human rights record and dismissed reported abuses in Xinjiang.[390][391] Other African countries, including Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique and Sudan, signed an October 2019 letter that publicly expressed support for China's treatment of Uyghurs.[392]In 2021, ambassadors from Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, and Sudan made statements in support of China's Xinjiang policies.[393]: 39 Burkina Faso's ambassador stated that Western allegations of forced labor and genocide are groundless.[393]: 39–40 Sudan's ambassador stated that the Xinjiang issue is not about human rights, but rather is a political weapon used by Western countries against China.[393]: 40 AmericasCanadaIn July 2020, The Globe and Mail reported that human rights activists, including retired politician Irwin Cotler, were urging the Parliament of Canada to recognize the abuses against Uyghurs in China as genocide and to impose sanctions on the officials responsible.[394]On 21 October 2020, the Subcommittee on International Human Rights (SDIR) of the Canadian House of Commons Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development condemned the persecution of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang by the Government of China and concluded that the Chinese Communist Party's actions amount to the genocide of the Uyghurs per the Genocide Convention.[395][396][397][398]On 22 February 2021, the Canadian House of Commons voted 266–0 to approve a motion that formally recognizes China as committing genocide against its Muslim minorities. Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and his cabinet did not vote.[399][400][401] China's Ambassador to Canada responded to the motion by calling the allegations of genocide and forced labor the "lie of the century."[402] In June 2021, Canada's Senate voted 29–33 against a motion to recognize the treatment of Uyghurs as genocide and to call for the 2022 Winter Olympics to be moved out of China should such treatment continue.[403]On 11 April 2021, Canada issued a travel advisory stating that individuals with "familial or ethnic ties" could be "at risk of arbitrary detention" by Chinese authorities when traveling in the Xinjiang region.[404][405] Radio Canada International reported that the announcement described that China had been "increasingly detaining ethnic and Muslim minorities in the region without due process."[404]In 2023, the House of Commons unanimously voted in favour of a non-binding motion to accept 10,000 Uyghur refugees fleeing persecution in China over the course of two years. The idea was to resettle them from countries such as Turkey rather than directly from China since Parliament member Sameer Zuberi, who proposed the motion, argued there was no safe way to do the latter.[406]United StatesFurther information: United States sanctions against ChinaUN counter-terrorism chief Vladimir Voronkov visited Xinjiang in June 2019.[407][408][409] The visit prompted anger from the U.S. State Department.[410] The U.S. has called these visits "highly choreographed" and characterized them as having "propagated false narratives."[411]In 2020, the United States Congress passed the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act in reaction to the internment camps.[412][413] Lawmakers also proposed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act requiring the assumption that all Xinjiang goods are made with forced labor and therefore banned.[414] In September 2020, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security blocked imports of products from five entities in Xinjiang to combat the use of forced labor, while shelving broader proposed bans.[415][416] A senior US diplomat called upon other countries to join the United States denunciations against the Chinese government's policies in Xinjiang.[417] Senators Cornyn, Merkley, Cardin, and Rubio signed a letter to request Mike Pompeo, the United States Secretary of State, to issue a determination of genocide. The National Review reports that "U.S. government genocide determinations are an incredibly tricky thing. They require solid evidence to meet the criteria set out under the 1948 Genocide Convention." When determinations are issued there isn't much change or an effect that they will bring in the short run. Although, "there's a strong, well-documented case for a determination in this case."[418] As of November 2020, US Senators Menendez and Cornyn are leading a bipartisan group to recognize the CCP's actions in Xinjiang as a genocide by way of a Senate resolution, which would make the United States Senate the first government to "officially recognize the situation as a genocide."[418]On 19 January 2021, Pompeo announced that the United States Department of State had determined that "genocide and crimes against humanity" had been perpetrated by China against the Uyghurs,[30] with Pompeo stating: "the People's Republic of China, under the direction and control of the Chinese Communist Party, has committed genocide and crimes against humanity against the predominantly Muslim Uighurs and other ethnic and religious minority groups, including ethnic Kazakhs and Kyrgyz... [i]n the anguished cries from Xinjiang, the U.S. hears the echoes of Nazi Germany, Rwanda, Bosnia and Darfur."[419] The announcement was made on the last full day of the Donald Trump presidency.[30][419]At the end of the Trump presidency, the incoming Biden administration had already declared as the Joe Biden 2020 presidential campaign that such a determination should be made, and that America would continue to recognize the Xinjiang activity as a genocide.[30] On 16 February 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden commented in a CNN town hall meeting in Wisconsin that Xi Jinping's rationale for justifying his policies, the idea that there "must be a united, tightly controlled China", derives from the fact that "Culturally, there are different norms that each country and their leaders are expected to follow."[420] He also promised in the same meeting that "there will be repercussions for China" for its human rights violations.[421] Some sources interpreted Biden's statements as excusing Chinese policy towards Uyghurs on cultural relativist grounds,[422] whereas an opposite view deemed it a misrepresentation.[421]In July 2021 while speaking at the Singaporean branch of the International Institute for Strategic Studies American Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin remarked on "genocide and crimes against humanity against Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang."[423]In March 2023, the House of Representatives Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party held hearings on what Washington says is an ongoing genocide against Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in China's Xinjiang region.[424]AsiaMiddle EastMany countries in the Middle East signed a UN document defending China's human rights record.[390][425][392] Iraq and Iran have also signed the document[426] while Saudi Arabia and Egypt have been accused of deporting Uyghurs to China.[427][428][429][430][431] Saudi Arabia supports China's approach in Xinjiang, and on a visit to China in 2019, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman stated, “China has the right to carry out anti-terrorism and de-extremization work for its national security.”[432] The United Arab Emirates has formally defended China's human rights records.[433] These countries have appreciated China's respect for the principle of non-interference in other countries' affairs and have therefore placed significance on their economic and political relations.[417]At the 2020 ministerial meeting of the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum, the Arab countries stated that they supported China's position on Xinjiang.[393]: 57 In an April 2021 group interview with CGTN anchor Liu Xin following their visit to Xinjiang, Syrian and Palestinian ambassadors to China Imad Moustapha and Fariz Mehdawi [ar] respectively accused Western media of intentionally overlooking "the economic, social and cultural rights that Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities enjoy in the region."[434] RFA journalist Shohret Hoshur criticised their responses and cited a past interview with Uyghur mother Patigul Ghulam as she was looking for her son killed in the 2009 Ürümqi riots, who said the Uyghurs were in a worse situation than the Palestinians and Syrians.[435]QatarQatar supported China's policies in Xinjiang until August 21, 2019; Qatar was the first Middle Eastern country to withdraw its defense of the Xinjiang camps.[436][437][438]IsraelIn 2021, Israel voted to condemn China's actions in the UNHRC; a sudden break in China–Israel relations.[439][440]Post-Soviet statesRussia, Belarus, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have expressed support for China's policies in Xinjiang.[391][392] Russia signed both statements at the UN (in July and October 2019) that supported China's Xinjiang policies.[358][360][392] NPR reported that Kazakhstan and "its neighbors in the mostly Muslim region of Central Asia that have benefited from Chinese investment aren't speaking up for the Muslims inside internment camps in China".[441]South AsiaNepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka have signed a UN document supporting China's policies in Xinjiang.[392][442]PakistanIn July 2021, Prime Minister Imran Khan said in an interview that he believes "the Chinese version" of the facts pertaining to abuses in Xinjiang and argued that undue attention was being given to Xinjiang relative to human rights violations in other regions of the world, such as in Kashmir.[443][444]Southeast AsiaCambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and the Philippines have issued statements of support for China's policies.[390] According to The Moscow Times, Thailand, Malaysia, and Cambodia have all deported Uyghur people at China's request.[445] In 2020, Malaysia minister Mohd Redzuan Md Yusof said that Malaysia would not entertain requests from Beijing to extradite Uyghurs if they felt their safety was at risk.[446]TurkeyIn February 2019, the Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesperson issued a statement calling China's repression of its Uighur minority a "great shame for humanity".[447][448] In response to a question on the reported death of Uyghur musician Abdurehim Heyit within the Xinjiang internment camps, the spokesperson stated "more than one million Uyghur Turks incurring arbitrary arrests are subjected to torture and political brainwashing in internment camps and prisons".[447] In July 2019, Turkish journalists from Milliyet and Aydınlık interviewed Heyit in Ürümqi who denied that he was tortured.[449][450]In February 2021, authorities arrested Uyghur protesters in Ankara following a complaint by the embassy of China in Turkey.[451][452] In March 2021, the Turkish parliament rejected a motion to call the Chinese government's treatment of Uyghurs a genocide.[453][454]On July 13, 2021, President Erdogan told Chinese President Xi Jinping in a phone call that it was important to Turkey that "Uyghur Turks live in prosperity and peace as equal citizens of China" but that Turkey respected China's territorial integrity and sovereignty.[455]In 2022, Turkey issued a joint statement with 49 UN member states condemning the Chinese government's persecution of Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang.[456]EuropeBelgiumIn May 2021, testimony about the situation in Xinjiang to the foreign affairs committee of the Belgian chamber of representatives had to be postponed after a massive DDOS attack on the .be domain.[457][458] In June 2021, the Belgian Parliament's foreign relations committee passed a motion condemning the abuses as crimes against humanity and stating that there was a "serious risk of genocide" in Xinjiang.[39][38]Czech RepublicIn June 2021, the Czech Senate unanimously passed a motion condemning the abuses against the Uyghurs as both genocide and crimes against humanity.[39][38]FranceIn December 2020, France said that it would oppose the proposed Comprehensive Agreement on Investment between China and the European Union over the use of forced labour of Uyghurs.[459][citation needed] In February 2021, the French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian denounced "institutionalised repression" of Uyghurs at the UNHRC.[460]French parliament in January 2022 denounced a "genocide" by China against its Uyghur Muslim population in a resolution.[36]FinlandIn March 2021 Finland's Prime Minister Sanna Marin tweeted a condemnation of the human rights situation in Xinjiang.[461]LithuaniaIn May 2021, the Lithuanian Parliament passed a resolution recognizing that the Chinese government's human rights abuses against the Uyghurs constitute genocide.[35]NetherlandsPro-Uyghur protest in Amsterdam, The Netherlands on 5 February 2011On February 25, 2021, the Netherlands parliament passed a non-binding resolution declaring the Chinese government's actions against the Uyghurs as a genocide.[33][462][463]UkraineUkraine had originally signed onto a 22 June 2021 statement to the UNHRC which called for independent observers to be provided immediate access to Xinjiang, but withdrew its signature two days later. Ukrainian lawmakers later stated that China had forced the policy pivot by threatening to limit trade and block a scheduled shipment of at least 500,000 COVID-19 vaccine doses.[464]United KingdomOn 10 October 2020, Britain's Shadow Foreign Secretary, Lisa Nandy suggested that Britain must oppose giving China a seat on the UNHRC in protest against its abuse of Uyghur Muslims. She added that the UN must be allowed to conduct an inquiry into possible crimes against humanity in Xinjiang.[465]A letter was signed in September 2020 by more than 120 MPs and peers, including senior Tories and Liberal Democrat leader Sir Ed Davey, which accused China of a "systematic and calculated programme of ethnic cleansing" against the country's Uyghur minority, and compared China to Nazi Germany.[466]In January 2021, the British parliament rejected a resolution which would have banned the UK from trading with countries engaged in genocides. Prime Minister Boris Johnson opposed the resolution.[467][468]In January 2021, foreign secretary Dominic Raab made a statement over China's human rights violations against Uyghurs, accusing China of "extensive and invasive surveillance targeting minorities, systematic restrictions on Uyghur culture, education, and the practice of Islam, and the widespread use of forced labour."[469]In January 2021, The Guardian reported that the UK government "fended off an all-party effort to give the courts a chance to designate China guilty of genocide on the day that Blinken said China was intent on genocide in Xinjiang province."[470]In March 2021, the UK and the EU sanctioned four Chinese officials, including Zhu Hailun and Wang Junzheng, for their involvement in violating the human rights of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang.[471] In response, China imposed sanctions on nine UK citizens for spreading "lies and disinformation" about human rights abuses in Xinjiang.[472]On 22 April 2021, the House of Commons unanimously passed a non-binding parliamentary motion declaring China's human rights abuses in Xinjiang as a genocide.[34][473]OceaniaAustraliaIn September 2019, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne stated, "I have previously raised Australia's concerns about reports of mass detentions of Uyghurs and other Muslim peoples in Xinjiang. We have consistently called for China to cease the arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and other Muslim groups. We have raised these concerns—and we will continue to raise them—both bilaterally and in relevant international meetings."[474] In March 2021, the federal government blocked a motion by Rex Patrick to recognize China's treatment of the Uyghurs as a genocide.[475][476]New ZealandIn 2018, New Zealand prime minister Jacinda Ardern raised the issue of Xinjiang while visiting Guangdong Party Secretary Leader Li Xi. Ardern also raised such concerns during China's periodic review at the UN in November 2018, to immediate pushback from China.[477]Ardern discussed Xinjiang privately with Xi Jinping during a 2019 visit to Beijing after the Christchurch mosque shootings. The New York Times accused New Zealand of tiptoeing around the issue for economic reasons as the country exports many products to China, including milk, meat, and wine.[478]On 5 May 2021, the New Zealand Parliament adopted a motion declaring that "severe human rights abuses" were occurring against the Uyghur people in Xinjiang. An earlier version of the motion proposed by the opposition ACT Party had accused the Chinese Government of committing genocide against the Uyghurs. The ruling Labour Party had opposed including the word "genocide" in the motion, leading to an amended version criticising "severe human rights abuses."[37]Other reactionsDomestic reactionChinese government officials and many Chinese people state that foreign discourses cast in terms of genocide, human rights abuses, and concentration camps show foreign political bias and ignorance of the facts.[90]: 136 According to academics Steve Tsang and Olivia Cheung, an overwhelming majority of Chinese approve of the government's policies toward minorities, including Uyghurs.[346]: 206 Non-governmental organizations and research institutionsIn January 2020, President Ghulam Osman Yaghma of the East Turkistan Government-in-Exile wrote that "the world is silently witnessing another Holocaust like genocide in East Turkistan....as the President of East Turkistan Government-in-Exile, on behalf of East Turkistan and its people, we again call on the international community including world governments to acknowledge and recognize China's brutal Holocaust like the oppression of East Turkistan's people as a genocide."[479]The Uyghur American Association previously expressed concern at the deportation of 20 Uyghur refugees from Cambodia to China in 2009,[480] and has said that Beijing's military approach to terrorism in Xinjiang is state terrorism.[481] The United States Holocaust Memorial Museum has issued statements describing the conditions in Xinjiang as crimes against humanity.[482][483][484] According to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, "the Chinese government's campaign against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang is multi-faceted and systematic. It is characterized by mass detention, forced labor, and discriminatory laws, and supported through high-tech manners of surveillance."[485]As of July 2020, Amnesty International had not taken a position on whether the Chinese government's treatment of Uyghurs constituted a genocide.[394] In June 2021, Amnesty released a report saying that China's treatment of Uyghurs constituted crimes against humanity.[486] Genocide Watch "considers the forced sterilizations and forcible transfer of children of Uyghurs and other Turkic minorities in Xinjiang to be acts of genocide" and subsequently issued a Genocide Emergency Alert in November 2020.[487]In September 2020, nearly two dozen activist groups, including the Uyghur Human Rights Project, Genocide Watch, and the European Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, signed an open letter urging the UNHRC to investigate whether crimes against humanity or genocide were taking place in Xinjiang.[488]In March 2021, the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy, a think tank at the Fairfax University of America, released a report stating that the "People's Republic of China bears State responsibility for committing genocide against the Uyghurs in breach of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide."[489][233] According to the report, the determination of the "intent to destroy the Uyghurs as a group is derived from objective proof, consisting of comprehensive state policy and practice, which President Xi Jinping, the highest authority in China, set in motion." The legal analysis of the Newlines Institute concludes that the People's Republic of China is responsible for breaches of each provision of Article II of the Genocide Convention.[233][337][490]Human Rights Watch followed in April 2021 with a report outlining "that the Chinese government has committed—and continues to commit—crimes against humanity against the Turkic Muslim population."[491] The report stated that Human Rights Watch had "not documented the existence of the necessary genocidal intent at [the] time", but that "nothing in this report precludes such a finding and, if such evidence were to emerge, the acts being committed against Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang—a group protected by the 1948 Genocide Convention—could also support a finding of genocide". The report made in collaboration with the Stanford Human Rights & Conflict Resolution Clinic also sets out recommendations for concerned governments and the UN.Uyghur TribunalMain article: Uyghur TribunalThe Uyghur Tribunal, a "people's tribunal" based in the United Kingdom, began to hold hearings in June 2021 to examine evidence in order to evaluate whether China's abuses against Uyghurs constitute genocide under the Genocide Convention.[492][493][494][495][496] The tribunal was chaired by Geoffrey Nice, the lead prosecutor in the trial of Slobodan Milošević, who announced the creation of the tribunal in September 2020.[492][493][497]On 9 December 2021, the tribunal concluded that China has committed genocide against the Uyghurs via birth control and sterilization measures.[498] The tribunal also found evidence of crimes against humanity, torture and sexual abuse.[498] The tribunal's final determination does not legally bind any government to take action.[496][499][500][501][502]Multinational corporationsXinjiang boycott advert on NYU's campus in New York, NY"Boycott Xinjiang Genocide Products! 抵制新疆种族灭绝产品！Also don't attack our Chinese neighbors.Just say no to xenophobia and racism!"In reaction to the proposed Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act in 2020 to impose sanctions on "any foreign person who 'knowingly engages'" and require firms to disclose their dealings with Xinjiang,[414] the president of the American Apparel & Footwear Association said that blanket import bans on cotton or other products from Xinjiang from such legislation would "wreak havoc" on legitimate supply chains in the apparel industry because Xinjiang cotton exports are often intermingled with cotton from other countries and there is no available origin-tracing technology for cotton fibers.[503] On September 22, 2020, the US Chamber of Commerce issued a letter stating that the act "would prove ineffective and may hinder efforts to prevent human rights abuses."[504] Major companies with supply chain ties to Xinjiang, including Apple Inc., Nike, Inc. and The Coca-Cola Company, have lobbied Congress to weaken the legislation and amend its provisions.[505]In February 2021, a policy was established by 12 Japanese companies to cease business deals with some of the Chinese firms involved in or benefitting from forced labor of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.[506]Both Nike and Adidas have criticized human rights abuses in Xinjiang and pledged not to do business in the region; their sales in China subsequently declined.[507] After a December 2022 report stated that nearly every global automaker had ties to Uyghur forced labor, United Auto Workers called for all automakers to cut off any supply chain links to Xinjiang.[508]Religious groupsIn July 2020, Marie van der Zyl, the President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews, pointed to similarities between the mass detention of Uyghur Muslims and concentration camps in the Holocaust.[509][510] On International Holocaust Remembrance Day in January 2021, van der Zyl urged the Chinese government to step back from committing atrocities.[511]In December 2020, the Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the Commonwealth Ephraim Mirvis published an op-ed in The Guardian on the occasion of Hanukkah in which he condemned the persecution of the Uyghurs and called for international action to address the "unfathomable mass atrocity" taking place in China.[512][513] The Chief Rabbi generally refrains from making comments on non-Jewish political issues.[510] Mirvis is part of a wider Jewish protest movement which has sprung up in opposition to the human rights abuses in Xinjiang, protesters are largely motivated by memories of the Holocaust and a desire to prevent a repeat of that horror.[514] In addition to liberal British Jews who have long been involved in international human rights issue the plight of the Uyghur also draws significant interest and support from Britain's Orthodox community. According to Orthodox Rabbi Herschel Gluck "This is something that is felt very deeply by the community. They feel that if 'Never again' is a term that needs to be used, this is certainly one of the situations where it applies."[510]In December 2020, a coalition of American Muslim groups criticized the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation for failing to speak up to prevent the abuse of the Uyghurs and accused member states of being "cowed by China's power". The groups included the Council on American–Islamic Relations (CAIR).[515]In August 2020, a group of 70 British faith leaders including imams, rabbis, bishops, cardinals, and an archbishop publicly declared that the Uyghurs faced "one of the most egregious human tragedies since the Holocaust" and called for those responsible to be held accountable. The group included the representative of the Dalai Lama in Europe and Rowan Williams, former Archbishop of Canterbury.[516]In March 2021, a group of sixteen Rabbis and a Cantor from across California's Jewish religious spectrum sent a letter to Representative Ted Lieu urging him to take action in support of the Uyghurs.[517] The grassroots organization Jewish Movement for Uyghur Freedom works to bridge the gap between the Uyghur and Jewish communities as well as advocate on their behalf.[518] In contrast to the earlier Save Darfur campaign major Jewish donors and organizations have tread softly due to a fear of reprisals against themselves and associated businesses by the Chinese government. Major Jewish groups which have spoken out on the Uyghur genocide or taken policy positions on it include the Union for Reform Judaism, the American Jewish Committee, the Rabbinical Assembly, the Anti-Defamation League, and the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.[519]In April 2021, the Jewish Council for Public Affairs, a U.S-based public policy group composed of organizations representing Reconstructionist, Reform, Conservative, and Orthodox Jews, urged the Jewish community to "call upon the [Chinese Communist Party] to end the genocide and exploitation of the Uyghurs, as well as halt the oppression of other ethnic and religious minorities living within its borders."[520]In 2021, a number of Jewish organizations and leaders in the United Kingdom including rabbi Jonathan Wittenberg incorporated the situation in Xinjiang into their Holocaust Memorial Day remembrances and commemorations.[521]In December 2021, the Council on American–Islamic Relations (CAIR) welcomed Biden’s decision to sign the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.[522]In December 2021, a coalition of Jewish organizations, including the American Jewish Committee and the Rabbinical Assembly, issued an open letter titled "Open Letter from the Jewish Community to President Biden on the Uyghur Genocide" to President Joe Biden urging additional action in response to abuses against Uyghurs including countering propaganda, strengthening sanctions, and increasing the amount of Uyghur refugees admitted to the US.[523][524]In January 2022, Jewish American activist Elisha Wiesel[525] criticised China and expressed support for Uyghur dissidents in a speech at a UN-held ceremony to mark International Holocaust Remembrance Day.[526] His speech drew praise from Uyghur Human Rights Project director Omer Kanat.[527]On 8 January 2023, World Bosniak Congress President[528] and former Grand Mufti of Bosnia Mustafa Ceric toured Xinjiang along with a delegation of more than 30 Islamic scholars from 14 countries as part of a Chinese government-organized visit, where he praised "the Chinese policy of fighting terrorism and de-radicalization for achieving peace and harmony" in the region, adding he was glad to see that Muslims there live in happiness.[529] Mustafa Prljaca, adviser to Bosnia's current Grand Mufti Husein Kavazovic, told Radio Free Europe that his office did not agree with Ceric's statements, saying: "We have different views, based on the information that we have."[530]In April 2023, the California chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR-CA) expressed strong support for the California Assembly resolution introduced by Jesse Gabriel condemning the human rights abuses in Xinjiang and supporting the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act.[531]ProtestsUyghur human rights demonstration protest near the White House, on September 25, 2015The Chinese Consulate in Almaty, Kazakhstan has been the site of a daily protest demonstration, primarily made up of old women whose relatives are believed to be detained in China.[532] In 2020 Uyghur protesters outside the Consulate General of China, Los Angeles were joined by activists representing Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.[533]Regular protests from local Uyghurs have been held at Chinese diplomatic sites in Istanbul, Turkey, where several hundred Uyghur women protested on International Women's Day in March 2021.[534] In London regular protests outside an outpost of the Chinese embassy have been organized by an Orthodox Jewish man from the local neighborhood. He has held protests at least twice a week since February 2019.[535][536]In March 2021, hundreds of Uyghurs living in Turkey protested the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to Istanbul by gathering both in Beyazit Square and near China's Consulate-General in Istanbul.[537] Over two-dozen NGOs that focus on the rights of Uyghurs were involved in organizing the protests.[537]In October 2021, basketball player Enes Kanter protested against abuses against the Uyghurs by the Chinese state by wearing sneakers on court which said "Modern Day Slavery" and "No More Excuses." He also criticized Nike for being silent on injustices in China.[538] Kanter tweeted "It is so disappointing that the governments and leaders of Muslim-majority countries are staying silent while my Muslim brothers and sisters are getting killed, raped, and tortured."[539]2022 Winter Olympics BoycottMain article: Concerns and controversies at the 2022 Winter OlympicsIn the aftermath of the 2019 leak of the Xinjiang papers which made public Chinese policies towards the Uyghurs, calls were made for a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics.[540][541][542][543] In a 30 July 2020 letter, the World Uyghur Congress urged the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to reconsider the decision to hold the Olympics in Beijing.[544][545] In a non-binding motion in February 2021, the Canadian House of Commons called for the IOC to move the Olympics to a new location.[546] The IOC met with activists in late 2020 about their request to move the Olympics.[547] In March 2021, the President of the International Olympic Committee Thomas Bach opposed a boycott, which would also damage the IOC image and finances, and said that the IOC must stay out of politics.[547] On 6 April 2021, a senior U.S. State Department official stated that the department's position "on the 2022 Olympics has not changed" and that it has not "discussed and [is] not discussing any joint boycott with allies and partners."[548] Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, India, Kosovo, Lithuania, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States announced diplomatic boycotts of the 2022 Winter Olympics.[549][550][551][552][553][554]Legal casesOn 4 January 2022, nineteen Uyghurs, with the help of lawyer Gulden Sonmez, filed a criminal case for torture, rape, crimes against humanity and genocide in the Istanbul Prosecutor's Office against Chinese officials. Sonmez stated that Turkish legislation recognises universal jurisdiction for the offences alleged in the case.[555]PublicationsNury Turkel published the book No Escape: The True Story of China's Genocide of the Uyghurs in 2022, which documented his personal story on the repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.[556][557] The book was long-listed for the 2022 Moore Prize for Human Rights Writing.[558]Denial of abusesThe abuses against the Uyghurs and related ethnic groups have been denied by the Chinese government. These denials have been both internal and external.[559] The Chinese government has conducted propaganda campaigns on social media to further denial of the abuses. In 2021, the Chinese government posted thousands of videos to social media showing residents of Xinjiang denying claims of abuse made by Mike Pompeo; a joint investigation by ProPublica and The New York Times found the videos were part of an influence campaign coordinated by the CCP's Central Propaganda Department.[116] They have also used their existing disinformation networks, including social media trolls, to deny genocide and other human rights abuses against Uyghurs.[560]In 2020, during an interview with Andrew Marr of the BBC, the Chinese ambassador to the UK Liu Xiaoming denied any abuse against Uyghurs despite being shown drone footage of what appeared to be shackled Uyghur, and other minority ethnic, prisoners being herded on to trains during a prison transfer. The ambassador also blamed reports of forced sterilisations on "some small group of anti-China elements".[561] In January 2021, Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Zhao Lijian responded to questions about the Uyghur genocide during a press briefing by stating, "China has no genocide; China has no genocide; China has no genocide, period."[562][563] In February 2021, Wang Wenbin called the Uyghur genocide the "lie of the century".[564][565]The abuses, and the existence of the camp network, have also been denied by a small minority of American left-wing media outlets. These include a left-wing blog called LA Progressive which began publishing denial articles in April 2020, while The Grayzone has been the most influential outlet to publish articles denying "China's ongoing repression of the Uyghur people".[566] The Grayzone has been featured by Chinese state media, including CGTN and the Global Times. In 2020, Chinese government spokesperson Hua Chunying retweeted a story published by The Grayzone which claimed to have debunked research into the internment camps in Xinjiang.[567]In February 2021, a Press Gazette investigation found that Facebook had accepted content from Chinese state media outlets such as China Daily and China Global Television Network that denied the mistreatment of Uyghurs.[568]According to anthropologist and China expert Gerald Roche, writing in The Nation, Xinjiang denialism only aids Chinese and American imperialism.[569] He cited Donald Trump, who, according to former National Security Advisor John Bolton, believed that building internment camps was "exactly the right thing to do."[570]According to reports by the Newlines Institute, a think tank at the Fairfax University of America, AmaBhungane, and The New York Times, Neville Roy Singham funds a network of nonprofits and groups, including Code Pink, that deny or downplay human rights abuses against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslim minorities in Xinjiang.[571][572][573]While on a Chinese government-sponsored trip to Xinjiang, former KMT chairwoman Hung Hsiu-chu accused Western nations of fabricating lies about Chinese repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.[574]See alsoOutline of Genocide studiesEthnic minorities in ChinaHistory of the Uyghur peopleHistory of XinjiangTurkic settlement of the Tarim BasinDzungar genocideDungan RevoltXinjiang conflictXinjiang papersTransnational repression by ChinaExplanatory notes^ July 2019 signatories opposing China's actions in Xinjiang: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK.^ July 2019 signatories supporting China's actions in Xinjiang: original signatories: Algeria, Angola, Bahrain, Belarus, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Comoros, The Congo, Cuba, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Gabon, Kuwait, Laos, Myanmar, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, The Philippines, Qatar (see below), Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Togo, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe;subsequently added signatories: Bangladesh, Djibuti, Equatorial Guinea, Iran, Iraq, Mozambique, Nepal, Palestine (the Palestinian Authority), Serbia, South Sudan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Yemen, Zambia.Note that Qatar quickly retracted their support after originally signing.[357]^ Including the US, Canada, Japan and Australia.^ Including Belarus, Pakistan, Russia, Egypt, Bolivia, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Serbia.^ October 2020 signatories opposing China's actions in Xinjiang: Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Palau, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.A.[27]^ October 2020 signatories supporting China's actions in Xinjiang: Angola, Bahrain, Belarus, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, China, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Cuba, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gabon, Grenada, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iran, Iraq, Kiribati, Laos, Madagascar, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, North Korea, Pakistan, State of Palestine, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, the U.A.E., Venezuela, Yemen, and Zimbabwe.[27]^ October 2020 non-signatories to the statement supporting China's actions in Xinjiang who had expressed support in 2019: Algeria, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Kuwait, Nigeria, Oman, the Philippines, Serbia, Somalia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Zambia.[27]ReferencesCitations^ Abbas, Rushan (2021). 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Wikipedia® is a registered trademark of the Wikimedia Foundation, Inc., a non-profit organization.Privacy policyAbout WikipediaDisclaimersContact WikipediaCode of ConductDevelopersStatisticsCookie statementMobile viewToggle limited content width<h2>Uyghur | History, Language, & Facts | Britannica</h2>Uyghur | History, Language, & Facts | BritannicaSearch BritannicaClick here to searchSearch BritannicaClick here to searchLogin Subscribe SubscribeHomeGames & QuizzesHistory & SocietyScience & TechBiographiesAnimals & NatureGeography & TravelArts & CultureMoneyVideosOn This DayOne Good FactDictionaryNew ArticlesHistory & SocietyLifestyles & Social IssuesPhilosophy & ReligionPolitics, Law & GovernmentWorld HistoryScience & TechHealth & MedicineScienceTechnologyBiographiesBrowse BiographiesAnimals & NatureBirds, Reptiles & Other VertebratesBugs, Mollusks & Other InvertebratesEnvironmentFossils & Geologic TimeMammalsPlantsGeography & TravelGeography & TravelArts & CultureEntertainment & Pop CultureLiteratureSports & RecreationVisual ArtsCompanionsDemystifiedImage GalleriesInfographicsListsPodcastsSpotlightsSummariesThe ForumTop Questions#WTFact100 WomenBritannica KidsSaving EarthSpace Next 50Student Center Home Games & Quizzes History & Society Science & Tech Biographies Animals & Nature Geography & Travel Arts & Culture Money Videos Uyghur Table of Contents Uyghur Table of Contents Introduction References & Edit History Related Topics For Students Uighur summary Discover 7 Deadliest Weapons in History7 Puzzling Plane Disappearances12 Greek Gods and GoddessesHow Did Helen Keller Fly a Plane?What Is the Newest Country in the World?Why Doesn’t Arizona Observe Daylight Saving Time?Who Votes for the Academy Awards?Home Geography & Travel Human Geography Peoples of Asia Geography & TravelUyghurpeople Actions Cite verifiedCite While every effort has been made to follow citation style rules, there may be some discrepancies. 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External Websites Council on Foreign Relations - China’s Repression of Uyghurs in XinjiangMinority Rights Group International - UighursHistory Today - A Uighurs’ History of ChinaAlso known as: Uighur, Uygur, Weiwu’er Written and fact-checked by The Editors of Encyclopaedia BritannicaEncyclopaedia Britannica's editors oversee subject areas in which they have extensive knowledge, whether from years of experience gained by working on that content or via study for an advanced degree. They write new content and verify and edit content received from contributors. The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica Last Updated: Mar 13, 2024•Article History Table of Contents Category: Geography & TravelChinese (Pinyin): Weiwu’er(Show more)Also spelled: Uygur or Uighur(Show more) See all related content → Recent News Mar. 13, 2024, 5:28 AM ET (AP) US-mandated religious freedom group ends Saudi trip early after rabbi ordered to remove his kippah Mar. 12, 2024, 5:49 AM ET (AP) Philippines says US will address concerns over garment exports held up on suspicion of forced labor Feb. 21, 2024, 11:49 PM ET (AP) An online dump of Chinese hacking documents offers a rare window into pervasive state surveillanceShow More Show Less Uyghur, a Turkic-speaking people of interior Asia. Uyghurs live for the most part in northwestern China, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region; a small number live in the Central Asian republics. There were some 10,000,000 Uyghurs in China and a combined total of at least 300,000 in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan in the early 21st century.The Uyghur language is part of the Turkic group of Altaic languages, and the Uyghurs are among the oldest Turkic-speaking peoples of Central Asia. They are mentioned in Chinese records from the 3rd century ce. They first rose to prominence in the 8th century, when they established a kingdom along the Orhon River in what is now north-central Mongolia. In 840 this state was overrun by the Kyrgyz, however, and the Uyghurs migrated southwestward to the area around the Tien (Tian) Shan (“Celestial Mountains”). There the Uyghurs formed another independent kingdom in the Turfan Depression region, but this was overthrown by the expanding Mongols in the 13th century.More From BritannicaCentral Asian arts: UighursThe Uyghurs are mainly a sedentary village-dwelling people who live in the network of oases formed in the valleys and lower slopes of the Tien Shan, Pamirs, and related mountain systems. The region is one of the most arid in the world; hence, for centuries they have practiced irrigation to conserve their water supply for agriculture. Their principal food crops are wheat, corn (maize), kaoliang (a form of sorghum), and melons. The chief industrial crop is cotton, which has long been grown in the area. Many Uyghurs are employed in petroleum extraction, mining, and manufacturing in urban centres.The chief Uyghur cities are Ürümqi, the capital of Xinjiang, and Kashgar (Kashi), an ancient centre of trade on the historic Silk Road near the border between Russia and China. The Uyghurs have lacked political unity in recent centuries, except for a brief period during the 19th century when they were in revolt against Beijing. Their social organization is centred on the village. The Uyghurs of Xinjiang are Sunni Muslims.Large numbers of Han (ethnic Chinese) began moving into Xinjiang after the establishment of the autonomous region in the 1950s. The influx became especially pronounced after 1990, and by the late 20th century the Han constituted two-fifths of Xinjiang’s total population. Over time economic disparities and ethnic tensions grew between the Uyghur and Han populations that eventually resulted in protests and other disturbances. A particularly violent outbreak occurred in July 2009, mainly in Ürümqi, in which it was reported that nearly 200 people (mostly Han) were killed and some 1,700 were injured. Violent incidents increased after that and included attacks by knife-wielding assailants and by suicide bombers. Chinese authorities responded by cracking down on Uyghurs suspected of being dissidents and separatists. The authorities’ actions included shootings, arrests, and long jail sentences until 2017, when the Chinese government initiated a thorough crackdown on Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Citing a need for greater security, the government set up cameras, checkpoints, and constant police patrols in Uyghur-dominated areas. The most controversial governmental undertaking—which was met by protests from human rights organizations—was the indefinite detention of up to one million Uyghurs in “political training centres,” heavily fortified buildings that were likened to the reeducation camps of the Mao Zedong era. In August 2018 the United Nations called upon China to end the detention, but government officials denied the existence of the camps. The Editors of Encyclopaedia BritannicaThis article was most recently revised and updated by Adam Zeidan. <h2>Uygur ethnic group | english.scio.gov.cn</h2>Uygur ethnic group | english.scio.gov.cnHOMETOP NEWSPRESS ROOMSCIO NEWSCHINA PROJECTSBELT AND ROADIN-DEPTHABOUT SCIOMORE +INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGESCHINA VOICESINFOGRAPHICSVIDEOSWHITE PAPERSFEATUREDCHINA FACTSHome > China Facts > Ethinic Minorities > Uygur ethnic groupChina.org.cn丨Updated: April 6, 2017Population: 8,399,393Major area of distribution: XinjiangLanguage: UygurReligion: IslamAlmost all the Uygurs are found in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region which covers more than 1,709,400 square kilometers or approximately one sixth of China's total landmass, and is by far the biggest of the country's regions and provinces. It occupies much of the sparsely-populated northwest.Besides the Uygur ethnic group, Han, Kazak, Hui, Mongolian, Kirgiz, Tajik, Xibe, Ozbek, Manchu, Daur, Tatar and Russian people also live in Xinjiang. The Uygurs is the largest ethnic group in Xinjiang. They believe in Islam.The region is bounded by the Altay Mountains in the north, the Pamirs in the west, the Karakoram Mountains, Altun Mountains and Kunlun Mountains in the south. The Tianshan Mountains divide Xinjiang into northern and southern parts with very different climate and landscape. Southern Xinjiang includes the Tarim Basin and the Taklimakan Desert, China's largest, while northern Xinjiang contains the Junggar Basin, where the Karamay Oilfields and the fertile Ili River valley are situated. The Turpan Basin, the hottest and lowest point in China, lies at the eastern end of the Tianshan Mountains. The Tarim, Yarkant, Yurunkax and Qarran rivers irrigate land around the Tarim Basin, while the Ili, Irtish, Ulungur and Manas rivers flow through arable and pastoral areas in northern Xinjiang. Many of the rivers spill into lakes. The Lop Nur, Bosten (Bagrax), Uliungur and Ebinur lakes teem with fish.Xinjiang's climate is dry and warm in the south, and cold in the north with plenty rainfall and snow. The Uygurs farm areas around the Tarim Basin and the Gobi Desert. Wheat, maize and paddy rice are the region's main grain crops, and cotton is a major cash crop. Since the 1950s, cotton has been grown in the Manas River valley north of 40 degrees latitude. The Tianshan Mountains are rich in coal and iron, the Altay in gold, and the Kunlun in jade. The region also has big deposits of non-ferrous and rare metals and oil, and rich reserves of forests and land open to reclamation.HistoryXinjiang has been part of China since ancient times. The Uygurs, together with other ethnic groups, opened up the region and have had very close economic and cultural ties with people in other parts of the country, particularly central China.Xinjiang was called simply "Western Region" in ancient times. The Jiaohe ruins, Gaochang ruins, Yangqi Mansion of "A Thousand Houses," Baicheng (Bay) Kizil Thousand Buddha Grottoes, Bozklik Grottoes in Turpan, Kumtula Grottoes in Kuqa and Astana Tombs in Turpan all contain a great wealth of relics from the Western and Eastern Han dynasties (206 BC-AD 220). They bear witness to the efforts of the Uygurs and other ethnic groups in Xinjiang in developing China and its culture.Zhang Qian, who lived in the second century BC, went to the Western Region as an official envoy in 138 and 119 BC, further strengthening ties between China and central Asia via the "Silk Road." In 60 BC, Emperor Xuan Di of the Western Han Dynasty established the Office of Governor of the Western Region to supervise the "36 states" north and south of the Tianshan Mountains with the westernmost border running through areas east and south of Lake Balkhash and the Pamirs.During the Wei, Jin, Northern and Southern dynasties (220-581) the Western Reigon was a political dependent of the government in central China. The Wei, Western Jin, Earlier Liang (317-376), Earlier Qin (352-394) and Later Liang (386-403) dynasties all stationed troops and set up administrative bodies there. In 327, Zhang Jun of the Earlier Liang Dynasty set up in Turpan the Gao Chang Prefecture, the first of its kind in the region.In the mid-seventh century, the Tang Dynasty established the Anxi Governor's Office in Xizhou (present-day Turpan, it later moved to Guizi, present-day Kuqa) to rule areas south and north of the Tianshan Mountains. The superintendent's offices in the Pamirs were all under the jurisdiction of the Anxi Governor's Office. In the meantime, four Anxi towns of important military significance – Guizi, Yutian (present-day Hotan), Shule (present-day Kaxgar) and Suiye (on the southern bank of the Chu River) – were established.In the early eighth century, the Tang Dynasty added Beiting Governor's Office in Tingzhou (present-day Jimsar). The Beiting and Anxi offices, with an administrative and military system under them, implemented effectively the Tang government's orders.In the early 13th century, Genghis Khan (1162-1227) appointed a senior official in the region. The Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368) established Bieshibali (present-day areas north of Jimsar) and Alimali (present-day Korgas) provinces. The Hami Military Command was set up during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644). During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) the northern part of the Western Region, namely, north of Irtish River and Zaysan Lake, was under Zuo Fu General's Office in Wuliyasu. The General's Office in Ili exercised power over areas north and south of the Tianshan Mountains, east and south of Lake Balkhash and the Pamirs. Xinjiang was made a province in 1884, the 10th year of the reign of Emperor Guang Xu.Uygur means "unity" or "alliance." The origin of the ethnic group can be traced back to the Dingling nomads in northern and northwestern China and in areas south of Lake Baikal and between the Irtish River and Lake Balkhash in the third century B.C. Some people maintain that the forefathers of the Uygurs were related to the Hans. The Dingling were later called the Tiele, Tieli, Chile or Gaoche (high wheel). The Yuanhe tribe reigned supreme among the Gaoche tribes during the fifth century A.D., and the Weihe among the Tiele during the seventh century. Several tribes rallied behind the Weihe to resist Turkic oppression.These ancient Uygur people were finally conquered by Turkic Kirghiz in the mid-ninth century. The majority of the Uygurs, who were scattered over many areas, moved to the Western Region under the Anxi Governor's Office, and areas west of Yutian. Some went to the Tufan principality in western Gansu Province. The Uygurs who settled in the Western Region lived commingled with Turkic nomads in areas north of the Tianshan Mountains and western pasturelands as well as with Hans, who had emigrated there after the Western and Eastern Han dynasties. They intermarried with people in southern Xinjiang and Tibetan, Qidan (Khitan) and Mongol tribes, and evolved into the group now known as the Uygurs.The Uygurs made rapid socio-economic and cultural progress between the ninth and the 12th centuries. Nomadism gave way to settled farming. Commercial and trade ties with central China began to thrive better than ever before. Through markets, they exchanged horses, jade, frankincense and medicines for iron implements, tea, silk and money. With the feudal system further established, a land and animal owners' class came into being, comprising Uygur khans and Bokes (officials) at all levels. After Islam was introduced to Kaxgar in the late 10th century, it gradually extended its influence to Shache (Yarkant) and Yutian, and later in the 12th century to Kuya and Yanqi, where it replaced Shamanism, Manichae, Jingism (Nestorianism, introduced to China during the Tang Dynasty), Ao'ism (Mazdaism) and Buddhism, which had been popular for hundreds of years. Western Region culture developed quickly, with Uygur, Han, Sanskrit, Cuili and Poluomi languages, calendars and painting styles being used. Two major centers of Uygur culture and literature – Turpan in the north and Kaxgar in the south – came into being. The large number of government documents, religious books and folk stories of this period are important works for students of the Uygur history, language and culture.In the early 12th century, part of the Qidan tribe moved westward from north-east China under the command of Yeludashi. They toppled the Hala Khanate established by the Uygurs, Geluolu and other Turkic tribes in the 10th century, and founded the Hala Khanate of Qidan (Black Qidan), or Western Liao as it is now referred to by historians. The state of Gao Chang became its vassal state. After the rise of the Mongols, most of Xinjiang became the territory of the Jagatai Khanate. In the meantime, when many Hans were sent to areas either south or north of the Tianshan Mountains to open up waste land, many Uygurs moved to central China. The forefathers of the Uygurs and Huis in Changde and Taoyuan counties in Hunan Province today moved in that exodus. The Uygurs exercised important influence over politics, economy, culture and military affairs. Many were appointed officials by the Yuan court and, under the impacts of the Han culture, some became outstanding politicians, military strategists, writers, historians and translators.The Uygur areas from Hami in the east to Hotan in the south were unified into a greater feudal separatist Kaxgar Khanate after more than two centuries of separatism and feuding from the late 14th century. As the capital was moved to Yarkant, it was also known as the Yarkant Khanate. Its rulers were still the offspring of Jagatai. During the early Qing period, the Khanate was a tributary of the imperial court and had commercial ties with central China. After periods of unsteady relations with the Ming Dynasty, the links between the Uygurs and ethnic groups in central China became stronger. Gerdan, chief of Dzungaria in northern Xinjiang, toppled the Yarkant Khanate in 1678 and ruled the Uygur area. The Qing army repelled in 1757 (the 22nd year of the reign of Emperor Qian Long) the separatist rebellion by the Dzungarian nobles instigated by the Russian Tsar, and in 1759 smashed the "Batu Khanate" founded by Poluonidu and Huojishan, the Senior and Junior Khawaja, in a separatist attempt.The Qing government introduced a system of local military command offices in Xinjiang. It appointed the General in Ili as the highest Western Regional Governor of administrative and military affairs over northern and southern Xinjiang and the parts of Central Asia under Qing influence and the Kazak and Blut (Kirgiz) tribes. For local government, a system of prefectures and counties was introduced.The imperial court began to appoint and remove local officials rather than allowing them to pass on their titles to their children. This weakened to some degree the local feudal system. The court also encouraged the opening up of waste land by garrison troops and local peasants, the promotion of commerce and the reduction of taxation, which were important steps in the social development of Uygur areas.Xinjiang was completely under Qing Dynasty rule after the mid-18th century. Although political reforms had limited the political and economic privileges of the feudal Bokes (lords), and taxation was slightly lower, the common ethnic people's living standards did not change significantly for the better. The Qing officials, through local Bokes, exacted taxes even on "garden trees." The Bokes expanded ownership on land and serfs, controlled water resources and manipulated food grain prices for profit.Harsh feudal rule and exploitation gave rise to the six-month-long Wushi (Uqturpan) uprising in 1765, the first armed rebellion by the Uygur people against feudalism. With the aim of preserving their rule and getting rid of Qing control, Uygur feudal owners made use of struggles between religious factions to whip up nationalism and cover up the worsening class contradictions. Zhangger, grandson of the Senior Khawaja, a representative of those owners, under the banner of religion and armed with British-supplied weapons, harassed southern Xinjiang many times from 1820 to 1828, but failed to win military victory.Uprisings and foreign interventionNot long after the outbreak of the Opium War, the Uygurs and Huis in Kuqa, influenced by rebellions of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom and the Nian Army uprisings by ethnic minority peasants in Yunnan, Shaanxi and Gansu provinces, launched an armed uprising in 1864. People in Urumqi, Shache (Yarkant), Ili, Barkol, Qitai, Hami, Mori, Jimsar and Changji responded. Uprisings against the Qing court swept Xinjiang, and several separatist regimes came into being. However, a handful of national and religious upper elements usurped the fruits of the uprisings under the cloak of "ethnic interest" and "religion," and became self-styled kings or khans. The warfare that ensued among them brought still greater catastrophes to the local people.Britain fostered Yukub Beg, the General Commander of the Kokand Khanate in 1865, who invaded Xinjiang and established the Zhedsar Khanate (Seven-City Khanate). Yukub Beg was a tool in the hands of Britain and Tsarist Russia, who wanted to split Xinjiang. He exercised cruel rule and, in the name of Allah, killed 40,000 non-Muslims in southern Xinjiang. His persecution was also extended to Islamic believers, who were tried at unfair "religious courts." The local people had to shoulder the war burdens, supplying warring factions with food grain, fuel, vehicles and draught animals, and the local economy suffered catastrophic damage. Bankrupt peasants fled, and some had to sell their children for a living. The slave trade boomed at local bazaars.To preserve Russia's vested interest and maintain an equilibrium in influence with Britain in Central Asia, the Tsar, behind the back of the Qing Court, signed illegal commercial and trade treaties with Yukub Beg. Russia claimed that it could not "sit idle" while there were uprisings in the provinces in western China, and in the name of "recovery and defense upon request," it sent troops to occupy Ili in 1871 and started a 10-year period of colonial rule. The Russian troops forced people of the Uygur, Kazak, Hui, Mongolian and Xibe tribes into designated zones in a "divide and rule" policy. Many Uygurs had to flee their home towns, and moved to Huicheng and Dongshan.It was in the interest of all ethnic groups to smash the Yukub Beg regime and recover Ili. So many local people supported the Qing troops when they overthrew Yukub Beg and recovered Xinjiang in 1877. However, not long after the Qing government had signed the "Sino-Russian Treaty of Peking" and the "Tahcheng Protocol on the Delimitation of the Sino-Russian Border," whereby China was compelled to cede 440,000 square kilometers of land to Russia, the Qing Court again concluded the "Ili Treaty" with Russia in 1881. Although China recovered Ili, it lost another 70,000 square kilometers of territory west of the Korgas River, and was charged nine million roubles compensation. On the eve of its withdrawal from Ili, Tsarist Russia coerced more than 10,000 Uygur, Hui, Mongolian, Kazak and Kirgiz people to move to Russia. Farmland, irrigation facilities, houses and orchards were devastated and food grain and animals looted. Five of nine cities in Ili became virtually ruins, and the Uygurs in the nine townships on the right bank of the Ili River were reduced to poverty.The Qing government decided to make the Western Region – formerly ruled by the general stationed in Ili – a province named Xinjiang, a step of important significance for local development and the strengthening of the north-west border defense against imperialist aggression. Ties between the area and central China became closer, and there was greater unity between the Uygurs and other ethnic groups in the common struggle against imperialism and feudalism.After the Revolution of 1911 which overthrew the Qing Dynasty, Qing rule was replaced by feudal warlords. Sheng Shicai, who claimed to be progressive, usurped power in Xinjiang in the "April 12" coup of 1933.In the same year, Britain encouraged Mohamed Imin, who dreamed of a greater Turkey, to found the Hotan Islamic Republic, and Maula Shabitida, an advocate of greater Islam, to set up the East Turkistan Islamic Republic. Japanese imperialism in 1937 masterminded the plots by Mamti and Raolebas to form an "independent" Islamic state, and Mamti, in collaboration with Mahushan, rebelled. However, all these separatist efforts failed.Contemporary historyIn 1933, when China was at a crucial point in history, the Chinese Communist Party began revolutionary activities in Xinjiang aimed at peace, democracy and progress. Sheng Shicai had to take some progressive steps, and declared six major policies -- anti-imperialism, amity with the Soviet Union, national equality, honest government, peace and national reconstruction. In the same year, the "Anti-Imperialist Association of the People of Xinjiang" was formed, and the journal, "Anti-Imperialist Front," was published. Part of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army went to Xinjiang in 1937. Later Sheng Shicai turned to the Kuomintang, persecuting the Communists, progressive people, patriotic youth and workers.The Kuomintang began to rule Xinjiang in 1944, forcing sharper contradictions on the Uygurs and other ethnic groups. It exacted dozens of taxes under all kinds of pretexts. One example was the taxation on land. An average peasant had to pay well over 15 percent of annual income for it. The amount of taxes in terms of money was eight times the sum in 1937. Local industry and commerce virtually went bankrupt, and the situation for rural Uygurs was even worse.Uprisings took place in Ili, Tacheng and Altay to oppose Kuomintang rule. They served to accelerate the liberation of the region in the national liberation war.Tao Zhiyue, the Commandant of the Kuomintang Xinjiang Garrison, and Burhan Shahidi, Chairman of the Kuomintang Xinjiang Provincial Government, accepted Chinese Communist Party's peace terms, and revolted against the Kuomintang government in Nanjing, and Xinjiang was peacefully liberated in October, 1949.Customs and habitsIn the past, many poor Uygur farmers lived on a diet of narrow-leaved oleaster and dried apricot and peach, mulberry and grain porridge. Now, wheat flour, rice and maize are the staple foods. Uygurs in some areas like milk tea with baked maize or wheat cakes. Some are made by mixing flour with sugar, eggs, butter or meat and are delicious. Paluo (sweet rice), cooked with mutton, sheep fat, carrots, raisins, onions and rice, is an important festival food for guests.The Uygurs' cotton growing and cotton yarn spinning industry has a long history. Working people usually wear cotton cloth garments. Men sport a long gown called a qiapan, which opens on the right and has a slanted collar. It is buttonless and is bound by a long square cloth band around the waist. Women wear broad-sleeved dresses and black waist coats with buttons sewn on the front. Some now like to wear Western-style suits and skirts. The Uygurs, old and young, men and women, like to wear a small cap with four pointed corners, embroidered with black and white or colored silk threads in traditional Uygur designs. The women's favorite decorations include earrings, bracelets and necklaces. Some paint their eyebrows and fingernails on grand festive occasions. Girls in the past combed their hair into a dozen pigtails, and regarded long hair as part of female beauty. After marriage, they usually wear two pigtails with loose ends, decorated on the head with a crescent-shaped comb. Some tuck up their pigtails into a bun.Over the centuries, many mosques, mazas (Uygur complexes, nobles' tombs), theological seminaries and religious courts were set up in Uygur areas. Over the past few hundred years, religion has greatly influenced economic, judicial and educational affairs and the Uygur family and matrimonial system. Some of the rich people made use of religious rules to marry more than one wife, and had the right to divorce them at any time. The marriage of the ordinary Uygurs was mostly arranged by the parents. Male chauvinism was practiced in the family, and Uygur women, humiliated and with nobody to turn to, often retreated into prayer.After 1949, feudal religious privileges were abolished, and religion was taken out of the control of the reactionary ruling class, and became a matter of individual conscience. As science and knowledge spread, many of the old feudalistic religious habits lost popularity. People can now decide for themselves whether the Sawm should be observed during Ramadan, how many naimazi (services) should be performed in a day and whether women in the street should wear veils.As these matters do not affect normal religious belief, the Uygurs are beginning to enjoy a more genuine religious freedom. The family, marriage and property are under the protection of the law, and Uygur women enjoy equality with men. Many are now working alongside men in modern industries.There are now more than a dozen million Moslems in the country, compared with eight million in the early post-1949 period. In 1953, the Chinese Islamic Association was established with Burhan Shahidi as its chairman. More than seven million people in Xinjiang believe in Islam, accounting for well over half of the national total. In the mid-1080s, there were 15,800 religious professionals, about 2,000 of whom were either deputies to the People's Congress or the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference at various levels, or worked in the regional or county branches of the Chinese Islamic Association. The region now boasts a total of 15,500 mosques or prayer centers, or one for almost every Moslem village.Culture since the mid-20th centuryUygur culture and art, which have a long and rich tradition, has flourished. Uygur literature is very rich in style and subject matter. Many folk tales, parables, comedies, poems and proverbs praise the courage, wisdom and kindness of the ordinary people, while satirizing the greed, cruelty and foolishness of the exploiting classes. For instance, "The Tales of Afandi" contain stinging satire about the Bayis and Imams who bully the people.Much of the written Uygur literature has been passed down from the 11th century, such as the epic "Kutadolu Biliq" (Blessings and Wisdom) by Yusuf Hass Hajib, and The Turkic Dictionary by Mohamu Kashgar, which are important works for students of ancient Uygur history, culture and language. More modern works include Maulabilalibin Maulayusuf's Wars on the Chinese Land, an epic describing the 1864 struggle of the Uygurs in Ili against the Qing government. Mutalifu, the patriotic and revolutionary poet, composed poems such as "Chinese Guerrillas," "Militant Girls" and "Love and Hatred" during the Anti-Japanese War. After 19949, much work has been done to collect, compile and publish classic and folk Uygur literature.The Uygurs are excellent at dancing. The "12 Mukams" (opera) is an epic comprising more than 340 classic songs and folk dances. After liberation, this musical treasure, which was on the verge of being lost, was collected, studied and recorded. The "Daolang Mukams," popular in Korla, Bachu (Maralwexi), Markit and Ruoqiang (Qarkilik), is another suite with distinct Uygur flavor.There is a wide variety of plucked, wind and percussion Uygur musical instruments, including the dutar, strummed rawap and dap. The first two are instruments with a clear and crisp tone for solo and orchestral performances. The dap is a sheepskin tambourine with many small iron rings attached to the rim. It is used to accompany dancing.The Uygur dances, such as the "Bowls-on-Head Dance," "Drum Dance," "Iron Ring Dance" and "Puta Dance," feature light, graceful and quick-swinging choreography movements. The "Sainaim Dance" is the most popular, while the "Duolang Dance," sometimes referred to as a flower of Uygur folk culture, brims over with vitality. It depicts the hunting activities of the ancient people of Markit. The movements portray strength, wildness and enthusiasm. The "Nazilkum," popular in Turpan, Shanshan and Hami, fully reflects the Uygurs' optimism and gift for humor.MORE FROM China SCIOChina.org.cn<h2>China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang | Council on Foreign Relations</h2>China’s Repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang | Council on Foreign Relations Skip to main content Cancel Council on Foreign Relations Foreign Affairs CFR Education Newsletters Related Sites Council of Councils Think Global Health Online Store SearchSearchUkraineIsrael-HamasTopicsFeatured Climate Change Global Climate Agreements: Successes and FailuresIntroduction Over the last several decades, governments have collectively pledged to slow global warming. 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The reeducation camps are just one part of the government’s crackdown on Uyghurs. A Uyghur man works at his shop in Kashgar in the Xinjiang region. Kevin Frayer/Getty Images Written ByLindsay Maizland Updated Last updated September 22, 2022 11:30 am (EST) PrintEmailShareSummaryAbout eleven million Uyghurs—a mostly Muslim, Turkic-speaking ethnic group—live in the northwestern region of Xinjiang.The Chinese government has imprisoned more than one million people since 2017 and subjected those not detained to intense surveillance, religious restrictions, forced labor, and forced sterilizations.The United States determined that China’s actions constitute genocide, while a UN report said they could amount to crimes against humanity.IntroductionThe Chinese government has reportedly arbitrarily detained more than a million Muslims in reeducation camps since 2017. Most of the people who have been detained are Uyghur, a predominantly Turkic-speaking ethnic group primarily in China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang. Beyond the detentions, Uyghurs in the region have been subjected to intense surveillance, forced labor, and involuntary sterilizations, among other rights abuses. More From Our Experts Joshua Kurlantzick Myanmar’s Army is Collapsing: An Update Manjari Chatterjee Miller India Strives to Balance Interests in the Middle East Carl Minzner Beijing’s Ideological Pivot Back To the Past The United States and several other foreign governments have described China’s actions in Xinjiang as genocide, while the UN human rights office said that the violations could constitute crimes against humanity. Chinese officials have said that they have not infringed on Uyghurs’ rights and claimed that they closed the reeducation camps in 2019. However, international journalists and researchers have documented an ongoing system of mass detention throughout the region using satellite images, individual testimonies, and leaked Chinese government documents.When did mass detentions of Muslims start?More on:ChinaHuman RightsReligionIslamAn estimated eight hundred thousand to two million Uyghurs and other Muslims, including ethnic Kazakhs and Uzbeks, have been detained since 2017, according to international researchers and U.S. government officials [PDF]. The Chinese government calls the facilities “vocational education and training centers;” the most common terms used by international media organizations and researchers are reeducation camps, internment camps, and detention camps. Some activists describe them as concentration camps. Outside of the camps, the eleven million Uyghurs living in Xinjiang—officially called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region—have continued to suffer from a decades-long crackdown by Chinese authorities.Experts estimate that reeducation efforts started in Xinjiang in 2014 and were drastically expanded in 2017. Beginning that year, they documented the construction of new reeducation camps and expansion of existing facilities for mass detention. Reuters journalists, observing satellite imagery, found that thirty-nine of the camps almost tripled in size between April 2017 and August 2018; they covered a total area roughly the size of 140 soccer fields. Similarly, analyzing local and national budgets over the past few years, Germany-based Xinjiang expert Adrian Zenz found that construction spending on security-related facilities in Xinjiang increased by 20 billion yuan (around $2.96 billion) in 2017. More From Our Experts Joshua Kurlantzick Myanmar’s Army is Collapsing: An Update Manjari Chatterjee Miller India Strives to Balance Interests in the Middle East Carl Minzner Beijing’s Ideological Pivot Back To the Past In late 2019, Xinjiang’s governor said that people detained in the reeducation camps had “graduated.” Journalists found that several camps were indeed closed. But the following year, researchers at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) identified [PDF] more than 380 suspected detention facilities using satellite images. They found that China refashioned some lower-security reeducation camps into formal detention centers or prisons; expanded existing detention centers; and constructed new, high-security detention centers throughout Xinjiang. (Chinese officials have said that ASPI is an anti-China tool funded by Australia and the United States.) Instead of detaining people in reeducation camps, authorities have increasingly used the formal justice system to imprison people for years. In 2022, Human Rights Watch reported that half a million people had been prosecuted since 2017, according to Xinjiang government figures. The Associated Press found that in one county, an estimated one in twenty-five people had been sentenced to prison on terrorism-related charges, all of them Uyghurs.What has happened in the reeducation camps?Most people detained in the reeducation camps were never charged with crimes and had no legal avenues to challenge their detentions. The detainees seem to have been targeted for a variety of reasons, according to media reports, including traveling to or contacting people from any of the twenty-six countries China considers sensitive, such as Turkey and Afghanistan; attending services at mosques; having more than three children; and sending texts containing Quranic verses. Often, their only crime is being Muslim, human rights groups say, adding that many Uyghurs have been labeled as extremists simply for practicing their religion. More on:ChinaHuman RightsReligionIslamInformation on what happened in the camps remains limited, but many detainees who have since fled China described harsh conditions. The UN human rights office released a report [PDF] in 2022 based on interviews with dozens of people, including twenty-six individuals who were detained, that found “patterns of torture or other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment” in the camps between 2017 and 2019. The UN report affirmed previous findings by international journalists, researchers, and rights organizations. Various exposés showed that detainees were forced to pledge loyalty to the CCP and renounce Islam, as well as sing praises for communism and learn Mandarin. Some people reported prison-like conditions, with cameras and microphones monitoring their every move and utterance. Others said they were tortured and subjected to sleep deprivation during interrogations. Women have shared stories of sexual abuse, including rape. Some released detainees contemplated suicide or witnessed others kill themselves.Detention also disrupted families. Children whose parents were sent to the camps were often forced to stay in state-run orphanages. Many Uyghur parents living outside of China faced a difficult choice: return home to be with their children and risk detention, or stay abroad, separated from their children and unable to contact them.What do Chinese officials say about the camps?Government officials first denied the camps’ existence. By late 2018, they started acknowledging that there were “vocational education and training centers” in Xinjiang. They publicly stated that the camps had two purposes: to teach Mandarin, Chinese laws, and vocational skills, and to prevent citizens from becoming influenced by extremist ideas, to “nip terrorist activities in the bud,” according to a government report. Pointing out that Xinjiang has not experienced a terrorist attack since December 2016, officials claimed the camps have prevented violence.As global condemnation of the abuses has grown, Chinese officials and state media have worked to discredit reports on Xinjiang using a range of tactics, including disseminating disinformation and harassing activists. They have repeated a narrative that “anti-China forces” in the United States and other Western countries are spreading “vicious lies.” Beijing tried to prevent the UN human rights office from releasing its report. After its release, Chinese officials described it as false information and published a rebuttal describing how foreign governments and organizations “spread numerous rumors and lies” about Xinjiang.Why is China targeting Uyghurs in Xinjiang?Chinese officials are concerned that Uyghurs hold extremist and separatist ideas, and they viewed the camps as a way of eliminating threats to China’s territorial integrity, government, and population. Xinjiang has been claimed by China since the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took power in 1949. Some Uyghurs living there refer to the region as East Turkestan and argue that it ought to be independent from China. Xinjiang takes up one-sixth of China’s landmass and borders eight countries, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kazakhstan.Daily News BriefA summary of global news developments with CFR analysis delivered to your inbox each morning. Weekdays.UrlEmailView all newsletters >The World This WeekA weekly digest of the latest from CFR on the biggest foreign policy stories of the week, featuring briefs, opinions, and explainers. Every Friday.Think Global HealthA curation of original analyses, data visualizations, and commentaries, examining the debates and efforts to improve health worldwide. Weekly.By entering your email and clicking subscribe, you're agreeing to receive announcements from CFR about our products and services, as well as invitations to CFR events. You are also agreeing to our Privacy Policy and Terms of Use.View all newsletters >Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, the CCP has pushed to Sinicize religion, or shape all religions to conform to the officially atheist party’s doctrines and the majority Han-Chinese society’s customs. Though the government recognizes five religions—Buddhism, Catholicism, Daoism, Islam, and Protestantism—it has long feared that foreigners could use religious practice to spur separatism.The Chinese government has come to characterize any expression of Islam in Xinjiang as extremist, a reaction to past independence movements and occasional outbursts of violence. The government has blamed terrorist attacks on the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, a separatist group founded by militant Uyghurs, in recent decades. (In 2020, the United States removed the group from its list of terrorist organizations, saying there was no credible evidence that the group had operated for at least the previous decade.) Following the 9/11 attacks, the Chinese government started justifying its actions toward Uyghurs as part of the Global War on Terrorism. It said it would combat what it calls “the three evils”—separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism—at all costs.In 2009, rioting in Xinjiang’s capital, Ürümqi, broke out as mostly Uyghur demonstrators protested against state-incentivized Han Chinese migration in the region and widespread economic and cultural discrimination. Nearly two hundred people were killed, and experts say it marked a turning point in Beijing’s attitude toward Uyghurs. In the eyes of Beijing, all Uyghurs could potentially be terrorists or terrorist sympathizers. During the next few years, authorities blamed Uyghurs for attacks at a local government office, train station, and open-air market, as well as Tiananmen Square in Beijing. Workers walk along the fence of a likely detention center for Muslims in Xinjiang on September 4, 2018. Thomas Peter/ReutersWhile visiting Xinjiang in 2014, Xi warned of the “toxicity of religious extremism” and advocated for using the tools of “dictatorship” to eliminate Islamist extremism in a series of secret speeches. In the speeches, revealed by the New York Times in 2019, Xi did not explicitly call for arbitrary detention but laid the groundwork for the crackdown in Xinjiang.In 2017, Xinjiang’s government passed an anti-extremism law that prohibited people from growing long beards and wearing veils in public. It also officially recognized the use of training centers to eliminate extremism. Arbitrary detention became widely used by regional officials under Chen Quanguo, Xinjiang’s Communist Party secretary, who moved to the region in 2016 after holding a top leadership position in Tibet. Known for increasing the number of police and security checkpoints, as well as state control over Buddhist monasteries in Tibet, Chen dramatically intensified security in Xinjiang. He repeatedly called on officials to “round up everyone who should be rounded up,” according to the New York Times report. Chen left the position in late 2021. Are economic factors involved in this crackdown?Xinjiang is an important link in China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a massive development plan stretching through Asia and Europe. Beijing hopes to eradicate any possibility of separatist activity to continue its development of Xinjiang, which is home to China’s largest coal and natural gas reserves. Human rights organizations have observed that the economic benefits of resource extraction and development are often disproportionately enjoyed by Han Chinese people, and Uyghur people are increasingly marginalized.Many people who were arbitrarily detained have been forced to work, according to multiple reports [PDF]. ASPI estimated that, between 2017 and 2020, eighty thousand previously detained Uyghurs were sent to factories throughout China linked to eighty-three global brands. Researchers from the Center for Strategic and International Studies say forced labor is an important element of the government’s plan for Xinjiang’s economic development, which includes making it a hub of textile and apparel manufacturing. Chinese officials have described the policy as “poverty alleviation.” To view this video please enable JavaScript, and consider upgrading to a web browser that supports HTML5 videoAre Uyghur Muslims Facing Genocide?VideoPauseVideoPauseAre Uyghur Muslims Facing Genocide?EmbedWhat is happening outside the camps in Xinjiang?International journalists who have visited the region say that Xinjiang has been turned into a surveillance state that relies on cutting-edge technology to monitor millions of people. Under Chen, Xinjiang was placed under a grid management system, as described in media reports, in which cities and villages were split into squares of about five hundred people. Each square has a police station that closely monitors inhabitants by regularly scanning their identification cards, taking their photographs and fingerprints, and searching their cell phones. In some cities, such as western Xinjiang’s Kashgar, police checkpoints are found every one hundred yards or so, and facial-recognition cameras are everywhere. The government also collects and stores citizens’ biometric data through a required program advertised as Physicals for All.Much of that information is collected in a massive database, known as the Integrated Joint Operations Platform, which then uses artificial intelligence to create lists of so-called suspicious people. Classified Chinese government documents released by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) in 2019 revealed that more than fifteen thousand Xinjiang residents were placed in detention centers during a seven-day period in June 2017 after being flagged by the algorithm. The Chinese government called the leaked documents “pure fabrication.”Many aspects of Muslim life have been erased, journalists reporting from Xinjiang have found. Communist Party members have been recruited since 2014 to stay in Uyghur homes and report on any perceived “extremist” behaviors, including fasting during Ramadan. Officials have destroyed thousands of mosques, often claiming the buildings were shoddily constructed and unsafe for worshippers. Halal food, which is prepared according to Islamic law, has become harder to find in Ürümqi as the local government has launched a campaign against it.Uyghur and other minority women have reported forced sterilizations and intrauterine device insertions [PDF], and officials have threatened to detain anyone who violates birth-control orders or has too many children. Analyzing government data, Zenz found that in Xinjiang’s two prefectures with the highest proportions of Uyghurs, the natural population growth rates (which exclude population change from migration) fell by 84 percent between 2015 and 2018, and declined further still in 2019. Uyghur parents are banned from giving their babies certain names, including Mohammed and Medina. Beijing has also pressured other governments to repatriate Uyghurs who have fled China, with a 2022 report [PDF] by the Wilson Center finding that more than 1,500 Uyghurs abroad have been detained in their host countries or forced to return to China. In 2015, for example, Thailand returned more than one hundred Uyghurs, and in 2017 Egypt deported several students. The documents released by ICIJ showed that the Chinese government instructed officials to collect information on Chinese Uyghurs living abroad and called for many to be arrested as soon as they reentered China.What has the global response been?Much of the world has condemned China’s detention of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The UN human rights office has urged China to release people who have been arbitrarily detained and disclose the whereabouts of those who are missing. After the office released its report in 2022, several Western countries on the UN Human Rights Council were considering a motion against China, potentially with an investigative mechanism. Lawmakers in several countries, including Canada and the United Kingdom, have declared that China is committing genocide against Uyghurs; the U.S. government was the first to do so, in January 2021. Many countries have sanctioned Chinese officials and entities linked to rights abuses. The European Union (EU) also sanctioned Chinese officials in 2021, marking the first time the bloc placed restrictions on China since 1989. Additionally, foreign governments have imposed restrictions to address forced labor in Xinjiang. The United States has essentially banned all imports from the region through its Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, and the United Kingdom has proposed measures to fine companies that fail to guarantee their supply chains do not use forced labor. The European Parliament adopted a nonbinding resolution in mid-2022 urging EU countries to ban imports made with forced labor. China’s partners have been notably silent. Prioritizing their economic ties and strategic relationships with China, many governments have ignored the human rights abuses. In June 2022, sixty countries signed a statement calling for the UN human rights chief to respect that Xinjiang-related issues are “China’s internal affairs” and stating that they “oppose the politicization of human rights.” Muslim-majority countries such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were among the signatories; human rights groups have criticized Muslim-majority countries for condoning the abuses.Recommended ResourcesThe UN human rights office documents China’s abuses in Xinjiang [PDF] in a report released in 2022.For Foreign Affairs, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom’s Nury Turkel and the U.S. State Department’s Beth Van Schaack lay out a plan for stopping China’s genocide. The BBC looks inside a Chinese reeducation camp using information from a cache of documents known as the Xinjiang Police Files.Survivors of China’s persecution share their stories with the New Yorker.On The President’s Inbox podcast, Uyghur journalist Gulchehra Hoja discusses the Chinese government’s repression.Analyzing satellite imagery of newly constructed factories, BuzzFeed looks at the rise of forced labor in Xinjiang.For Foreign Affairs, journalist Nithin Coca examines how China’s actions in Xinjiang could affect its relations with Muslim-majority nations.Creative Commons Creative Commons: Some rights reserved. CloseThis work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) License.View License DetailChinaHuman RightsReligionIslamWill Merrow helped create the graphics in this Backgrounder. For media inquiries on this topic, please reach out to [email protected]. 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Cook March 8, 2024Council on Foreign RelationsAboutMember ProgramsContactSupportFor MediaNewslettersMembershipCareers©2024 Council on Foreign Relations.All rights reserved.Privacy Policy and Terms of Use. <h2>Uyghurs - Chinese Studies - Oxford Bibliographies</h2>Uyghurs - Chinese Studies - Oxford BibliographiesJump to ContentJump to Main Navigation Personal Profile Subject ListAboutNewsTake a TourFor AuthorsSubscriber ServicesContact UsSite Help PublicationsPagesPublicationsPages Browse by Subject African American StudiesAfrican StudiesAmerican LiteratureAnthropologyArchitecture Planning and PreservationArt HistoryAtlantic HistoryBiblical StudiesBritish and Irish LiteratureBuddhismChildhood StudiesChinese StudiesCinema and Media StudiesClassicsCommunicationCriminologyEcologyEducationEnvironmental ScienceEvolutionary BiologyGeographyHinduismInternational LawInternational RelationsIslamic StudiesJewish StudiesLatin American StudiesLatino StudiesLinguisticsLiterary and Critical TheoryManagementMedieval StudiesMilitary HistoryMusicPhilosophyPolitical SciencePsychologyPublic HealthRenaissance and ReformationSocial WorkSociologyUrban StudiesVictorian LiteratureBrowse All SubjectsHow to SubscribeFree TrialsSign inCloseLoginSign inYou could not be signed in, please check and try again.UsernamePlease enter your UsernamePasswordPlease enter your PasswordForgot password?Don't have an account?Sign in via your InstitutionYou could not be signed in, please check and try again.Sign in with your library cardPlease enter your library card numberIn This Article Expand or collapse the "in this article" section Uyghurs IntroductionGeneral OverviewContested Histories and NarrativesEconomy and MigrationGeopolitics and SecurityUyghurs and the StateIdentityUyghur Culture, Language, and LiteratureMass Internment, Formal Incarceration, and Forced LaborOfficial Chinese NarrativesBack to topRelated Articles Expand or collapse the "related articles" sectionaboutAbout Related Articles close popupChina’s WestChinese NationalismEthnicity and Minority Nationalities Since 1949Ethnicity and the HanHuman Rights in ChinaIslam in ChinaOther Subject AreasAfrican American StudiesAfrican StudiesAmerican LiteratureAnthropologyArchitecture Planning and PreservationArt HistoryAtlantic HistoryBiblical StudiesBritish and Irish LiteratureBuddhismChildhood StudiesCinema and Media StudiesClassicsCommunicationCriminologyEcologyEducationEnvironmental ScienceEvolutionary BiologyGeographyHinduismInternational LawInternational RelationsIslamic StudiesJewish StudiesLatin American StudiesLatino StudiesLinguisticsLiterary and Critical TheoryManagementMedieval StudiesMilitary HistoryMusicPhilosophyPolitical SciencePsychologyPublic HealthRenaissance and ReformationSocial WorkSociologyUrban StudiesVictorian LiteratureForthcoming Articles Expand or collapse the "forthcoming articles" sectionComputing in ChinaPopular Music in Contemporary ChinaSino-Russian Relations Since the 1980sFind more forthcoming articles... FeedbackPrintExport CitationsCiteEmail this contentShare LinkCopy this link, or click below to email it to a friendEmail this content or copy the link directly:https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com/display/document/obo-9780199920082/obo-9780199920082-0187.xmlThe link was not copied. Your current browser may not support copying via this button.Link copied successfullyCopy linkShare ThisFacebook LinkedIn Twitter UyghursbyDavid O'BrienLAST MODIFIED: 21 April 2021DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199920082-0187IntroductionThe Uyghur (alternatively spelled Uighur) are the largest and titular ethnic group living in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, a vast area in northwestern China of over 1.6 million sq. km. According to the 2010 census Uyghurs make up 45.21 percent of the population of Xinjiang, numbering 8,345,622 people. The Han, the largest ethnic group in China, make up 40.58 percent in the region with 7,489,919. A Turkic-speaking largely Muslim ethnic group, the Uyghurs traditionally inhabited a series of oases around the Taklamakan desert. Their complex origin is evidenced by a rich cultural history that can be traced back to various groups that emerged across the steppes of Mongolia and Central Asia. Uyghur communities are also found in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, with significant diaspora groups in Australia, the United States, Germany, and Turkey. In the first half of the 20th century, Uyghurs briefly declared two short-lived East Turkestan Republics in 1933 and again in 1944, but the region was brought under the complete control of the Chinese state after the Communist Party (CCP) came to power in 1949. Within China they are considered one of the fifty-five officially recognized ethnic minority groups, who, along with the Han who constitute 92 percent of the population, make up the Chinese nation or Zhonghua Minzu 中华民族. However, for many Uyghurs the name “Xinjiang,” which literally translates as “New Territory,” indicates that their homeland is a colony of China, and they prefer the term “East Turkestan.” Nevertheless, many scholars use Xinjiang as a natural term even when they are critical of the position of the Communist Party. In this article both terms are used. In the early years of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) Uyghurs numbered about 80 percent of the population of Xinjiang, but large-scale government-sponsored migration has seen the number of Han in the region rise to almost the same as that of the Uyghur. This has led to an increase in ethnic tensions often caused by competition for scarce resources and a perception that the ruling Communist Party favors the Han. In 2009, a major outbreak of violence in the capital Ürümchi saw hundreds die and many more imprisoned. The years 2013 and 2014 were also crucial turning points with deadly attacks on passengers in train stations in Kunming and Yunnan, bombings in Ürümchi, and a suicide attack in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, all blamed on Uyghur terrorists. Since then the Chinese government has introduced a harsh regime of security clampdowns and mass surveillance, which has significantly increased from 2017 and which, by some accounts, has seen over one million Uyghurs and other Muslim ethnic minorities imprisoned without trial in “reeducation” camps. The Chinese government insist these camps form part of an education and vocational training program designed to improve the lives of Uyghurs and root out “wrong thinking.” Many Uyghurs believe it is part of a long-term project of assimilation of Uyghur identity and culture.General OverviewIn recent years scholarly interest in the Uyghurs has increased especially as reports of conflict and ethnic tensions have continued to emerge. Within China scholarship on ethnic groups in general, and Uyghurs and Tibetans in particular, is highly sensitive and most of what is publicly available adheres closely to the government line (see Official Chinese Narratives). Research by Uyghur scholars is even more sensitive as evidenced by the authors of some of the works contained in this annotated bibliography having been imprisoned in recent years. For this reason much of the scholarship contained here has been written by those working outside of China. Understanding who the Uyghurs are and how their identity came to be as we know it today involves an exploration of a complex history of states and tribes, some of which passed in quick succession over the past thousand years—Qarluq, Qarakhanid, Qara Khitay, Mongol, Chaghatayid, Moghulistan, and Yarkand, as Millward 2007 shows. The ethnonym “Uyghur” has had vastly different meanings throughout its history. It was first used to refer to a Turkic steppe, nomadic, shamanistic, and Manichaean society in northwestern Mongolia (744–840 CE). The region’s place along what is now called the Ancient Silk Road is central to the emergence of the modern Uyghur identity. Bellér-Hann 2008 demonstrates how the movement of goods but also ideas, religions, and ideologies greatly influenced the development of Uighur culture and tradition, the legacy of which can still be seen today in the traditions central to Uyghur community life. Situated the crossroads of Eurasia, the region has been fought over by great powers for whom its borders would define empires, as discussed in Brophy 2016. In more recent times another movement of people, the migration of Han into the region, has led to an increase in ethnic tensions and outbreaks of ethnic violence, details of which can be found in Bovingdon 2010, Starr 2004, and Hayes and Clarke 2015. Brox and Bellér-Hann 2014 shows how this development in itself has had an enormous impact not just on the lives of Uyghurs, but also on Uyghur identity more broadly. Ercilasun and Ercilasun 2018 notes how the Uyghur are situated not solely within the borders of the modern Chinese state; rather, they possess a cross-border and international identity. As outlined in Clarke 2018 (cited under Geopolitics and Security), events in the region today have significant implications not just for those who live there but for Central Asia more broadly and beyond.Bellér-Hann, Ildikó. Community Matters in Xinjiang, 1880–1949: Towards a Historical Anthropology of the Uyghur. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill, 2008. DOI: 10.1163/ej.9789004166752.i-477A rich and detailed examination of Uyghur life in pre-Communist China drawing on a wealth of primary sources. Beller-Hann demonstrates how ideas of tradition, community, and culture from this period have played a significant role in the construction of contemporary Uyghur identity.Bovingdon, Gardner. The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land. New York: Columbia University Press, 2010. This work explores why, despite the claims of the Communist Party of China that harmony and brotherhood exists between the different ethnic groups in Xinjiang/East Turkestan, for most of the existence of the People’s Republic of China a majority of Uyghurs have resisted Chinese rule in the region. Based on ethnographic fieldwork, Bovingdon explores why many Uighurs feel alienated from China.Brophy, David. Uyghur Nation: Reform and Revolution on the Russia-China Frontier. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016. DOI: 10.4159/9780674970441Brophy’s book explores how a declining Qing dynasty and a rising Russia impacted the people who lived in the border regions of both empires. Through an analysis of a broad range of sources he shows how large numbers of Muslims living in Xinjiang/East Turkestan migrated to Russian territory, where they came into contact with political and intellectual currents among Russia’s Muslims that greatly impacted the forging of a modern Uyghur identity.Brox, Trine, and Ildikó Bellér-Hann, eds. On the Fringes of the Harmonious Society: Tibetans and Uyghurs in Socialist China. Copenhagen: Nias, 2014. This edited volume explores the “carrot-and-stick” approach of rapid economic development and harsh security clampdowns that China has adopted in its two largest autonomous regions in recent years. It shows how, despite the huge investment in and engagement with both regions, many Uyghurs and Tibetans remain deeply suspicious of Beijing.Ercilasun, Güljanat Kurmangaliyeva, and Konuralp Ercilasun. The Uygur Community: Diaspora, Identity and Geopolitics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-52297-9The Uyghur diaspora is increasingly visible and influential but also complex and disparate. This work explores the history and complexity of this diaspora through an exploration of identity politics, the position of Uighurs in Central Asia, the relationship between diaspora groups with Beijing, and the impact of the Ürümchi riots of 2009 on Turkish-Chinese relations, among other themes.Hayes, Anna, and Michael Clarke, eds. Inside Xinjiang: Space, Place and Power in China’s Muslim Far Northwest. London: Routledge, 2015. This edited volume explores the social, political, and economic terrains of Xinjiang/East Turkestan through an exploration of the lived experience of the people who live there. While multidisciplinary in approach, it is particularly focused on how political power and control impact on ideas of space and place.Millward, James A. Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007. A comprehensive history of Xinjiang/East Turkestan stretching from the ancient past to today. Millward demonstrates how the region has always been a major crossroads of trade, ideas, and religion and how Uyghur identity has been shaped by these movements. A work of broad appeal to both specialists and those new to the topic.Starr, S. Frederick, ed. Xinjiang: China’s Muslim Borderlands. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004. A wide-ranging, multidisciplinary edited volume that explores the many complexities of Xinjiang/East Turkestan. Examining the region’s history, its ethnic and natural geography, and economic, military, and international relations, among other themes, it is a hugely useful resource to gain a broad understanding of the region. The book was severely criticized by the Chinese government; thirteen of the volume’s authors were banned from China following its publication.Schluessel, Eric. Land of Strangers: The Civilizing Project in Qing Central Asia. New York: Columbia University Press, 2020. DOI: 10.7312/schl19754This work explores how the Qing dynasty gained control over the region it would rename as Xinjiang. In so doing its shows how Confucian ideas of “civilization” were used to legitimize the colonial project. Schluessel demonstrates that instead of assimilation, divisions between communities only deepened, resulting in a profound estrangement that continues to this day.back to top Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content on this page. Please subscribe or login. How to SubscribeOxford Bibliographies Online is available by subscription and perpetual access to institutions. 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Privacy PolicyCookie PolicyLegal NoticeAccessibilityPowered by: PubFactory[49.157.13.121]49.157.13.121Find out more<h2>“Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots”: China’s Crimes against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims | HRW</h2>“Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots”: China’s Crimes against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims | HRW Skip to cookie privacy notice Skip to main content Human Rights WatchShare this via FacebookShare this via TwitterShare this via WhatsAppShare this via EmailOther ways to shareShare this via LinkedInShare this via RedditShare this via TelegramShare this via PrinterDownloadsDownload the full report in EnglishDownload the summary and recommendations in UyghurDonate NowDownloadsDownload the full report in EnglishDownload the summary and recommendations in Uyghur Would you like to read this page in another language? Yes No, don't ask again ✕ Close Would you like to see a version of this page that loads faster by showing text only? Yes No, don't ask again ✕ Close April 19, 2021 “Break Their Lineage, Break Their Roots” China’s Crimes against Humanity Targeting Uyghurs and Other Turkic Muslims Available In English 简体中文 繁體中文 日本語 A Chinese police officer guards the road near a “reeducation” camp in Yining, Xinjiang, September 4, 2018. © 2018 Thomas Peter/Reuters SummaryBreak their lineage, break their roots, break their connections, and break their origins. Completely shovel up the roots of “two-faced people,” dig them out, and vow to fight these two-faced people until the end.—Maisumujiang Maimuer, Chinese religious affairs official, August 10, 2017, on a Xinhua Weibo pageIn May 2014, the Chinese government launched the “Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism” (严厉打击暴力恐怖活动专项行动) in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang or XUAR) against Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims.[1] Research by Stanford Law School’s Human Rights & Conflict Resolution Clinic and Human Rights Watch, along with reports by human rights organizations, the media, activist groups, and others, and internal Chinese Communist Party (CCP) documents, show that the Chinese government has committed—and continues to commit—crimes against humanity against the Turkic Muslim population.[2]This report sets forth the factual basis for that conclusion, assessing available information about Chinese government actions in Xinjiang within the international legal framework.Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), crimes against humanity are serious specified offenses that are knowingly committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population. “Widespread” refers to the scale of the acts or number of victims. A “systematic” attack indicates a pattern or methodical plan. Crimes against humanity can be committed during peace time as well as during armed conflict, so long as they are directed against a civilian population.Crimes against humanity are considered among the gravest human rights abuses under international law. The specific crimes against humanity documented in this report include imprisonment or other deprivation of liberty in violation of international law; persecution of an identifiable ethnic or religious group; enforced disappearance; torture; murder; and alleged inhumane acts intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to mental or physical health, notably forced labor and sexual violence.The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, located in China’s northwest, is the only region in China with a majority Muslim population. The Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, and other communities in the region are ethnically Turkic. Unlike the majority Han Chinese, who are primarily Chinese speakers, the Turkic population is predominantly Muslim and have their own languages. According to the 2010 census, Uyghurs made up 46 percent and Kazakhs 7 percent of the Xinjiang population.The Chinese government’s oppression of Turkic Muslims is not a new phenomenon, but in recent years has reached unprecedented levels. As many as a million people have been arbitrarily detained in 300 to 400 facilities,[3] which include “political education” camps, pretrial detention centers, and prisons.[4] Courts have handed down harsh prison sentences without due process, sentencing Turkic Muslims to years in prison merely for sending an Islamic religious recording to a family member or downloading e-books in Uyghur. Detainees and prisoners are subjected to torture and other ill-treatment, cultural and political indoctrination, and forced labor. The oppression continues outside the detention facilities: the Chinese authorities impose on Turkic Muslims a pervasive system of mass surveillance, controls on movement, arbitrary arrest and enforced disappearance, cultural and religious erasure, and family separation.The United States State Department and the parliaments of Canada and the Netherlands have determined that China’s conduct also constitutes genocide under international law. Human Rights Watch has not documented the existence of the necessary genocidal intent at this time. Nonetheless, nothing in this report precludes such a finding and, if such evidence were to emerge, the acts being committed against Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang—a group protected by the 1948 Genocide Convention—could also support a finding of genocide.In 2017, according to official statistics, arrests in Xinjiang accounted for nearly 21 percent of all arrests in China, despite people in Xinjiang making up only 1.5 percent of the total population. Since 2017, Chinese authorities have used various pretexts to damage or destroy two-thirds of Xinjiang’s mosques; about half of those have been demolished outright. Important Islamic sacred sites have been demolished across the region.[5] As part of regional authorities’ intrusive “Becoming Families” surveillance, development, and indoctrination campaign, officials impose themselves for overnight stays at the homes of Turkic Muslims, a practice that authorities say “promote[s] ethnic unity.” In another particularly chilling practice, some Turkic Muslim children whose parents have been arbitrarily detained are placed in state institutions such as orphanages and boarding schools, including boarding preschools.[6]The global response to these abuses has been increasingly critical. Some governments, such as Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the US, have imposed targeted and other sanctions on Chinese government officials, agencies, and companies implicated in rights violations. Increasingly, governments are joining statements at the United Nations Human Rights Council and the Third Committee, the human rights arm of the UN General Assembly, to condemn Chinese government policy. Nonetheless, many governments, including several members of the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation, still praise the Chinese government’s Xinjiang policies.In July 2019, two dozen governments sent a letter to the Human Rights Council president urging “meaningful access” for the UN high commissioner for human rights to Xinjiang, and monitoring and reporting on alleged abuses against the Muslim population.[7] The Chinese government responded by coordinating, though not itself joining, a letter signed by 50 countries, including Iran, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, and other states with poor human rights records.[8] In November 2019, a similar group of governments delivered a similar statement of concern at the UN Third Committee. China responded with a letter signed by 54 countries.[9]Throughout 2020, reports of abuses in Xinjiang increased, making it harder for governments to deny or avoid. In June 2020, 50 UN special procedures—special rapporteurs, working groups, and other human rights experts—issued a searing indictment of China’s human rights record, including the Chinese government’s “collective repression” of religious and ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet. The experts called for a special session of the Human Rights Council on China, for the creation of a dedicated UN monitoring mechanism on China, and for UN agencies and governments to press China to meet its human rights obligations.[10] In October 2020, a cross-regional group of 39 governments issued a stinging public rebuke of the Chinese government’s widespread human rights violations in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet. The statement largely endorsed the call by the 50 UN special procedures.[11] Instead of committing to investigate the allegations, the Chinese government responded with two separate statements, including one on Xinjiang read out by Cuba and signed by 45 countries.[12]Investigating China’s Crimes against HumanityEnsuring justice for serious violations of human rights is the responsibility of the state that has jurisdiction over the area in which the crimes were committed. The state is obligated to ensure that domestic criminal justice mechanisms impartially investigate the alleged violations and identify and prosecute the individuals responsible in accordance with international fair-trial standards. The Chinese government has repeatedly denied that officials have committed abuses in Xinjiang and has been unwilling to conduct investigations or permitted independent international monitors to do so.Historically, governments that fail to conduct investigations into serious human rights violations frequently invoke state sovereignty when other authorities, such as UN bodies or regional bodies, have sought to conduct investigations. Under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, which went into effect in 2002, the court is empowered to investigate and prosecute individuals alleged to be most responsible for grave international crimes, including crimes against humanity, when the state with primary jurisdiction is unwilling or are unable to do so. Then the ICC can undertake a criminal investigation and prosecution if the suspected perpetrators are citizens of a state that is party to the ICC treaty, if the alleged violations are committed in the territory of an ICC member state, or if a non-member state asks the ICC to consider violations committed on its territory. China is not a party to the ICC statute. While the ICC could assume jurisdiction if the UN Security Council refers the situation in Xinjiang to the court, because China is a permanent member of the Security Council, its veto power could thwart such an action.Given the gravity of the abuses against Turkic Muslims, there is a pressing need for concerned governments to take strong, coordinated action to advance accountability. One approach would be for a United Nations commission of inquiry (COI) to be established to investigate alleged violations in Xinjiang. The COI should have a mandate to establish the facts, identify the perpetrators, and make recommendations to provide accountability. The COI should be comprised of eminent persons, including experts in international human rights law, crimes against humanity, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, and gender issues. This COI could be established through a resolution adopted by the UN Human Rights Council, though the UN General Assembly, the UN Security Council, and the UN secretary-general are also empowered to take such an action.This report also sets out other recommendations for concerned governments to increase pressure on the Chinese government to change its abusive policies in Xinjiang, including pursuing individual criminal and state responsibility for these crimes, targeted sanctions, and actions under other UN mechanisms, such as the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD).Individual states should consider pursuing criminal cases under the concept of “universal jurisdiction,” which refers to the ability of a country’s domestic judicial system to investigate and prosecute certain grave crimes, such as torture, even if they were not committed on its territory. Many states have laws permitting prosecutions for such crimes if the victims were nationals of that state. Human rights treaties, such as the Convention against Torture and the International Convention against Enforced Disappearance, obligate states parties to extradite or prosecute suspected offenders who are under that state’s jurisdiction. Under customary international law, it is generally accepted that states may prosecute those responsible for crimes against humanity.I. BackgroundThe Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang or XUAR) is located in China’s northwest, bordering India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia. Unlike the majority Han Chinese population, who are primarily Chinese speakers, the Uyghur, Kazakh, and Kyrgyz populations are ethnically Turkic, predominantly Muslim, and have their own languages. According to the 2010 census, Uyghurs made up 46 percent of the Xinjiang population. Xinjiang is the only region in China with a majority Muslim population.[13] Some Turkic Muslims refer to the territory as “East Turkestan.”[14]Chinese authorities began implementing discriminatory policies in what became the XUAR in 1949, when the newly created People’s Republic of China government began to settle People’s Liberation Army soldiers on military state farms in Xinjiang, known as bingtuan (also known as the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, or XPCC).[15] In the 1990s, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Beijing’s fear of instability in the region prompted a second massive assimilation drive in Xinjiang.[16] As part of its “Big Development of the Northwest” plan, the government introduced economic incentives to attract Han settlers, leading to the arrival of between one and two million Han Chinese migrants in Xinjiang between approximately 1999 and 2009.[17] The government’s approach, however, benefited Han Chinese while further marginalizing the Turkic Muslim community, generating local resentment over the stream of new settlers.[18] The effects of the large migration of Han Chinese on local culture, language, and traditions also exacerbated these tensions between the Turkic Muslim and Han populations.[19]The growing tensions and discontent led to what began as peaceful protests by Turkic Muslims in February 1997 in the city of Ghulja,[20] which in turn prompted a massive crackdown by the Public Security Bureau and People’s Armed Police involving tens of thousands of arrests and dozens of extrajudicial killings of Turkic Muslims, and executions following unfair trials.[21] Over the years, the authorities have increased the presence of security forces across the region, reinforcing Beijing’s narrative that Turkic Muslims are an ethno-nationalist threat to the Chinese state, and that Xinjiang serves as a breeding ground for the “three evil forces” of separatism, terrorism, and extremism.Human Rights Watch in 2005 documented the “systematic repression of religion … in Xinjiang as a matter of considered state policy,” at a “level of punitive control seemingly designed to entirely refashion Uighur religious identity to the state’s purposes,” which seemed to be primarily the “enforcement of loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party and the state.”[22] This repression included the arrest, torture, and execution of peaceful activists for alleged involvement in “separatist activity,” severe restrictions on religious practice, chronic and daily harassment, and restrictions on travel.[23] In 2009, a protest in Urumqi against false rape allegations that targeted Turkic Muslim men devolved into violence; while the underlying cause of the escalation was unclear, the Chinese government accused the World Uyghur Congress—an international organization of exiled Turkic Muslims—and its leader Rebiya Kadeer of planning the riots.[24] In the aftermath of this unrest, the government further intensified pressure on the Turkic Muslim community, engaging in numerous human rights violations including mass surveillance,[25] arbitrary arrests and detention,[26] torture and other ill-treatment,[27] enforced disappearances,[28] and persecution.[29] The government also pressured foreign governments to forcibly return Turkic Muslim asylum seekers to China.[30]In subsequent years, Chinese authorities significantly stepped-up repressive policies against ethnic Uyghurs, and increasingly, other Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, often justifying the government’s actions as part of the “global war on terror.”[31] President Xi Jinping later officially launched China’s own “People’s War on Terror” in 2014.[32]In 2014, the Chinese government launched the Strike Hard campaign in Xinjiang following high-profile attacks allegedly carried out by Turkic Muslims in the Xinjiang region and at the Kunming train station in Yunnan province.[33] The details of these incidents have not been possible to verify because of the authorities’ tight control of information. In mid-2014, Xinjiang officials demanded the return of Turkic Muslim migrants in Urumqi and other regional centers to their rural hometowns for the purported purpose of obtaining a new identity card—the People’s Convenience Card.[34] Chinese authorities denied the card to most of these migrants, who were then forced to remain in the rural heartlands of Xinjiang, far from the major cities that have benefited from economic development.[35]In 2016, Beijing appointed Chen Quanguo, who previously oversaw the Tibet Autonomous Region, as the new Xinjiang Communist Party secretary.[36] In his capacity as the Tibet Communist Party secretary, Chen gained notoriety for his hardline response to local community members who advocated peacefully for solutions to legitimate grievances, including land rights and access to Tibetan language education in schools. Some of the tactics that he has deployed in Xinjiang—including heavy securitization and heightened surveillance, and forcing those seen as overly religious to undergo “political education”—were developed in Tibet.[37]Since Xi Jinping’s rise to power in 2013, the Chinese government has aggressively pursued assimilationist policies in ethnic minority regions, increasingly insisting on the “Sinicization” of those communities, driven by nationalism and in many instances Islamophobia inside and outside China.[38] Shohrat Zakir, the chairman of the XUAR government and the deputy party committee secretary of Xinjiang, claimed in July 2020 that China had “effectively contained” religious extremism and had “laid a good foundation for completely solving the deeply rooted problems that affect the region’s long-term stability.”[39]II. Crimes against Humanity in XinjiangThe concept of crimes against humanity dates to at least 1915.[40] It was further developed as part of the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal that hosted the Nuremberg trials of Nazi leaders after the Second World War.[41] While there is no international treaty on crimes against humanity, in 1997 the term was codified as part of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).[42]Since at least 2014, the Chinese government has subjected Turkic Muslims to various crimes against humanity, including mass arbitrary detention, torture and deaths in detention, and enforced disappearances.Mass Arbitrary Detention and ArrestIt is unclear when Chinese officials planned and began to carry out the mass detention of Turkic Muslims. The detention of Turkic Muslims in extra-legal detention centers has been documented since at least 2016, well before the start of the wave of detentions that began in spring 2017.[43]The number of Turkic Muslims detained since the crackdown began is also unknown, but it is widely accepted that between several hundred thousand and one million Turkic Muslims have been detained in so-called political education camps.[44] Many Turkic Muslims reported that over half of their family members have been interned in political education camps, pretrial detention centers, or prisons. The US State Department estimates that, in total, as many as two million people passed through the political education camps alone between April 2017 and December 2018, and a leaked internal memo by Chinese authorities states that 15,683 “suspicious persons” were taken into custody in a single week in June 2017.[45] In 2017, Xinjiang Party Secretary Chen Quanguo encouraged officials to “round up everyone who should be rounded up.”[46] Most of those detained in the political education camps are never charged with any crime. Chinese officials have directed local authorities to acknowledge to detainees’ relatives that their loved ones are not criminals, but instead are being held for their own good because they have been “infected by unhealthy thoughts.”[47]At the same time, although the CCP has claimed that the political education camps are merely “Vocational Skills Education Training Centers,” police officers have targeted many prominent Turkic Muslim academics, writers, journalists, doctors, and entertainers—people who are already clearly highly educated—as well as older persons.[48] A leaked internal official document adds to these conflicting narratives, repeatedly referring to the detainees as being “punished.”[49] And Chen Quanguo has been quoted as directing that the centers “teach like a school, be managed like the military, and be defended like a prison.”[50] To this end, in accordance with Party directives, these facilities are surrounded by perimeter walls, guard watchtowers, and armed guards in order to “prevent escapes.”[51]The justifications officials have used to detain Turkic Muslim individuals in the camps have often been trivial. The “Qaraqash Document”—an internal official document leaked in February 2020 by the Uyghur Human Rights Project—detailed the reasons for which internees in a district of Qaraqash county were detained.[52] Overseas connections featured prominently, including overseas travel, especially to any of 26 “sensitive” countries,[53] going on an unofficial Hajj pilgrimage, applying for a passport,[54] communicating with someone abroad, and even engaging in conduct such as “accidentally clicking on an overseas website on their phone.”[55] Domestic travel and contact have also garnered suspicion, with several Turkic Muslims in Qaraqash being detained for movements within China or for communications with people outside the county.[56]Officials also detained Turkic Muslims in Qaraqash for innocuous religious practices—including any unofficial religious activities such as fasting, prayer, or attendance at religious events and ceremonies; studying religion; having a household with a “dense religious atmosphere”; wearing a headscarf or having a wife who wore a headscarf; or having a beard.[57] Turkic Muslims have also been detained for failing to perform community work such as flag raising or carrying out patrol duty, or for violating the state’s birth planning policies.[58]Detainees have been deprived of their physical liberty not only for their beliefs and behaviors protected under international law—which is, in itself, a violation of human rights norms—but also for the actions of others, a form of collective punishment.[59] Officials often target the relatives of Turkic Muslim journalists and activists—especially those working abroad—in apparent retaliation for their work.[60] To this end, authorities kept detailed records of the personal information and behavioral records of internees’ “Three Circles”—their immediate and extended family, their friends and neighbors, and their religious circles—as shown in the Qaraqash Document.[61]Internees appear to be categorized and subjected to different levels of security and duration of detention.[62] A confidential internal document approved by Zhu Hailun—Xinjiang’s deputy party secretary, Chen Quanguo’s right-hand man, and the region’s top security chief—states that detainees are placed based on an initial screening in either general management, strict, or very strict zones—which vary in “education and training methods”—and some are managed according to a scoring system that measures their behavior.[63] These scores determine potential transfers of detainees between zones, the treatment of detainees within their respective zones, as well as “rewards, punishments, and family visits.”[64] In order to be released, detainees must have maintained a good score, be categorized at the “general management” level, and have served at least one year, although there have been cases of the camps releasing detainees sooner.[65]Besides the political education camps, the Strike Hard Campaign has also seen a spike in the arbitrary detention and formal arrest of Turkic Muslims in the criminal justice system. Detention in the camps has led to trial and imprisonment, but data also strongly suggest that Turkic Muslims have been targeted for prosecution solely on the basis of their ethnic identity and religious beliefs.[66] Indictments, and ensuing convictions, in Xinjiang accounted for approximately 13 percent of all indictments in China in 2017.[67] The number of arrests and criminal indictments in Xinjiang increased by 306 percent and 237 percent, respectively, in the past five years compared to the previous five-year period.[68] Using official figures combined with their own documentation, data from the Xinjiang Victims Database support estimates that about 300,000 people have been sentenced since the Strike Hard Campaign escalated in late 2016.[69] These increases are the result of the Strike Hard Campaign and harsh policies and practices adopted by Chen Quanguo, who is believed to be at least in part responsible for a 92 percent increase in “security spending” in Xinjiang in 2016 and 2017, as well as for a significant expansion in police recruitment.[70]Chinese authorities have often detained Turkic Muslims on the basis of overbroad crimes such as “separatism.”[71] Ilham Tohti, a prominent Uyghur academic who ran a website providing news and information about Turkic Muslims, was prosecuted for separatism and sentenced to life in prison in 2014.[72] Related charges include “terrorism” and “religious extremism,” which are almost always leveled against ethnic minorities such as Turkic Muslims.[73] Chinese authorities have made many of these arrests and detentions without any evidentiary basis and frequently fail to respect the due process rights of detainees. Detainees and their relatives interviewed by Human Rights Watch all reported that at no point did the authorities ever present them with a warrant, with evidence of a crime, or with any other documentation, nor were they ever informed of which authorities were responsible for their arrest.[74] Lawyers told the Network of Chinese Human Rights Defenders (CHRD) that defendants facing terrorism charges are not allowed to plead “not guilty,” and tend to be quickly put on trial and sentenced to prison terms. CHRD has also documented that lawyers risk being dismissed from cases for attempting to protect their clients’ due process rights, and has reported cases of other procedural abuses such as verdicts being prepared before the trials take place, or government officials rather than judges deciding sentences.[75]The Xinjiang authorities maintain tight control of information and so only seven verdicts of those imprisoned since late 2016 are publicly available. They are:Jin Dehuai, a Hui Muslim, serving life imprisonment for “splittism” for organizing trips abroad to study the Quran, inviting religious figures from other countries to Xinjiang, and holding religious meetings in the region between 2006 and 2014;[76]Nebijan Ghoja Ehmet, a Uyghur, convicted of “inciting ethnic hatred and discrimination” for telling others “what is haram and halal,” and sentenced to 10 years in prison;[77]Asqar Azatbek, an ethnic Kazakh, convicted of “spying and fraud” for showing a visiting official from Kazakhstan around hydraulic projects near the Kazakh-Chinese border, and sentenced to 20 years in prison;[78]Nurlan Pioner, a Kazakh, convicted of “disturbing public order and extremism” for educating over 70 people in religion, and sentenced to 17 years in prison;[79]Nie Shigang, a Hui, was originally convicted of “assisting in terrorist activities” and “money laundering” for helping over 100 Turkic Muslims transfer money to their relatives in Egypt—funds authorities said were used for terrorist activities—and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Upon appeal, however, the court ruled that Nie was not guilty of “assisting in terrorist activities” and reduced his sentence to five years for “money laundering”;[80]Serikzhan Adilhan, a Kazakh, was convicted of running an “illegal business” for selling cigarettes worth 174,600 RMB (US$27,000) without a license and sentenced to three-and-a-half years. The verdict against Serikzhan Adilhan is the only one of the seven available verdicts that is posted on the Chinese government’s official database of court verdicts;[81] andHuang Shike, a Hui, was convicted of “illegal use of the internet” for explaining the Quran to others in two WeChat groups and sentenced to two years in prison.[82]Other available information concerning 51 cases—including the indictments, incarceration notices, leaked official documents, and official communications with families—indicate that most of the Turkic Muslim individuals in these cases have been imprisoned for vague and overbroad offenses such as “inciting ethnic hatred,” “picking quarrels and provoking trouble,” and for watching or listening to “extremist” content.In one indictment, four family members, all Turkic Muslims, were indicted for having traveled to Turkey to visit another family member. The authorities claimed that the man in Turkey—a university lecturer named Erkin Emet—belonged to a terrorist organization, and that the gifts they gave him—including a dutar (a musical instrument) and other household goods—was evidence of them “assisting terrorism.” These four, along with another sibling of Erkin Emet, were imprisoned for between 11 and 23 years.[83]Torture and Other Ill-Treatment in CustodyNumerous deaths in detention or shortly after release from custody have been reported since 2018. The Xinjiang Victims Database has reported 177 deaths of detainees in various parts of Xinjiang, most of them while in custody and some after release as a result of complications from injuries suffered in custody or from illnesses, including mental disabilities, that developed in these facilities or were not appropriately treated.[84] Radio Free Asia reported 150 deaths in one camp in Aksu Prefecture during the latter half of 2018 and 4 other deaths in separate political education camps in 2018.[85] The Chinese authorities have rarely acknowledged these deaths.[86]Human Rights Watch and others have reported on torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of detainees by the authorities in both political education camps and police detention facilities (看守所). In a 2018 report, Human Rights Watch documented that in Xinjiang, police detention facility staff beat detainees, hung them from ceilings and walls, forcibly deprived them of sleep, and subjected them to prolonged shackling. Some former detainees reported having been strapped to metal chairs, known as “tiger chairs,” during police interrogations.[87]Former detainees from political education camps and police detention facilities told Human Rights Watch about the use of physical and psychological punishments, ill-treatment of or lack of medical care for people particularly vulnerable to harsh detention conditions, and suicide attempts. Former Uyghur detainee Mihrigul Tursun said she witnessed nine deaths in three months of detention.[88] Another man said that his father died in the camp and that his body showed signs of torture.[89]Mihrigul Tursun also told of being stripped naked, forced to undergo a medical examination, and being electroshocked and beaten while interrogated. She described how 40 to 68 women, chained at the wrists and ankles, were put in the same 420-square-foot underground cell in which they were expected to urinate and defecate. The cell had just one small hole in the ceiling for ventilation.[90]In the camps, in some cases, detainees were not permitted to talk; any utterance in Turkic languages was punished. Some reported being incessantly observed through video cameras and microphones.[91] A leaked CCP directive corroborates these allegations, ordering “full video surveillance coverage of dormitories and classrooms free of blind spots, ensuring that guards on duty can monitor in real time, record things in detail, and report suspicious circumstances immediately.”[92]Some former detainees described overcrowding, having to share beds with others, and taking turns sleeping. They emphasized the emotional distress stemming from deplorable living conditions and the prospect of indefinite detention.[93]Detainees said the food was poor and inadequate. A typical meal involved steamed buns and thin soup. While basic medical care was available, people remained detained even when they had serious illnesses or were elderly.[94]Detainees were forced to sing songs hailing the CCP and Xi Jinping. They were punished harshly for minor infractions of the camps’ arbitrary rules; for example, authorities would deny food to those who resisted speaking Chinese.[95] One former detainee recounted how, after resisting political education efforts, he was placed in solitary confinement in a two-by-two meter cell where he was handcuffed, deprived of food and water, and forced to stand for 24 hours without sleep.[96] A leaked internal document instructs officials to deal with detainees who have “a vague understanding, negative attitudes or even show resistance” through “assault-style transformation through education,” in order to “ensure that results are achieved.”[97]Enforced DisappearancesIn many cases, relatives have had no news about the whereabouts or well-being of their detained family members. Some may receive notices when their relatives are transferred to a formal prison, if they ever are. The lack of information about enforced disappearances led to the emergence of the #MeTooUyghur social media campaign,[98] in which individuals demand proof from Chinese authorities that those detained by the state are still alive and well.[99] One online platform that allows relatives of detainees and activists to compile accounts of disappearances had recorded over 11,500 testimonies as of December 2020.[100] In many cases, family members or friends—especially those based abroad—are afraid even to seek information about those who are missing, fearing that international communication or provision of assistance to those seeking to locate detained persons will result in retaliation by the authorities.[101]In some cases, the authorities have detained people while their children are away at school. The New York Times reported in November 2019 that the CCP leadership issued a classified directive on handling questions about detained family members from students who return home at the end of the academic semester.[102] This guide instructed officials to tell students that their relatives are in “a training school set up by the government,” which they cannot leave. The students also get a warning that their behavior could affect their relatives’ prospects of release. Similarly, the Qaraqash Document revealed that local officials would assess the attitudes and behaviors of detainees’ relatives in determining detainees’ prospects of release. One entry in the Qaraqash Document notes that a detainee was not recommended for release because members of their family had failed to join flag-raising ceremonies on time.[103]Mass SurveillanceAlthough the Chinese government uses mass surveillance throughout the country, its monitoring and tracking of Turkic Muslims is particularly invasive in Xinjiang.[104] The government encourages people to inform on each other and deploys government officials to monitor Turkic Muslims. For example, under the “ten households, one unit” policy, groups of 10 households are held responsible for monitoring one another, facing collective punishment for infractions by any one household.[105]One major feature of the Strike Hard Campaign is the deployment of fanghuiju (访惠聚) teams in Xinjiang, in which hundreds of thousands of government cadres are stationed in villages, regularly visit and surveil people, and subject them to political propaganda.[106] In October 2016, authorities initiated a related effort, called the “Becoming Family” (结对认亲) campaign, where more than a million cadres spent at least five days every two months in the homes of Xinjiang residents, primarily in the countryside.[107] Street corner police stations, known as “convenience police stations,” form a dense control complex, carefully organized in a grid system that divides populations into geometric units for tighter and more focused surveillance.[108]Another facet of this mass surveillance of the Turkic Muslims is the extensive and compulsory collection of their biometric data.[109] Chinese authorities collect DNA samples, fingerprints, iris scans, and blood types from all Xinjiang residents between the ages of 12 and 65, in part through a medical examination program, “Physicals for All.” Turkic Muslims’ biometrics are collected without choice or informed consent.[110] The biometric data of “focus personnel”—that is, those considered threatening to regime stability—and their family members are taken regardless of age.[111] In addition, Chinese authorities have also collected voice samples from Turkic Muslims during passport application processes and at police checkpoints.[112] Much of this data is entered into searchable databases.[113] The collection of these biometrics is part of the government’s drive to form a “multi-modal” biometric portrait of individuals and to gather ever more data about its citizens. All of this data can be linked in police databases to the person’s identification number, which in turn is linked to any of their additional biometric and personal information on file.The Xinjiang authorities have also put in place networks of automated sensory systems throughout the region, which include CCTV cameras with facial recognition, automated license plate recognition, and infrared capabilities; WiFi sniffers that collect identifying addresses of networked devices; and security checkpoints and visitors’ management systems that gather identifying information.[114] Kitchen knives in Xinjiang are tracked by QR codes that include the owner’s ID number, photo, ethnicity, and address, and vehicles are subject to mandatory location trackers.[115]Much of this information is fed into the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP), which aggregates data about individuals, flags to officials those whom it deems potentially threatening, and determines who should be rounded up by police, investigated, and sent to political reeducation camps or other detention facilities.[116] Human Rights Watch in December 2020 published research based on a leaked list of over 2,000 detainees from Aksu prefecture, which provided detailed evidence that the vast majority of the people flagged by the IJOP system are detained for everyday, lawful, nonviolent behavior.[117] In one case, for example, the IJOP system flagged a woman as suspicious because she had received four calls from a foreign number in March 2017, noting the precise duration of the calls.Former detainees are released to even harsher conditions of mass surveillance. In addition to the modes of surveillance detailed above, former detainees and their relatives are frequently monitored by local officials who regularly assess and record their moods and behavior along metrics such as whether their thoughts are “stable”; whether they can “recognize their mistakes”; and whether they have a “sincere attitude of regret.”[118] Some receive daily visits from local cadres, and are obligated to sign in every morning and attend roll-call in the evenings.[119]The use of mass surveillance also extends beyond Xinjiang and into the Turkic Muslim diaspora outside China, as authorities pressure them to provide detailed information about themselves, including their address, phone number, and school or workplace.[120] The government has also hacked into Turkic Muslims’ smartphones around the world by embedding malicious software in apps and software frequently used by Turkic Muslims, which can “remotely turn on a phone’s microphone, record calls or export photos, phone locations and conversations on chat apps.”[121]Cultural and Religious ErasureThe Chinese government’s apparent goal in creating the camps is the erasure of Turkic Muslim culture and religion. Multiple government platforms state that the purpose of the camps is to “wash brains” and “cleanse hearts.”[122] Detainees are forced to learn Chinese and are forbidden from speaking any other language.[123] They must sing the praises of the CCP and memorize rules applicable only to Turkic Muslims, such as those restricting Islamic practices and the Uyghur language.[124]Former detainees reported being told that they would not be allowed to leave the camps unless they learned over 1,000 Chinese characters and spoke Chinese, or were otherwise determined to have become sufficiently loyal Chinese subjects.[125] Officials have also forced detainees to engage in self-criticism, and to criticize their fellow internees, their friends, and their families for their cultural and religious practices. Those who regurgitated state propaganda particularly well or who criticized their peers especially harshly might be rewarded with a transfer to more comfortable conditions.[126] This treatment is in line with an internal directive that orders camp officials to “promote the repentance and confession of the students for them to understand deeply the illegal, criminal, and dangerous nature of their past behavior.”[127]Authorities have prohibited religious practice of any kind, and detainees are punished for the performance of ordinary religious acts. Guards closely watch detainees for signs of religious activity and prevent them from engaging in acts such as praying or growing beards, which are both seen as signs of extremism.[128] Detainees are also cut off from any contact with “the outside world apart from during prescribed activities” in the name of “prevent[ing] trouble,” according to a leaked internal directive; to this end, detainees are forbidden from having cellphones.[129] To ensure that this erasure of religious practice is maintained, camp officials have also purportedly forced detainees to sign documents agreeing not to practice their religion before releasing them.[130]Outside of the camps, a fundamental aspect of the government’s current treatment of Turkic Muslims is their forced assimilation into mainstream Han Chinese culture, and the government’s repeated attempts to hollow out Turkic Muslim culture. Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang are required to attend weekly, or even daily, Chinese flag-raising ceremonies, political indoctrination meetings and, at times, Chinese language classes.[131] The authorities have imposed punishments for refusal to watch state-run television programs or listen to state-run radio programs.[132] Speaking or writing the Uyghur language is discouraged. Chinese authorities have banned the use of Uyghur and Kazakh language teaching materials, and state employees who use these languages are deemed “unpatriotic” and could be labeled a “two-faced person”—a charge that has resulted in the detention of hundreds of Turkic Muslim public figures, maybe more.[133]Beginning in March 2017, and as part of a program initiated by Chen Quanguo, Turkic Muslim public figures—including Party cadres, government officials, religious clergy, and intellectuals—have published letters professing their gratitude and loyalty to the CCP; renouncing their Turkic roots, cultural and historical ties, and religious beliefs; and denouncing religious extremism and “two-faced” Turkic Muslims.[134] Chinese authorities have banned the common Arabic greeting meaning “peace be unto you,” and have erased Arabic from restaurant signage, mosques, street signs, and wall murals.[135]The Chinese government’s restrictions on the practice of Islam in Xinjiang effectively outlaw expressions of faith outside state control.[136] Xinjiang authorities have imposed bans on “abnormal” beards, wearing headscarves in public places, and common Islamic names with religious connotations,[137] and consider private religious acts such as regular prayer or fasting for Ramadan as “signs of extremism.”[138] One Uyghur woman, Horigul Nasir, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for allegedly promoting the wearing of headscarves.[139] Xinjiang authorities have also confiscated Qurans and prayer mats, and Turkic Muslims caught with these items can face harsh punishment.[140] The authorities require that the use of “halal” be restricted only to certain food products (meat, dairy, and edible oils), banning such labels for other purposes.[141] There have been reports of government officials pressuring Turkic Muslims into drinking alcohol, in violation of their religious beliefs, and into displaying emblems of traditional Chinese culture during lunar new year celebrations.[142]Turkic Muslim imams, particularly “unauthorized” imams not registered with the CCP, risk mistreatment and imprisonment as a result of their positions.[143] In early 2015, Chinese authorities forced Turkic Muslim imams to dance in the street while chanting state propaganda, and to take an oath swearing not to teach religion to children.[144] Xinjiang authorities also require that the hajj, the pilgrimage to Mecca, be organized by the state. Authorities prohibit the creation, possession, consumption, and dissemination—including on the internet—of a range of materials defined so broadly and vaguely that nearly any expression can be construed as prohibited. For example, they include anything that “undermines national unity, social stability, economic development, or scientific and technological progress” or that “affects religious harmony.”[145]Authorities have also destroyed numerous burial grounds where generations of Turkic Muslim families have been buried, which many view as an attempt to disconnect Turkic Muslims from their history and ancestry.[146] For example, authorities destroyed the burial site of Lutpulla Mutellin, a prominent Uyghur poet who was executed by Chinese authorities in 1945, and converted it into a “Happiness Park,” complete with fake pandas, children’s rides, and a man-made lake, while the graves were moved to an industrial zone in the desert. In one case, family members of those buried in targeted burial grounds were given only two days to claim remains. This destruction has been done with little care or respect for the deceased, with reports of human bones being left behind—despite officials’ insistence that the measures are “civilized.”[147] The authorities have provided little justification for the demolitions besides making way for urban reconstruction, ensuring “standardization,” or “sav[ing] space and protect[ing] the ecosystem.”[148] Furthermore, authorities have also set up crematoria, or “burial management centers,” to conduct the cremation of Xinjiang residents, in contravention of Muslim burial traditions.[149]As noted, authorities have also targeted mosques for demolition. According to one estimate, some 16,000 mosques in Xinjiang have been damaged or destroyed since 2017, and about half of those have been demolished.[150] Many of the remaining mosques have been desecrated in other ways, such as through the removal of crescents from atop the mosques or by installing framed copies of state policies on “de-extremification” or “ethnic unity” on their walls.[151]Xinjiang authorities have also increasingly promoted marriages between Turkic Muslims and Han Chinese, offering preferential university entrance for children of mixed families and posting online videos of happy inter-ethnic couples and magazine articles with tips on how Han Chinese men can “win the heart of a Uyghur girl.”[152] Darren Byler, an anthropologist who studies Uyghur culture, says there are rising pressures on young Turkic Muslim women to marry Han men as a result of the Strike Hard Campaign, noting that many young Turkic Muslim men are detained, while there are plenty of young Han suitors, many of whom are Party cadres, with relative political and socioeconomic power.[153] Those who refuse or speak ill of these marriages, moreover, risk being sent to political education camps or having family members sent to the camps.[154] Some marriages between Turkic Muslim women and Han male cadres have also resulted from the “Becoming Family” homestay policy. Human Rights Watch has documented cases of male cadres being dispatched to stay at homes, including when there are only women or children at home, making women and girls vulnerable to sexual violence.[155]Turkic Muslims in China are also effectively cut off from the global Muslim community, including family and friends abroad. International communication is punished, and those caught using WhatsApp or other foreign communications software, or those who have connections to any of a list of 26 “sensitive countries,” have been interrogated, detained, and even tried and imprisoned.[156] The Qaraqash Document is essentially a list of detainees in the political education system who have relatives overseas.[157] Chinese authorities also target users of Zapya,[158] a file-sharing app developed by a Beijing startup that allows users to download the Quran and share religious teachings.[159] Likewise, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform (IJOP) has flagged for detention individuals from Xinjiang who have obtained foreign citizenship and applied for Chinese visas, or those who have applied for a renewal of their identity documents from Chinese embassies or consulates abroad.[160]Finally, many former detainees are “released” to job placements far from their homes, which may be an additional method by which authorities aim to weaken their sense of community, culture, and heritage.[161]Separation of FamiliesIn addition to separations stemming from mass detention and placement of former detainees in jobs far from home, many families have been separated as a result of heightened restrictions on the movement of Turkic Muslims. The tightening of passport controls and border crossings have left some children stranded in Xinjiang unable to join their parents, who had gone abroad.[162] Because Xinjiang authorities punish contact with those abroad, many Turkic Muslims report having lost contact with their relatives, including their young children, for months or even years.[163]One consequence of government policies in the region, intentional or otherwise, has been the intergenerational separation of Turkic Muslims. Many Turkic Muslim children have been left effectively parentless due to the mass incarcerations. The state began to issue urgent directives on dealing with children of detained or “double-detained” parents in early 2018.[164]In some cases, Chinese authorities have ordered the removal of these children from the care of their extended families, transferring them instead to state institutions without the consent of their relatives.[165] These transfers follow a November 2016 order from Chen Quanguo to place all Xinjiang “orphans” into state institutions by 2020, purportedly for “concentrating” orphans previously cared for “in a scattered manner”—an order that includes no mention of their families’ or the children’s consent. The policy also defines orphans broadly as “children who have lost their parents or whose parents cannot be found,” which, in some regions, includes children for whom one or both parents have been detained.[166] Moreover, there are reports that some children who are not orphans by any definition have been transferred, without the consent of their parents, to full-time boarding schools, where they are only allowed home on weekends and holidays, and parents have only limited visiting privileges.[167] Some of those who resist the removal of their children to these schools say they risked being sent to detention camps for their defiance.[168]The institutions in which these children are housed range from boarding schools, including boarding preschools, to “rescue, care, and protection centers for children in especially difficult circumstances,” to traditional orphanages.[169] The CCP is building these centers at a rapid pace. As of September 2018, the CCP had budgeted over US$30 million to build or expand at least 45 of these “rescue, care, and protection centers” since the beginning of 2017, creating enough beds to house 5,000 children.[170] Children are taught Chinese and some are punished for speaking their native languages, and they are taught to sing and dance to propagandistic songs.[171] These placements are accompanied by state propaganda extolling the benefits of placing children “under the loving care of the Party and the government.”[172]Forced Returns to ChinaChinese authorities have tracked down hundreds of Turkic Muslim asylum seekers around the world and forced them to return to repression and in some cases detention. In many cases, it is impossible to find out what has happened to returnees.[173]In March 2014, Thailand immigration officials conducted a night raid in a remote rubber plantation and detained 60 women, 78 men, and 82 children who identified themselves as Turkish. The immigration officials held the group at the Sadao Immigration Detention Center in Songkhla province. The following July, Thai authorities allowed approximately 170 members of this group and other Turkic peoples in Thailand seeking asylum to go to Turkey. Approximately 100 others deemed to be Turkic Muslims were returned to China.[174] Efforts by Human Rights Watch to assess their whereabouts and well-being have yielded no information.In early 2017, the Chinese government demanded the return of Turkic Muslim students living abroad, accusing the community of “separatism” and “religious extremism.”[175] Following this demand, there were reports of Chinese authorities detaining family members of these students to coerce them into returning to China.[176] The Chinese government has also pressed other governments to cooperate in the return of Turkic Muslims abroad. For example, in July 2017, Egyptian authorities arrested at least 62 Turkic Muslims living in Egypt without informing them of the grounds for their detention, denied them access to lawyers and contact with their families, and put at least 12 Turkic Muslims on a flight to China.[177] These arrests and deportations followed a meeting between Egyptian Interior Minister Magdy Abd al-Ghaffar and Chinese Deputy Public Security Minister Chen Zhimin, in which Chen stressed the Chinese government’s eagerness to exchange information about “extremist organizations.”[178]Forced LaborThere have been numerous credible reports that Chinese authorities are subjecting Turkic Muslims to forced labor under the government’s “idle labor transfer programs” (富余劳动力转移). Under this program, ethnic minorities are placed in jobs, including in factories, in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China.These labor transfer programs predated the Strike Hard Campaign. They started in 2006 but dipped around 2014 following the Kunming train station attack.[179] The programs saw a revival around 2017 and 2018 as part of the Chinese government’s nationwide “poverty alleviation” efforts.[180]The levels of coercion involved in these programs appear to have dramatically increased with the Strike Hard Campaign. The evidence indicates that detainees have been sent to perform forced labor after they were released from Xinjiang’s political education camps. Satellite images also show the recent emergence of new factories, connected to or near the camps, where inmates allegedly provide low-cost or unpaid labor.[181] In at least one instance, such a factory purportedly became an extension of a political education camp; laborers live in dormitories, may be prohibited from returning home on a regular basis, and receive no pay for their work until they “complete their training.”[182]The crackdown on Turkic Muslims since 2014 also coincides with the Chinese government’s encouragement of the vertical integration of China’s garment manufacturing sector by moving textile and garment factories closer to the cotton production centered in Xinjiang, hinting at a textile and apparel expansion plan that depends heavily on the forced labor of inmates at the various detention facilities.[183]Additionally, authorities have assembled Turkic Muslims and sent them to factories in various Chinese provinces. The conditions strongly suggest coercion, including the use of minders and political indoctrination of exported workers.[184] A 2017 state television report showed how officials pressured one young woman into participating in such schemes, even though she did not wish to be away from home.[185] A leaked Nankai University study of these schemes described how “some [exported] workers are unwilling to leave and have been seriously homesick.”[186] Organized labor transfer programs exist in other parts of China, such as Shanxi province, but these workers do not appear to be subjected to the same coercive conditions as those from Xinjiang.[187]Official plans published online detail how the program will transform ethnic minorities into a disciplined, patriotic, Chinese-speaking industrial work force.[188] As of 2018, the Chinese government has documented the employment of 450,000 new Turkic Muslim workers including impoverished household members, struggling relatives of prisoners and detainees, and political education camp detainees in the cotton and textiles industry.[189]Sexual Violence and Violations of Reproductive RightsThere are disturbing reports of sexual violence against Turkic Muslim women in detention. Tursunay Ziawudun was held in a camp for nine months in 2018. She reported that masked men gang-raped her on three occasions, that these same men used electroshock on and inside her genitals, and that camp authorities took women in her cell to be raped “every night.”[190]In addition to Tursunay Ziawudun’s first-person account, a number of other former detainees and camp teachers have said they witnessed, or heard of, inmates being raped. A political education camp teacher, Qulbinur Sedik, a Uyghur, said police officers told her women were being raped, including with electric batons.[191] A former detainee, an ethnic Kazakh woman, said a police officer threatened her with rape if she was not honest.[192] Aina Shormanbayeva, a prominent human rights lawyer in Kazakhstan who has been documenting abuses in Xinjiang, said one of the victims told her she was gang raped twice in a political education camp.[193] Others have recounted stories of sexual humiliation such as having their pubic hair pulled.[194]Human Rights Watch is unable to ascertain the extent to which sexual violence is perpetrated against Turkic Muslim women across Xinjiang, due to the hidden nature of such abuses and the stigma survivors may face. But the gravity of such allegations merits further investigation.Emerging reports also reveal violations of the reproductive rights of Turkic Muslim women in Xinjiang. Several former detainees and Xinjiang residents have described being subjected to procedures without consent. Rakhima Senbay, a mother of four and a former detainee, said she was forcibly implanted with an intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD).[195] Gulzir Mogdyn and an unnamed Kazakh woman (whose case is being advocated for by Kazakh rights advocate Aiman Umarova) said they were subjected to forced abortions while in Xinjiang. Zumrat Dawut said she was subjected to forced sterilization.[196]It is not clear how extensively coercive measures to control women’s fertility are being implemented as part of the Strike Hard Campaign. Throughout China for decades, women have been subjected to violations of their reproductive rights, with most Han couples limited to strict, and brutally enforced, birth quotas of one child per couple, a policy changed as of January 1, 2016, to two children per couple.[197]There are indications that these national birth control policies have been implemented more strictly than before in Xinjiang during the Strike Hard Campaign, out of a stated concern that resistance to family planning policy is the result of an adherence to religious extremism as an “ideological virus” that the government has determined needs to be eradicated.[198]Of the reasons for detention listed in the Qaraqash Document, violations of birth policies—that is, having too many children—was the most common, representing 115 of the 409 reasons for internment reported in the leaked document.[199] Over the past decade, Chinese academics and government officials have described Turkic Muslim and other minority population growth in the region as “excessive,” a catalyst of “religious extremism and splittism,” and a threat to national security.[200] A May 2015 government broadcast stated that “religious extremism begets re-marriages and illegal extra births.”[201] That same month, the district secretary of Hotan asserted at a family planning meeting that “de-extremification is an opportunity to eliminate the influence and interference of religion on family planning,” a sentiment reiterated in the Xinjiang White Paper.[202]In 2017, a phrase began to crop up in government documents related to family planning in Xinjiang: “severely attack behaviors that violate family planning.”[203] That same year, local governments in the region launched a “Special Campaign to Control Birth Control Violations,” seeking to unearth and punish birth policy violations dating as far back as the 1990s, with especially harsh punishments proposed for violations committed after July 28, 2017, when Xinjiang reformed its family planning policy to eliminate ethnic distinctions in birth policies. A regionwide directive issued in 2018 ordered the continuation and expansion of this campaign, and countywide implementation schemes were issued in April and May of that year.[204] Qiemo County, for example, specifically mandated that discovered violators be subjected to “vocational skills education and training,” referring to extrajudicial internment at reeducation camps. In particular, those family planning violations deemed to have come about “due to the influence of extreme religious thinking” were to be “dealt with severely.”[205]Concurrently in 2019, government officials launched a “Special Action Plan of the ‘Two Thorough Investigations’ of Illegal Births,” which required counties to implement intrusive birth control measures, namely IUD implantations and permanent sterilizations.[206] Bayingol Prefecture, for example, ordered that “all [women] that meet IUD placement conditions and are without contradictions must have [IUDs] placed immediately.”[207] Nilka County’s 2019 family planning policy involved the fitting of IUDs after just one birth in women who were part of the “floating population.” These IUDs were designed and legislated to be removable only through a surgical procedure, and the state has imposed prison terms and fines on any removal procedures not performed by state-approved medical practitioners.[208]While the number of sterilization procedures in the rest of China plummeted following the 2016 abolition of the country’s longstanding one-child policy, sterilizations surged in Xinjiang in 2017 and 2018, despite Turkic Muslim communities’ traditional reticence toward such procedures.[209] Turkic Muslim women have also reported threats of internment for refusal to undergo these “free” medical services.[210]III. International Legal StandardsHuman Rights Watch and the Stanford Clinic find that Chinese authorities have committed crimes against humanity against Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. Any specific prosecution of crimes against humanity would need to meet a criminal law standard for individual criminal culpability.Crimes against HumanityThe commission of crimes against humanity can serve as the basis for individual criminal liability not only in a country’s own domestic courts, but also in international tribunals, as well as in domestic courts outside the country under the principle of universal jurisdiction. Individual criminal liability extends beyond those who carry out the acts, to those who order, assist, facilitate, and aid and abet the offense. Under the principle of command responsibility, military and civilian officials up to the top of the chain of command can be held criminally responsible for crimes committed by their subordinates when they knew or should have known that such crimes were being committed but failed to take reasonable measures to prevent the crimes or punish those responsible.There is not yet an international convention on crimes against humanity, although a draft is under consideration by states. The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court outlines a range of prohibited acts[211] that constitute crimes against humanity “when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”[212] The acts detailed above implicate the following crimes against humanity: murder; enslavement; imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; torture; persecution; enforced disappearance; and other inhumane acts.General RequirementsThe Rome Statute defines crimes against humanity as specified acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” This definition can be broken down into four requirements: (1) that the attack is “widespread or systematic”; (2) that the attack is directed against a “civilian population”; (3) that the acts are committed “with knowledge of the attack”; and (4) that the acts are “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.”[213]The government’s mass incarceration of a million Turkic Muslims across the Xinjiang region meets the requirement of a “widespread or systematic” attack.[214] Turkic Muslims living in the Xinjiang region constitute a specific civilian population. Internal documents disseminated among CCP officials that reference key elements of the crimes targeting the Turkic Muslims—such as “assault style reeducation” of uncooperative detainees—illustrate the Chinese authorities’ knowledge of the attack.[215]The fourth requirement “requires that the State or organization actively promote or encourage such an attack against a civilian population.”[216] Commentators have noted that the word “policy” in this definition was added late in the stages of the Rome Conference in order to articulate the consensus and provide assurance that isolated acts would not be treated as crimes against humanity.[217]Human Rights Watch and the Stanford Clinic found a state policy to commit the described attacks against Turkic Muslims. The accounts of former detainees held at different facilities and during different time periods—such as the repeated allegations of the use of a “tiger chair,” forced political indoctrination, and cultural erasure, as well as similarities in detention conditions—are strikingly similar, which indicates the existence of an organized policy.Zhu Hailun, Xinjiang’s deputy party secretary, signed off on internal documents directing oppressive monitoring and control systems in the camps, as well as “assault-style reeducation” of disobedient detainees.[218] Sweeping statements by Chen Quanguo, the region’s top security chief—such as his exhortation to “round up everyone who should be rounded up” or that “the struggle against terror and to safeguard stability is a protracted war, and … a war of offense”—further illustrate support for these crimes at the senior level.[219] The government’s assignment to Xinjiang of Chen Quanguo, who presided over brutal and repressive government policies in Tibet, is further evidence of a broader government policy that facilitated crimes against humanity.In addition, statements and documents by high-ranking CCP officials indicate that the campaign against the Turkic Muslims reflects a systematic policy of repression adopted at the highest levels of the Party. For example, in leaked speeches by Xi Jinping, the CCP leader instructed Xinjiang police forces to “show absolutely no mercy” and unleash the “organs of dictatorship” against “radical Islam,” contending that religious extremism had already captured broad swaths of the Xinjiang population.[220] These speeches corroborate Xi’s involvement in catalyzing this campaign. Some of these cited statements and documents reference Turkic Muslims directly, such as one internal security bulletin that specifically flags the 1,869,310 Turkic Muslims using the Zapya peer-to-peer file-sharing app for authorities’ attention.[221] Others, such as Xi Jinping’s speeches, refer more vaguely to “terrorism,” “extremism,” or “radical Islam.”[222] Although these speeches do not make reference to Turkic Muslims explicitly, the CCP’s longstanding conflation of Turkic Muslim religiosity and separatism with violent extremism and terrorism suggests that this language may serve simply as thinly veiled references to the Turkic Muslims.[223]The CCP has gone to extraordinary lengths to ensure enforcement of the mass detention campaign in Xinjiang. To this end, the treatment of Wang Yongzhi, a CCP official who resisted the campaign, is illustrative. Although he initially followed the leadership’s orders to detain Turkic Muslims en masse in his region of Yarkand, he worried that this hardline approach would provoke backlash, exacerbate ethnic tensions, and hurt the region’s economy.[224] In a signed confession that appears to have been made under duress, Wang professed that the pressure to detain Turkic Muslims and prevent violence led him to drink on the job. Eventually, he ordered the release of over 7,000 political education camp inmates in September 2017.[225] For this act of defiance, the CCP detained him, stripped him of all power, prosecuted him, and, by publicizing his confession, made an example of him for “gravely disobeying the party central leadership’s strategy for governing Xinjiang.”[226]In 2017, the Party opened 12,000 investigations—20 times more than the previous year—into other Party cadres for similar infractions in Xinjiang, and purged or otherwise punished thousands of Xinjiang officials who resisted or failed to implement the mass detention campaign.[227] This routine removal of Party members who did not fully carry out the campaigns bolsters the conclusion that the CCP’s treatment of Turkic Muslims is a reflection of state policy.The Chinese government’s insistence on and enforcement of secrecy shows a high degree of centralized control over the camps, and an institutional awareness of the need to cover up their internal workings. Leaked CCP directives warned officials that the “work policy of the vocational skills education and training centers are … highly sensitiv[e],” and directed officials to “strengthen [their] staff’s awareness of staying secret,” and instruct them to exercise “serious political discipline” and “secrecy discipline” in the camps, including the prohibition of any video equipment in the camps.[228] Likewise, former detainees have reported being forced to sign documents agreeing not to divulge the internal camp practices.[229]Finally, in the cases of some of these crimes against humanity, there exist explicit, written or otherwise recorded government policies, such as the laws prohibiting Islamic religious practices. Even in the absence of comprehensive written policies, the concerted, systematic nature and the massive scale of the attacks against Turkic Muslims shows the existence of a state policy.Constitutive ActsThe discussion above shows that constitutive acts of crimes against humanity enumerated in the Rome Statute have been committed. The information uncovered for each, however, varies; in the sections below, the discussion of these acts will be ordered according to the amount and quality of the information meeting the elements of the crime, starting with the strongest.EnslavementThe forced labor of Turkic Muslim detainees may also constitute enslavement as contemplated by the Rome Statute. Although the Rome Statute itself defines the crime narrowly,[230] the Elements of Crimes interpret enslavement to encompass “exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a person to a servile status.”[231] Even if Turkic Muslim laborers are well treated,[232] the Nuremberg Tribunal has held that even in the absence of torture or ill-treatment, slavery can exist where laborers are “without lawful process … deprived of their freedom by forceful restraint.”[233]The forced labor of Turkic Muslims arbitrarily detained in political education facilities, as well as the automatic, involuntary transfer of “graduated” detainees to adjacent factories where they work for low or no wages, in a state where the government has exerted total and arbitrary power over the Turkic Muslim population, amounts to enslavement.Imprisonment and Other Severe Deprivation of Physical LibertyChinese authorities have arbitrarily and without due process imprisoned up to one million Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang in political education camps. Others are being held arbitrarily in detention facilities and prisons. This mistreatment amounts to the crime against humanity of imprisonment and other severe deprivation of physical liberty. Restrictions on the liberty of those not being held in detention facilities may be so drastically limited by Chinese government policies that their treatment also constitutes a “severe deprivation of physical liberty” within the scope of crimes against humanity.TortureTurkic Muslims in custody have been subjected to torture, defined by the Rome Statute as “the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering” that can be either physical or mental.[234] The Rome Statute definition of torture as a crime against humanity does not require that it be inflicted with a specific prohibited purpose, such as to obtain a confession, meaning that certain acts of severe physical or mental pain or suffering would fall within the crimes against humanity definition of torture regardless of the purpose for which it is committed.[235]Many of the acts committed against Turkic Muslims amount to torture under the Rome Statute as well as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Acts of torture include interrogation in “tiger chairs” using electroshock and other violent means of interrogation, and beatings, prolonged solitary confinement, sexual violence, and deprivation of food or water that are arbitrarily inflicted on detainees.PersecutionThe Chinese government’s targeting of and the repressive measures used against the Turkic Muslim ethnic group meet the requirements for the crime against humanity of persecution. Persecution is “the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity,”[236] based on “political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender … or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law.”[237] Persecution operates as an umbrella term that encompasses other constitutive acts so long as they are committed with discriminatory intent.Formal legislation and informal rules that target the religious practices of Turkic Muslims—including their names, attire, appearance, diet, observance of religious holidays, and prayer—and the abuse of Turkic Muslims for violations of such rules demonstrate that the Chinese authorities are taking action against Turkic Muslims on the basis of their religious and cultural identity.Other acts that qualify as persecution may include the razing of mosques and other religiously or culturally important sites, the involuntary implantation of contraceptive devices in Turkic Muslim women, the mandatory or coerced assimilation of Han Chinese culture into Turkic Muslim families through government programming, and the forced indoctrination of Turkic Muslims into state propaganda both inside and outside of camps.These actions reflect what has been termed “cultural persecution.”[238] The International Law Commission has previously indicated that persecution could take the form of “a prohibition on practising certain kinds of religious worship; prolonged and systematic detention of individuals who represent a political, religious or cultural group; a prohibition on the use of a national language, even in private; [and] systematic destruction of monuments or buildings representative of a particular social, religious, cultural or other group.”[239]In addition, the CCP’s use of highly invasive surveillance technology to identify and locate Turkic Muslims, as well as the mass aggregation of biometric data of Turkic Muslims, facilitates apprehension and wrongful detention.[240]Enforced DisappearanceThe Rome Statute defines an enforced disappearance as arrests or detentions of someone by government authorities “followed by a refusal to acknowledge the arrest, detention, or abduction, or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons,” “with the intention of removing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.”[241] Enforced disappearances not only violate various human rights law provisions, but they put the individual disappeared at heightened risk of torture and other ill-treatment and take a terrible psychological toll on their families, who may wait long periods before finding out what happened to them.The Chinese authorities in Xinjiang have routinely taken people into custody, including those sent to “political education” camps as well as other detention facilities without immediately notifying family members of this. In some cases, families do not learn that their relative has been taken into custody until that person has been released or transferred to another facility.Rape, Enforced Sterilization, and Other Forms of Sexual ViolenceAllegations of sexual violence in detention, including rape, would be crimes against humanity if committed with knowledge of an attack on the civilian population.[242] For example, the ICC Elements of Crimes specify that sterilizations carried out without patients’ “genuine consent” qualify as crimes against humanity. On the other hand, the Elements of Crimes also note that birth control measures that have a “non-permanent effect” would not count as “enforced sterilization”—which makes it more difficult to include the forced or coerced implantation of IUDs in this category.[243]Deportation and Forcible Transfer of PopulationTurkic Muslims in China and abroad have been “deported or forcibly transferred, without grounds permitted under international law … to another location, by expulsion or other coercive acts.”[244] The Elements of Crimes provide that both physical and psychological force, such as “fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or persons or another person” can characterize an act of displacement as forcible transfer.[245]RecommendationsTo the Chinese GovernmentTake immediate steps to end human rights violations against Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang and elsewhere, notably arbitrary detention and imprisonment, including in so-called reeducation camps; torture and other ill-treatment; restrictions on freedom of religion, privacy, and movement; sexual violence and enforced sterilization; and forced labor.Take immediate steps to end alleged crimes against humanity against Turkic Muslims.Investigate and appropriately prosecute government officials implicated in serious human rights violations and crimes against humanity.To the United NationsThe United Nations Human Rights Council should adopt a resolution to create a commission of inquiry with authority to: Investigate allegations of crimes against humanity and other human rights abuses against Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang, including unlawful imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty; persecution against an identifiable group on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, or religious grounds; enforced disappearance; torture; murder; other inhumane acts including forced labor; and restrictions on religious freedom; sexual violence; and violations of reproductive rights;Make recommendations to end the abuses;Identify responsible officials and provide a road map for holding them accountable;Call for appropriate reparations for victims and survivors; andReport regularly to the council and other relevant UN bodies.The UN high commissioner for human rights should exercise her independent monitoring and reporting mandate to collect information, speak out publicly on her findings, prepare reports on the human rights situation in Xinjiang, and keep the Human Rights Council regularly informed.UN special procedures should continue to document and publicly report on human rights violations in Xinjiang by the Chinese authorities within their respective mandates, with a view to supporting the creation of a commission of inquiry or a similar investigative mechanism.The UN secretary-general should publicly voice support for a commission of inquiry into human rights violations in Xinjiang, and publicly and privately urge Chinese authorities to end abuses against Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang. The secretary-general should publicly express support for accountability for those responsible for crimes against humanity in Xinjiang.The UN General Assembly should request that the commission of inquiry into abuses in Xinjiang also present its reports to the General Assembly and that the reports be transmitted to all UN member states and relevant UN bodies.The General Assembly should adopt a resolution that explicitly supports concrete measures for accountability, including targeted sanctions against those responsible for crimes against humanity.Members of the UN Security Council should take action to the extent possible, given China’s position as a permanent member, including by expressing support for a commission of inquiry on human rights violations in Xinjiang, including through an Arria formula meeting.To Concerned GovernmentsIn Coordinated Bilateral or Multilateral ActionImpose visa bans, travel bans, and targeted individual sanctions under the US Global Magnitsky Act, the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, and other human rights sanctions regimes in place in Canada, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere; these sanctions will be more effective if pursued collectively.Specify in all individual and joint public condemnations of rights abuses in Xinjiang that Chinese authorities are responsible for criminal acts that are part of widespread or systematic attacks against Turkic Muslims in Xinjiang that amount to crimes against humanity.Facilitate prosecutions against Chinese officials implicated in crimes against humanity on the basis of universal jurisdiction laws.Encourage national prosecutors to launch structural investigations, similar to ICC preliminary examinations, in which the prosecutor’s office collects and analyzes information about alleged serious violations to provide groundwork for future prosecutions.Impose escalating actions against technology companies found to be contributing to China’s mass surveillance state in Xinjiang, including by using the US Global Magnitsky Act, the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, and other sanctions regimes in place in Canada, the UK, and elsewhere.States party to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination should individually and jointly file complaints against China for its violations of the convention against Turkic Muslims.With Respect to Trade, Investment, and Business ActivitiesRelevant government agencies should review all investments in Xinjiang and, where necessary, impose trade sanctions, including divestment, in sectors facing credible allegations of serious abuses such as forced labor.Issue public advisories to companies similar to the one issued by Canada in January 2021 about: The gravity of human rights abuses in Xinjiang, including forced labor;Companies’ legal responsibilities under international and national law;Risks of becoming complicit in serious human rights violations through direct business activities and supply chains; andResponsibilities to conduct transparent and thorough human rights due diligence for any business dealings in China.The European Commission should not submit the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment to the European Parliament and Council for ratification until reports of forced labor have been investigated by independent and impartial international experts, abuses have been addressed, victims compensated, and there is substantial progress toward holding perpetrators to account.Call on businesses to publicly disclose the names, addresses, ownership, and other relevant details about whom they do business with in Xinjiang.Adopt legally binding requirements for human rights due diligence by companies operating in Xinjiang.Review the portfolios of international financial institutions to ensure that they are not complicit in repression in the region.Adopt or enact thorough due diligence legislation binding companies to prevent, mitigate, and remedy human rights abuses and environmental harms in their value chains.Adopt or enact legislation banning imports of goods produced through forced labor.To Countries with Turkic Muslim DiasporasEnsure Turkic Muslims have access to a fair system for adjudicating asylum requests.Facilitate family reunification by allowing family members of Turkic Muslims to join them.End all refoulement and other direct and indirect forced returns of Turkic Muslims to China.Establish mechanisms to track cases of harassment of Turkic Muslims present in other countries and take steps, including through the criminal law, to hold perpetrators accountable.Ensure Turkic Muslims have access to programs providing legal, medical, and psychological assistance to survivors of torture, rape, and other crimes, and for cultural and religious preservation.To Businesses and InvestorsRecognize that the responsibility to undertake human rights due diligence as articulated in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights is not currently possible in Xinjiang due to government interference.Join the the Coalition to End Forced Labor in the Uyghur Region’s “Call to Action” to end the practice of forced labor involving Turkic Muslims or take comparable steps. AcknowledgmentsThis report was prepared with the assistance of the Stanford Human Rights & Conflict Resolution Clinic, under the directorship of Dr. Beth Van Schaack, Leah Kaplan Visiting Professor in Human Rights at the Law School and a faculty affiliate with Stanford’s Center for Human Rights & International Justice. Maya Wang, senior China researcher in the Asia Division at Human Rights Watch, researched and wrote parts of the report. The report was edited by Sophie Richardson, China director. Brad Adams, Asia director, and James Ross, legal and policy director, provided legal review. Joseph Saunders, deputy program director, provided program review. [1] The region is home to several different communities of Turkic Muslims; the two biggest groups are 11 million Uyghurs and 1.6 million Kazakhs. There are also smaller communities of Kyrgyz and others. Human Rights Watch has documented abuses against members of each of these communities, including arbitrary detention in “political education” camps. For this report, we use the term Turkic Muslims to refer to all members of the community targeted by Chinese government policies.[2] See Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “Exposed: China’s Operating Manuals For Mass Internment And Arrest By Algorithm,” International Consortium of Journalists, November 24, 2019, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/exposed-chinas-operating-manuals-for-mass-internment-and-arrest-by-algorithm/; Steven Lee Myers, “China Defends Crackdown on Muslims, and Criticizes Times Article,” New York Times, November 18, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/18/world/asia/china-xinjiang-muslims-leak.html; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “The Mass Internment of Uyghurs: ‘We want to be respected as humans. Is it too much to ask?’” https://uhrp.org/press-release/mass-internment-uyghurs-%E2%80%9Cwe-want-be-respected-humans-it-too-much-ask%E2%80%9D.html.[3] Alison Killing, Megha Rajagopalan, and Christo Buschek, “Blanked-Out Spots On China’s Maps Helped Us Uncover Xinjiang’s Camps,” Buzzfeed News, August 27, 2020, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/alison_killing/satellite-images-investigation-xinjiang-detention-camps; Kelsey Munro, “Xinjiang Data Project website launch,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 25, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/news/xinjiang-data-project-website-launch.[4] Fergus Ryan, Danielle Cave, and Nathan Ruser, “Xinjiang’s Re-education Camps,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 1, 2018, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/mapping-xinjiangs-re-education-camps.[5] Nathan Ruser, James Leibold, Kelsey Munro, and Tilla Hoja, “Cultural Erasure,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 23, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure.[6] Adrian Zenz, “Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 7, July 2019.[7] Joint letter to the Human Rights Council president on Xinjiang, July 2019, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/190708_joint_statement_xinjiang.pdf.[8] Nick Cumming-Bruce, “China’s Retort Over Its Mass Detentions: Praise From Russia and Saudi Arabia,” New York Times, July 12, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/world/asia/china-human-rights-united-nations.html.[9] “54 countries voice support for China's counter-terrorism measures in Xinjiang,” Xinhua, October 30, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/30/c_138514935.htm.[10] “UN experts call for decisive measures to protect fundamental freedoms in China,” June 26, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006.[11] Statement by Ambassador Christoph Heusgen on behalf of 39 Countries in the Third Committee General Debate, October 6, 2020, https://new-york-un.diplo.de/un-en/news-corner/201006-heusgen-china/2402648.[12] Cuba Made a Joint Statement on Behalf of 45 Countries in Firm Support of China’s Counter-Terrorism and Deradicalization Measures in Xinjiang, October 6, 2020, http://chnun.chinamission.org.cn/eng/hyyfy/t1822121.htm.[13] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang, 2005, https://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/china0405/china0405.pdf.[14] Ibid., p. 13.[15] Ibid.; Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang,” July 9, 2008, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/07/09/behind-violence-xinjiang.[16] Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang.”[17] Ibid.[18] Ibid.[19] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows, p. 10.[20] Known as Yining in Chinese.[21] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows; Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang”; Amnesty International, “People’s Republic of China: Rebiya Kadeer’s personal account of Gulja after the massacre on 5 February 1997,” 2007, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/64000/asa170012007en.pdf; Amnesty International, “Remember the Gulja massacre? China’s crackdown on peaceful protesters,” 2007.[22] Human Rights Watch, Devastating Blows.[23] Ibid., p. 3-4; for a comprehensive overview and analysis of sources of ethnic tensions in the region in recent history, see 伊力哈木 (Ilham Tohti), 当前新疆民族问题的现状及建议 (Present-Day Ethnic Problems in Xinjiang: Overview and Recommendations), https://chinachangedotorg.files.wordpress.com/2015/05/e4bc8ae58a9be59388e69ca8efbc9ae5bd93e5898de696b0e79686e6b091e6978fe997aee9a298e79a84e78eb0e78ab6e58f8ae5bbbae8aeae1.pdf; translated at http://docs.uyghuramerican.org/pdf/ilham-tohti_present-day-ethnic-problems-in-xinjiang-uighur-autonomous-region-overview-and-recommendations_complete-translation1.pdf.[24] Chris Buckley, “China calls Xinjiang riot a plot against rule,” Reuters, July 5, 2009.[25] Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled: An Assessment of China’s National Human Rights Action Plan, January 2011, https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/01/11/promises-unfulfilled/assessment-chinas-national-human-rights-action-plan, p. 49.[26] Ibid., p. 33-36; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Demand Release of Seriously Ill Uighur,” March 10, 2011, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/28000/asa170112011en.pdf.[27] Amnesty International, “Justice, Justice”: The July 2009 protests in Xinjiang, China, 2010, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/36000/asa170272010en.pdf; Amnesty International, “China urged to release Uighur activist allegedly tortured in prison,” December 20, 2010, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2010/12/china-debe-liberar-activista-uigur-presuntamente-torturado-carcel/.[28] Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled; Human Rights Watch, “We Are Afraid to Even Look for Them”: Enforced Disappearances in the Wake of Xinjiang’s Protests, 2009, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/xinjiang1009webwcover.pdf, p. 21-32; Amnesty International, “Justice, Justice”; Amnesty International, “China must reveal whereabouts of Uighur children detained after deadly clash,” January 6, 2012, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2012/01/china-must-reveal-whereabouts-uighur-children-detained-after-deadly-clash.[29] Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang”; Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled, p. 49; Dan Levin, “China Remodels and Ancient Silk Road City, and an Ethnic Rift Widens,” New York Times, March 5, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/06/world/asia/china-remodels-an-ancient-silk-road-city-and-an-ethnic-rift-widens.html.[30] Human Rights Watch, Promises Unfulfilled, p. 62-63; Human Rights Watch, “Letter from HRW to Grand Imam Ahmed el Tayeb Re: Forced Return of Ethnic Uyghurs to China,” July 7, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/letter-hrw-grand-imam-ahmed-el-tayeb; Human Rights Watch, “Malaysia/China: Prevent Forced Return of Uighurs,” August 22, 2011, https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/08/22/malaysia/china-prevent-forced-return-uighurs; Sara Colm, “Analysis: Inside Perspective on Uighurs,” Phnom Penh Post, December 20, 2010, https://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/analysis-inside-perspective-uighurs; Human Rights Watch, “China: Forcibly Returned Uighur Asylum Seekers at Risk,” December 22, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/12/22/china-forcibly-returned-uighur-asylum-seekers-risk; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Demand Release of Seriously Ill Uighur,” March 10, 2011; World Uyghur Congress and Uyghur Human Rights Project, Alternative Report: Submission to the United Nations Committee Against Torture (CAT) In Consideration of CAT/C/CHN/5 2(2015), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/CHN/INT_CAT_CSS_CHN_22111_E.pdf.[31] Human Rights Watch, “Behind the Violence in Xinjiang.”[32] “Xinjiang’s Party chief wages ‘people’s war’ against terrorism,” China Daily, May 26, 2014, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/26/content_17541318.htm.[33] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses”: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims, September 2018, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0918_web2.pdf, p. 11-25; Joanne Smith Finley, “Securitzation, insecurity and conflict in contemporary Xinjiang: has PRC counter-terrorism evolved into state terror?” Central Asian Survey, 2019, p. 1-3; James Millward, “‘Reeducating’ Xinjiang’s Muslims,”ChinaFile, February 7, 2019, https://www.chinafile.com/library/nyrb-china-archive/reeducating-xinjiangs-muslims. [34] Smith Finley, “Securitization, insecurity and conflict in contemporary Xinjiang,” Central Asian Survey, p. 1, 3, 23, n.6.[35] Ibid. Note that this economic development has nevertheless largely benefitted Han Chinese settlers.[36] Chris Buckley, “The Leaders Who Unleashed China’s Mass Detention of Muslims,” New York Times, October 13, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/13/world/asia/china-muslim-detainment-xinjang-camps.html; Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” China Brief, September 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/chen-quanguo-the-strongman-behind-beijings-securitization-strategy-in-tibet-and-xinjiang/; Edward Wong, “China Said to Detain Returning Tibetan Pilgrims,” New York Times, April 7, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/world/asia/china-said-to-detain-returning-tibetan-pilgrims.html.[37] International Campaign for Tibet, “The origin of the ‘Xinjiang model’ in Tibet under Chen Quanguo: Securitizing ethnicity and accelerating assimilation,” December 19, 2018, https://savetibet.org/the-origin-of-the-xinjiang-model-in-tibet-under-chen-quanguo-securitizing-ethnicity-and-accelerating-assimilation/; Sui-Wee Lee, “China's top Tibet official orders tighter control of Internet,” Reuters, February 29, 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-tibet/chinas-top-tibet-official-orders-tighter-control-of-internet-idUSTRE8200BZ20120301; Human Rights Watch, “China: China Poised to Repeat Tibet Mistakes Abusive Policies Planned for Uyghur Region,” January 20, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/01/20/china-poised-repeat-tibet-mistakes.[38] Deng Yuwen, “Reading the China Dream,” https://www.readingthechinadream.com/deng-yuwen-chinese-statism.html.[39] “Full Transcript: Interview with Xinjiang Government Chief on Counterterrorism, Vocational Education and Training in Xinjiang,” People’s Daily, October 16, 2018, http://en.people.cn/n3/2018/1016/c90000-9508925.html.[40] Human Rights Watch, Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: A Topical Digest of the Case Law of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 2006, https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/07/26/genocide-war-crimes-and-crimes-against-humanity/topical-digest-case-law.[41] Ibid.[42] The UN International Law Commission has prepared draft articles on prevention and punishment of crimes against humanity, which adopt the ICC Statute’s definition of the offense. The Draft Articles are under consideration in the UN General Assembly.[43] Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees,” September 10, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/10/china-free-xinjiang-political-education-detainees; Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018; Emily Feng, “Uighur children fall victim to China anti-terror drive,” Financial Times, July 9, 2018.[44] Adrian Zenz, “New Evidence for China’s Political Re-Education Campaign in Xinjiang,” China Brief, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/evidence-for-chinas-political-re-education-campaign-in-xinjiang; Chinese Human Rights Defenders and Equal Rights Initiative, “China: Massive Numbers of Uyghurs and Other Ethnic Minorities Forced into Re-education Programs,” August 3, 2018, https://www.nchrd.org/2018/08/china-massive-numbers-of-uyghurs-other-ethnic-minorities-forced-into-re-education-programs. This estimate was cited by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) in its concluding observations to its review of China. CERD, Concluding observations on the combined fourteenth to seventeenth periodic reports of China (including Hong Kong, China and Macao, China), CERD/C/CHN/CO/14-17, 2018, para. 40. Note that Zenz has recently revised his estimate to between 900,000 and 1.8 million. Adrian Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts’: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 11, November 2019.[45] Testimony of Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Busby, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “The China Challenge, Part 3: Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law,” December 4, 2018, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/120418_Busby_Testimony.pdf; “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第14期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 14), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558505/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-Chinese.pdf, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558506/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-14-English.pdf.[46] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-xinjiang-documents.html.[47] Ibid.[48] Testimony of Rushan Abbas, Director of Campaign for Uyghurs, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity Policy of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “ARIA in Action, Part 1: Human Rights, Democracy, and Rule of Law,” April 9, 2019, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/040919_Abbas_Testimony.pdf; Sada Seytoff and Alim Seytoff, “Academic Freedom Watchdog Demands China Unconditionally Release Prominent Uyghur Scholar,” Radio Free Asia, November 2, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scholar-11022018134451.html.[49] 吐鲁番市集中教育培训学校学员子女问答策略 (Tactics from Turpan City for answering questions asked by the children of concentrated education and training school students), translated in “Document: What Chinese Officials Told Children Whose Families Were Put in Camps,” New York Times, November 16, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/16/world/asia/china-detention-directive.html (Tactics from Turpan City).[50] Ben Dooley, “Inside China’s internment camps: tear gas, Tasers and textbooks,” Agence France-Presse, October 25, 2018, https://www.afp.com/en/inside-chinas-internment-camps-tear-gas-tasers-and-textbooks.[51] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558509/China-Cables-Telegram-Chinese.pdf, para. 14, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558510/China-Cables-Telegram-English.pdf; Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/muslims-camps-china/.[52] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “‘Ideological Transformation’: Records of Mass Detention from Qaraqash, Hotan,” February 2020, https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_QaraqashDocument.pdf.[53] These countries are Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Alexandra Ma, “China is using flimsy excuses to lock up its Muslim minority on a huge scale — here are some of the bizarre reasons people are in jail,” Business Insider, September 16, 2018, https://www.businessinsider.com/china-gives-these-excuses-to-imprison-uighur-ethnic-minority-2018-9.[54] Detention for this reason is especially unjust in that the government, during a brief period in 2015, encouraged Uyghurs to apply for passports, and that many of the Uyghurs detained on this basis appear to have applied for passports during this window. Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 10.[55] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 10.[56] Ibid.[57] Ibid., p. 11, 16.[58] Ibid., p. 13.[59] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 3, 24-25.[60] Amnesty International, “Separated Souls: Uighur journalist’s unbreakable resolve to help her detained family,” March 16, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/03/uighur-journalists-unbreakable-resolve-to-help-detained-family/; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Detained Uighur Has Nervous Breakdown.”[61] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 4. This information appears to power what officials termed the “three circles and six diagrams collision analysis” (三圈六图碰撞分析), a method by which authorities analyze and evaluate detainees.[62] Gerry Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News, May 17, 2018, https://apnews.com/6e151296fb194f85ba69a8babd972e4b/China%E2%80%99s-massindoctrinationcamps-evoke-Cultural-Revolution.[63] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 14.[64] Ibid., para. 16.[65] Ibid., para. 17; Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “New Leak Reveals Orders for China’s Internment Camps,” New York Times, November 24, 2019; Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News.[66] Tactics from Turpan City.[67] Terence McCoy, “China scores 99.9 percent conviction rate last year,” Washington Post, March 11, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/03/11/china-scored-99-9-percent-conviction-rate-last-year/; Lily Kuo, “China’s criminal conviction rate is 99.9 percent,” Quartz, August 7, 2014, https://qz.com/246696/chinas-criminal-conviction-rate-is-99-9/; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017,” July 2018; Emily Feng, “‘Illegal Superstition’: China Jails Muslims For Practicing Islam, Relatives Say,” National Public Radio, October 8, 2019, https://www.npr.org/2019/10/08/764153179/china-has-begun-moving-xinjiang-muslim-detainees-to-formal-prisons-relatives-say; Chris Buckley, “China’s Prisons Swell After Deluge of Arrests Engulfs Muslims,” New York Times, August 31, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/world/asia/xinjiang-china-uighurs-prisons.html.[68] Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017.”[69] Gene A. Bunin, “The Elephant in the XUAR,” December 9, 2020, https://livingotherwise.com/2020/12/09/the-elephant-in-the-xuar-i-entire-families-sentenced/.[70] Adrian Zenz, “China’s Domestic Security Spending: An Analysis of Available Data,” China Brief, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-domestic-security-spending-analysis-available-data/; Adrian Zenz and James Leibold, “Chen Quanguo: The Strongman Behind Beijing’s Securitization Strategy in Tibet and Xinjiang,” China Brief, September 2017.[71] Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: Detained Uighur Has Nervous Breakdown,” March 20, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1700732019ENGLISH.pdf; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: 30 Relatives of Uighur Activist Arbitrarily Detained,” November 14, 2017, https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/uaa25117-3.pdf; Amnesty International, “Urgent Action: 20 Relatives of Uighur Journalist Detained,” March 1, 2018, https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA1779642018ENGLISH.pdf.[72] Human Rights Watch, Submission to Universal Periodical Review of China, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/03/29/submission-universal-periodic-review-china; Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017.”[73] Ibid.[74] Human Rights Watch, “China: Free Xinjiang ‘Political Education’ Detainees,” September 10, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/10/china-free-xinjiang-political-education-detainees.[75] Chinese Human Rights Defenders, “Criminal Arrests in Xinjiang Account for 21% of China’s Total in 2017.”[76] Entry 13409: Jin Dehuai, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=13409.[77] Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Chaqiliq County People’s Court Criminal Verdict, 2018, Xinjiang 2824 Criminal-Case No. 121, https://shahit.biz/verview.php?no=35.[78] Entry 915: Asqar Azatbek, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=915.[79] Entry 5821: Nurlan Pioner, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=5821.[80] Entry 11997: Nie Shigang, Xinjiang Victims Database, https://shahit.biz/eng/viewentry.php?entryno=11997.[81] Verdict against Serikzhan Adilhan, convicted of running an illegal business ( 塞力克江·阿德勒汗非法经营罪二审刑事裁定书 ), September 5, 2019, China Judgement Online, https://archive.vn/5mxOi.[82] Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region High People’s Court Criminal Judgment, 2017, Xinjiang 40 Criminal Final No. 78, https://shahit.biz/verview.php?no=36.[83] “Siblings Get Lengthy Jail Terms in Xinjiang For Links to Turkey-Based Uyghur Scholar,” Radio Free Asia, August 22, 2020, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/scholar-siblings-08222020092753.html.[84] Of the 177, 124 died in custody; of that number, 101 were Uyghurs, 20 were Kazkahs, and 1 each were Han, Tatar, and Uyghur-Kazakh. The numbers were generated using the database’s filter function; see https://shahit.biz/eng/#filter.[85] “At Least 150 Detainees Have Died in One Xinjiang Internment Camp: Police Officer,” Radio Free Asia, October 29, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/deaths-10292019181322.html;“Uyghur Father of Two Dies After Falling Ill in Xinjiang Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, April 12, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/father-04122018153525.html; “Uyghur Man Buried Amid Strict Security After Latest Xinjiang Reeducation Camp Death,” Radio Free Asia, June 8, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/gulja-burial-06082018164250.html; “Uyghur Teenager Dies in Custody at Political Re-Education Camp,” Radio Free Asia, March 14, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/teenager-03142018154926.html; “Elderly Uyghur Woman Dies in Detention in Xinjiang ‘Political Re-Education Camp,’” Radio Free Asia, May 24, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/woman-05242018164854.html.[86] Helen Davidson, “China confirms death of Uighur man whose family says was held in Xinjiang camps,” Guardian, October 2, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/oct/02/china-confirms-death-of-uighur-man-whose-family-says-was-held-in-xinjiang-camps.[87] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 41-42.[88] Harry Cockburn, “Muslim woman describes torture and beatings in China detention camp: ‘I begged them to kill me’,” The Independent, November 28, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/uighur-muslim-china-mihrigul-tursun-torture-reeducation-camps-a8656396.html.[89] Human Rights Watch interview with Ismail (pseudonym), 40, whose father died in a political education camp and his brother is held in a camp, May 12, 2018.[90] Testimony of Mihrigul Tursun; Gerry Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News, May 17, 2018, recounting former detainee’s interrogation in a “tiger chair.”[91] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 41-42; Philip Wen and Olzhas Auyezov, “Tracking China’s Muslim Gulag,” Reuters, November 29, 2018.[92] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 3.[93] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 2, 36, 41-42, 49-50, 54-55.[94] Ibid.[95] Ibid.[96] Ibid., p. 50.[97] Adrian Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts’: Evidence from Chinese Government Documents about the Nature and Extent of Xinjiang’s Extrajudicial Internment Campaign,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 11, November 2019.[98] “#MenmuUyghur” in Uyghur.[99] Austin Ramzy, “‘Show Me That My Father is Alive.’ China Faces Torrent of Online Pleas,” New York Times, February 17, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/17/world/asia/uighurs-china-internment-camps.html.[100] Xinjiang Victims Database, shahit.biz.[101] Patrick Poon, “Families of missing Uighurs terrified to search for their loved ones,” Amnesty International, March 31, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/03/uighurs-too-scared-to-search-for-missing-family/.[102] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019.[103] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation.”[104] US Committee on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, 2019, https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2019USCIRFAnnualReport.pdf; Jianli Yang and Lianchao Han, “Did a Muslim Slave Make Your Chinese Shirt?” Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2019.[105] “Timeline of Chen Quanguo’s Uyghur Region Policy,” Radio Free Asia, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/. See also, “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第2期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 2), https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6558501-China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-2-Chinese.html, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558502/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-2-Enligsh.pdf, encouraging the use of 10-household units to monitor individuals in Xinjiang known to have obtained foreign nationality and applied for Chinese visas, or have obtained certificates from Chinese embassies and consulates.[106] An acronym that stands for “Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Get Together the Hearts of the People” (访民情、惠民生、聚民心). These teams, also known as “village-based work teams,” were first implemented in the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 2011—then extended indefinitely—by then-Tibet Party Secretary Chen Quanguo. See Human Rights Watch, “China: No End to Tibet Surveillance Program,” January 18, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/18/china-no-end-tibet-surveillance-program; “200,000 Communist Party members Dispatched to Stay in Grassroots Villages in Xinjiang to Visit the People, Benefit the People, and Get Together the Hearts of the People” (新疆20万机关干部下基层住万村，访民情、惠民生、聚民心), People Online (人民网), http://xj.people.com.cn/GB/188750/361873/.[107] Human Rights Watch, “China: Visiting Officials Occupy Homes in Muslim Region,” May 13, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/05/13/china-visiting-officials-occupy-homes-muslim-region.[108] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, May 2019, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/china0519_web5.pdf, p. 15-16.[109] Xinjiang: 2017 Nián Quánmín Jiànkāng Tǐjiǎn Gōngzuò Quánbù Wánchéng (新疆：2017年全民健康体检工作全部完成), Xīnjiāng Rìbào (新疆日报), November 2, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2017-11/02/content_5236389.htm; Human Rights Watch, “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions,” December 13, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/12/13/china-minority-region-collects-dna-millions.[110] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, p. 15; “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions.”[111] Human Rights Watch, “China: Minority Region Collects DNA from Millions.”[112] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, p. 15; Isobel Cockerell, “Inside China’s Massive Surveillance Operation,” Wired, May 9, 2019, https://www.wired.com/story/inside-chinas-massive-surveillance-operation/.[113] Human Rights Watch, “Police DNA Database Threatens Privacy,” May 15, 2016, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/15/china-police-dna-database-threatens-privacy.[114] Human Rights Watch, “China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region,” February 26, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/02/26/china-big-data-fuels-crackdown-minority-region; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “‘Ideological Transformation’: Records of Mass Detention from Qaraqash, Hotan,” February 2020, https://docs.uhrp.org/pdf/UHRP_QaraqashDocument.pdf, p. 16-17.[115] Steven Melendez, “In locked-down Xinjiang, China is tracking kitchen knvies with QR codes,” Fast Company, December 20, 2017, https://www.fastcompany.com/40510238/in-xinjiang-china-some-knives-branded-with-owners-qr-codes; “When CCTV cameras aren’t enough: Chinese police order drivers to install tracking devices on their cars,” Fast Company , February 21, 2017, https://www.fastcompany.com/4031016/when-cctv-cameras-arent-enough-chinese-police-order-drivers-to-install-tracking-devices-on-their-cars.[116] Human Rights Watch, China’s Algorithms of Repression, p. 1, 24; “China: Big Data Fuels Crackdown in Minority Region.” IJOP collects information such as the individual’s name, ID type and number, ethnicity, address, license plate number, profession, education, passport, phone number, relationship with head of household, blood type, height, photo, political status, religion, “religious atmosphere” (fair or strong), reason for seeking asylum or education abroad, destination country, exit time, changed identity? (if yes, to what), and reason for leaving Xinjiang. See also, Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 14-15; and “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第2期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 2), encouraging the detention of Xinjiang residents who IJOP identified as having obtained foreign nationality and applied for Chinese visas, or having obtained certificates from Chinese embassies and consulates.[117] Human Rights Watch, “China: Big Data Program Targets Xinjiang’s Muslims: Leaked List of Over 2,000 Detainees Demonstrates Automated Repression,” December 9, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/09/china-big-data-program-targets-xinjiangs-muslims.[118] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 13.[119] Ibid.[120] For information on targeted digital surveillance against the Uyghur diaspora, see Stevens Le Blond, Adina Uritesc, Cédric Gilbert, Zheng Leong Chua, and Prateek Saxena, “A Look at Targeted Attacks Through the Lens of an NGO,” San Diego: USENIX Association, 23rd USENIX Security Symposium, August 20-22, 2014, https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/usenixsecurity14/sec14-paper-blond.pdf.[121] Paul Mozur and Nicole Perlroth, “China’s Software Stalked Uighurs Earlier and More Widely, Researchers Learn,” New York Times, July 1, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/01/technology/china-uighurs-hackers-malware-hackers-smartphones.html.[122] Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts,’” Journal of Political Risk.[123] Peter Stubley, “Uighur Muslims forbidden to pray or grow beards in China’s ‘re-education’ camps, former detainee reveals,” The Independent, March 22, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-education-camps-forbidden-beards-pray-pork-xinjiang-a8835861.html. See also, 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 8, describing how detainees should “adhere to the daily concentrated study of the national language (Chinese), law, and skills” and how camps should “make remedial Chinese studies the top priority.”[124] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4, 9-10, 39-40. According to a former detainee, these rules included prohibitions on Islamic greetings, Uyghur and Kazakh writing on Uyghur restaurant signs, the use of Uyghur or Kazakh in public spaces, Uyghur- and Kazakh-language schools, and the establishment of minority-only chat groups on WeChat, QQ, and other social media websites; a ban on communications with any person in the 26 “sensitive” countries; and cash rewards for the intermarriage of Han Chinese and Kazakhs.[125] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4, 38-39.[126] Shih, “China’s mass indoctrination camps evoke Cultural Revolution,” AP News.[127] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 11.[128] Peter Stubley, “Uighur Muslims forbidden to pray or grow beards in China’s ‘re-education’ camps, former detainee reveals,” The Independent.[129] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 3.[130] Emily Rauhala and Anna Fifield, “She survived a Chinese internment camp and made it to Virginia. Will the U.S. let her stay?” Washington Post, November 17, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/11/17/she-survived-chinese-internment-camp-made-it-virginia-will-us-let-her-stay/?arc404=true.[131] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4, 69.[132] Sophie Richardson, “China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang,” Human Rights Watch, April 24, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/04/24/china-bans-many-muslim-baby-names-xinjiang.[133] Dake Kang, “Correction: China-Xinjiang-Banished Textbooks story,” AP News, September 3, 2019, https://apnews.com/4f5f57213e3546ab9bd1be01dfb510d3; Qiao Long and Yang Fan, “China Bans Use of Uyghur, Kazakh Textbooks, Materials in Xinjiang Schools,” Radio Free Asia, October 13, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/ethnic-textbooks-10132017135316.html; Darren Byler, “The ‘Patriotism’ of Not Speaking Uyghur,” SupChina, January 2, 2019, https://supchina.com/2019/01/02/the-patriotism-of-not-speaking-uyghur/; Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 17.[134] “Xinjiang’s ‘Open Letter’ Forces Uyghurs to Put Loyalty to China in Writing,” Radio Free Asia, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/ChenPolicy3.html; “Timeline of Chen Quanguo’s Uyghur Region Policy,” Radio Free Asia, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/.[135] Byler, “The ‘Patriotism’ of Not Speaking Uyghur,” SupChina.[136] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 4.[137] The rationale is that such names “exaggerate religious fervor.” Although not “illegal” per se, children with banned names cannot obtain household registration, which is essential for accessing public school and other social services. The ban was also imposed retroactively, thereby requiring parents to change their children’s names. Sophie Richardson, “China Bans Many Muslim Baby Names in Xinjiang,” Human Rights Watch; “Timeline of Chen Quanguo’s Uyghur Region Policy,” Radio Free Asia.[138] Ibid.; Amnesty International, “‘Forgive my children for not fasting’ – Ramadan in Xinjiang,” May 3, 2019, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/2019/05/forgive-my-children-ramadan-in-xinjiang/.[139] Shohret Hoshur, “Uyghur Woman Handed 10-Year Prison Term Over Headscarf Claim,” Radio Free Asia, September 19, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/headscarf-09192017174307.html.[140] Shohret Hoshur, “Xinjiang’s Korla City Seizes Qurans, Prayer Mats From Uyghur Muslims,” Radio Free Asia, October 2, 2017, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/qurans-10022017152453.html.[141] US Committee on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, 2019, p. 37.[142] Jon Sharman, “China ‘forcing Muslims to eat pork and drink alcohol’ for lunar new year festival,” The Independent, February 7, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-muslims-xinjiang-pork-alcohol-lunar-new-year-spring-festival-uighur-islam-a8767561.html.[143] See “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第20期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 20), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558507/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-20-Chinese.pdf, translated at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6558508/China-Cables-IJOP-Daily-Bulletin-20-English.pdf.[144] “Suppressing religious freedoms: Chinese imams forced to dance in Xinjiang region,” Express Tribune, April 18, 2015, https://tribune.com.pk/story/871879/suppressing-religious-freedoms-chinese-imams-forced-to-dance-in-xinjiang-region/. See also, World Uyghur Congress and Uyghur Human Rights Project, Alternative Report: Submission to the United Nations Committee Against Torture (CAT) In Consideration of CAT/C/CHN/5, 2015, p. 2.[145] Regulations of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region on Religious Affairs, 2014 (新疆维吾尔自治区宗教事务条例 2014), art. 40.[146] CNES, Airbus DS, Earthrise, and AFP, “Then and now: China’s destruction of Uighur burial grounds,” Guardian, October 9, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/09/chinas-destruction-of-uighur-burial-grounds-then-and-now; “Even in death, Uighurs feel long reach of Chinese state,” Agence France-Presse, October 9, 2019, https://www.afp.com/en/news/15/even-death-uighurs-feel-long-reach-chinese-state-doc-1ky71r1; Adam Withnall, “China ‘building cark parks and playgrounds’ over Uighur Muslim graveyards ‘to eradicate ethnic group’s identity,” The Independent, October 9, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslims-burial-grounds-satellite-xinjiang-a9148996.html.[147] Ibid.[148] Ibid.[149] Shohret Hoshur, “Xinjiang Authorities Use ‘Burial Management Centers’ to Subvert Uyghur Funeral Traditions,” Radio Free Asia, April 19, 2018, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/burials-04192018141100.html.[150] Cultural Erasure, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/cultural-erasure.[151] Joanne Smith Finley, “‘Now We Don’t Talk Anymore’: Inside the ‘Cleansing’ of Xinjiang,” ChinaFile, December 28, 2018, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/now-we-dont-talk-anymore; Lily Kuo, “Revealed: new evidence of China’s mission to raze the mosques of Xinjiang,” Guardian, May 6, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/07/revealed-new-evidence-of-chinas-mission-to-raze-the-mosques-of-xinjiang (“If one were to remove these … shrines, the Uighur people would lose contact with earth. They would no longer have a personal, cultural, and spiritual history. After a few years we would not have a memory of why we live here or where we belong.”) For a comparison of such demolitions to the demolitions of synagogues and Jewish cemeteries during Kristallnacht in Nazi Germany, see Fred Hiatt, “In China, every day is Kristallnacht,” Washington Post, November 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/11/03/china-every-day-is-kristallnacht/?arc404=true.[152] Eva Xiao, “China pushes inter-ethnic marriage in Xinjiang assimilation drive,” Agence France-Presse, May 16, 2019, https://news.yahoo.com/china-pushes-inter-ethnic-marriage-xinjiang-assimilation-drive-044619042.html; Darren Byler, “Uyghur Love in a time of Interethnic Marriage,” SupChina, August 7, 2019, https://supchina.com/2019/08/07/uyghur-love-in-a-time-of-interethnic-marriage/; “Xinjiang Authorities Push Uyghurs to Marry Han Chinese,” 2017, Radio Free Asia (2017), https://www.rfa.org/english/news/special/uyghur-oppression/ChenPolicy2.html.[153] Ibid.[154] Ibid.; Leigh Hartman, “China coerces Uighur women into unwanted marriages,” ShareAmerica, September 24, 2019, https://share.america.gov/china-coerces-uighur-women-into-unwanted-marriages/.[155] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 11-25.[156] Ibid., p. 4, 14-15.[157] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 9.[158] Known as Kuai Ya in Chinese.[159] “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第20期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 20); Scilla Alecci, “How China Targets Uighurs ‘One By One’ For Using A Mobile App, Int’l Consortium of Investigative Journalists,” November 24, 2019, https://www.icij.org/investigations/china-cables/how-china-targets-uighurs-one-by-one-for-using-a-mobile-app/.[160] “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第2期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 2).[161] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 12.[162] Human Rights Watch, “Eradicating Ideological Viruses,” p. 5, 83-86; Testimony of Mihrigul Tursun, Hearing before the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2018.[163] Ibid.; Amnesty International, China: Uyghurs living abroad tell of campaign of intimidation, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2020/02/china-uyghurs-living-abroad-tell-of-campaign-of-intimidation/.[164] Zenz, “‘Wash Brains, Cleanse Hearts,’” Journal of Political Risk.[165] Human Rights Watch, “China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families,” September 15, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/09/15/china-xinjiang-children-separated-families; “China: Children Caught in Xinjiang Crackdown,” October 16, 2018, https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/10/16/china-children-caught-xinjiang-crackdown.[166] Ibid.[167] “China is putting Uighur children in ‘orphanages’ even if their parents are alive,” The Independent, September 21, 2018, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighurs-human-rights-muslims-orphanages-xinjiang-province-reeducation-a8548341.html.[168] Emily Feng, “Uighur children fall victim to China anti-terror drive,” Financial Times, July 9, 2018, https://www.ft.com/content/f0d3223a-7f4d-11e8-bc55-50daf11b720d.[169] Adrian Zenz, “Break Their Roots: Evidence for China’s Parent-Child Separation Campaign in Xinjiang,” Journal of Political Risk, vol. 7, no. 7, July 2019.[170] “China is putting Uighur children in ‘orphanages’ even if their parents are alive,” The Independent.[171] Ibid.; Human Rights Watch, “China: Xinjiang Children Separated from Families.”[172] Zenz, “Break Their Roots,” Journal of Political Risk.[173] Human Rights Watch, “China: Forcibly Returned Uighur Asylum Seekers At Risk,” December 22, 2009; “Thailand: More Uighurs Face Forced Return to China,” March 21, 2014; “Letter to Malaysian Prime Minister Concerning Forced Return of Uighurs,” February 1, 2013; “Saudi Arabia: Clarify Status of Uyghur Detainees,” November 23, 2020.[174] Catherine Putz, “Thailand Deports 100 Uyghurs to China,” The Diplomat, July 11, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/thailand-deports-100-uyghurs-to-china/.[175] Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China,” July 7, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/07/07/egypt-dont-deport-uyghurs-china; Matt Rivers, Max Foster, and James Griffiths, “Disturbing video shows hundreds of blindfolded prisoners in Xinjiang,” CNN, October 7, 2019.[176] Joëlle Garrus, “No place to hide: exiled Chinese Uighur Muslims feel state’s long reach,” Hong Kong Free Press, August 19, 2018, https://www.hongkongfp.com/2018/08/19/no-place-hide-exiled-chinese-uighur-muslims-feel-states-long-reach/; Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China.”[177] Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Don’t Deport Uyghurs to China.”[178] Ibid.[179] For a discussion about the history around these schemes, see Li Xiaoxia, “(新疆少数民族产业工人队伍发展及现状分析),” 北方民族大学学报(哲学社会科学版), 2015.[180] See, for example, 新疆的农村劳动力转移出现四个转变产生四大效应, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2007-06/18/content_652170.htm, mentioning that over 100,000 Xinjiang workers were exported to other provinces under the scheme in 2006.[181] Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “China’s Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,” New York Times, December 16, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/16/world/asia/xinjiang-china-forced-labor-camps-uighurs.html.[182] Shohret Hoshur, “Internment Camp Assigned Uyghur Forced Laborers to Xinjiang Textile Factory: Official,” Radio Free Asia, November 14, 2019, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/laborers-11142019142325.html.[183] Fair Labor Association, “Issue Brief: Forced Labor Risk in Xinjiang, China,” 2020, https://www.fairlabor.org/sites/default/files/documents/reports/fla-brief-xinjiang_forced_labor_risk_final.pdf; Citizen Power Initiatives for China, Cotton: The Fabric Full of Lies, 2019.[184] ASPI, “Uyghurs for Sale,” https://www.aspi.org.au/report/uyghurs-sale.[185] John Sudworth, “‘If the others go I’ll go’: Inside China’s scheme to transfer Uighurs into work,” BBC News, March 2, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-56250915.[186] Ibid.; 中国财富经济研究院智库报告-1009新疆和田地区维族劳动力转移就业扶贫工作报告, Nankai University, http://web.archive.org/web/20200507161938/https:/ciwe.nankai.edu.cn/2019/1223/c18571a259225/page.htm.[187] 我省出台措施进一步加大就业扶贫力度, http://www.jcgov.gov.cn/dtxx/sxyw/202003/t20200315_890057.shtml.[188] Bernhard Zand and Adrian Zenz, “The Equivalent of Cultural Genocide,” Spiegel Online, November 28, 2019, https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/chinese-oppression-of-the-uighurs-like-cultural-genocide-a-1298171.html.[189] 孙瑞哲分享十大行业发展热点 (Sun Ruizhe Shares Top Ten Industry Development Hot Topics), March 4, 2018, transcript, http://www.ccta.org.cn/hyzx/201803/t20180305_3683861.html; Jianli Yang and Lianchao Han, “Did a Muslim Slave Make Your Chinese Shirt?,” Wall Street Journal, October 16, 2019.[190] Matthew Hill, David Campanale, and Joel Gunter, “‘Their goal is to destroy everyone’: Uighur camp detainees allege systematic rape,” BBC News, February 2, 2021, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-55794071.[191] Ruth Ingram, “Confessions of a Xinjiang Camp Teacher,” The Diplomat, August 17, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/08/confessions-of-a-xinjiang-camp-teacher/.[192] Forthcoming ChinaFile publication.[193] Human Rights Watch interview with Aina Shormanbayeva via an electronic communication platform, August 20, 2020.[194] Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Abortions, IUDs and Sexual humiliation: Muslim women who fled China for Kazakhstan recount ordeals,” Washington Post, October 7, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/abortions-iuds-and-sexual-humiliation-muslim-women-who-fled-china-for-kazakhstan-recount-ordeals/2019/10/04/551c2658-cfd2-11e9-a620-0a91656d7db6_story.html; Amie Ferris-Rotman, Aigerim Toleukhan, Emily Rauhala, and Anna Fifield, “China accused of genocide over forced abortions of Uighur Muslim women as escapees reveal widespread sexual torture,” The Independent, October 6, 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-uighur-muslim-women-abortions-sexual-abuse-genocide-a9144721.html.[195] Ferris-Rotman, “Abortions, IUDs and Sexual humiliation,” Washington Post.[196] Ibid.; Ferris-Rotman, Toleukhan, Rauhala, and Fifield, “China accused of genocide over forced abortions of Uighur Muslim women as escapees reveal widespread sexual torture,” The Independent; Rauhala and Fifield, “She survived a Chinese internment camp and made it to Virginia,” Washington Post.[197] Maya Wang, “Ending the One-Child Policy Does Not Equal Reproductive Freedom in China,” Human Rights Watch, October 29, 2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/10/29/dispatches-ending-one-child-policy-does-not-equal-reproductive-freedom-china.[198] Adrian Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention: The CCP’s Campaign to Suppress Uyghur Birth Rates in Xinjiang,” China Brief, vol. 20, no. 12, 2020, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/Zenz-Internment-Sterilizations-and-IUDs-UPDATED-July-21-Rev2.pdf?x19523.[199] Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 9.[200] Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief.[201] Ibid., p. 7-8.[202] 闫国灿同志在地区卫生计生工作会议上的讲话 (Speech by Comrade Yan Guocan at the Regional Health and Family Conference), 和田政府网 (Hotan Government Net), May, 30, 2015, http://archive.is/fCkb3; Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief; Joyce Huang, “Rights Activists Denounce China’s Xinjiang White Paper,” VOA News, March 19, 2019, https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/rights-activists-denounce-chinas-xinjiang-white-paper.[203] Emphasis added. Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief.[204] Ibid.[205] See Uyghur Human Rights Project, “Ideological Transformation,” p. 9.[206] Zenz, “Sterilizations, IUDs, and Coercive Birth Prevention,” China Brief.[207] Ibid., p. 13.[208] Ibid.[209] Ibid., p. 15-16.[210] Ibid.[211] The acts are: “Murder; Extermination; Enslavement; Deportation or forcible transfer of population; Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law; Torture; Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; Enforced disappearance of persons; The crime of apartheid; Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.” Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, entered into force July 1, 2002.[212] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(a).[213] The Rome Statute further defines a qualifying action as “a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of [the enumerated acts] against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to commit such attack.” Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(a).[214] An “attack” is a course of conduct involving the commission of acts of violence. See Oxford Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 196. See also, Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes (ICC Elements of Crimes), ICC-ASP/1/3, September 9, 2002, https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/336923d8-a6ad-40ec-ad7b-45bf9de73d56/0/elementsofcrimeseng.pdf, art. 7. “Attack directed against a civilian population” means a course of conduct involving the commission of enumerated acts in the Rome Statute. The acts do not need to be part of a military attack.[215] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), paras. 3, 11.[216] ICC Elements of Crimes.[217] See Darryl Robinson, “Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the Court,” in Roy S. Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court, The Making of the Rome Statute (1999). (“Explicit recognition of this policy element was essential to the compromise on crimes against humanity. It is the existence of a policy that unites otherwise unrelated inhumane acts, so that it may be said that in the aggregate they collectively form an ‘attack’. Delegations supporting the compromise explained that the policy element was intended as a flexible test.”)[218] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), paras. 3, 11.[219] Austin Ramzy and Chris Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy’: Leaked Files Expose How China Organized Mass Detentions of Muslims,” New York Times, November 16, 2019.[220] Ibid.; Austin Ramzy, “5 Takeaways From the Leaked Files on China’s Mass Detention of Muslims,” New York Times November 16, 2019.[221] “一体化联合作战平台” 每日要情通报: 第20期 (“Integrated Joint Operation Platform” Daily Essentials Bulletin No. 20).[222] Ramzy and Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy,’” New York Times.[223] See, e.g., Enshen Li, “Fighting the ‘Three Evils’: A Structural Analysis of Counter-Terrorism Legal Architecture in China,” Emory International Law Review, vol. 33, no. 3, 2019; Kilic Kanat, “Repression in China and Its Consequences in Xinjiang,” Hudson Institute, July 28, 2014, https://www.hudson.org/research/10480-repression-in-china-and-its-consequences-in-xinjiang.[224] Ramzy and Buckley, “‘Absolutely No Mercy,’” New York Times.[225] Ibid.[226] Ibid. His confession and the investigation report were read aloud to officials throughout Xinjiang, and state media outlets portrayed him as corrupt.[227] Ibid.[228] 自治区机关发电 (Autonomous Region State Telegram), para. 25.[229] Emily Rauhala and Anna Fifield, “She survived a Chinese internment camp and made it to Virginia. Will the U.S. let her stay?” Washington Post, November 17, 2019.[230] Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(c).[231] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(c), n.11. The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia held in the Kunarac case that exploitative conditions may rise to the level of enslavement when factors such as control of movement, control of environment, use or threat of force, psychological control, and other forms of coercion that would diminish a person’s free will are present. Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovač and Zoran Vuković, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement in the Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, February 22, 2001, §§ 543-543, https://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf.[232] See, e.g., Chris Buckley and Austin Ramzy, “China’s Detention Camps for Muslims Turn to Forced Labor,” New York Times, December 16, 2018, discussing state propaganda extolling the benefits of the “job training” program.[233] United States v. Pohl, Judgement, US Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, November 3, 1947, http://www.worldcourts.com/imt/eng/decisions/1947.11.03_United_States_v_Pohl.pdf.[234] Rome Statute, art. 7(1)(f), 7(2)(e).[235] Oxford Public International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), p. 519.[236] Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(g).[237] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(h).[238] See Elisa Novic, Beyond Words: From ‘Cultural Genocide’ to ‘Cultural Persecution,’ Oxford Scholarship Online, 2016. [239] Ibid., p. 148-149, citing International Law Commission commentary on the 1991 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind.[240] See, for example, Tactics from Turpan City, instructing officials on how to respond to the economic concerns of detainees’ family members; Adrian Zenz, “China Didn’t Want Us to Know. Now Its Own Files Are Doing the Talking,” New York Times, November, 24, 2019, describing the economic fallout of these policies.[241] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(i); Rome Statute, art. 7(2)(i).[242] ICC Elements of Crimes, art. 7(1)(g)-2.[243] Ibid., art. 7(1)(g)-5.[244] Ibid., art. 7(1)(d).[245] Ibid., art. 7(1)(d), n.12. Related Content April 19, 2021 News Release China: Crimes Against Humanity in XinjiangMass Detention, Torture, Cultural Persecution of Uyghurs, Other Turkic MuslimsApril 19, 2021 News Release China: Crimes Against Humanity in XinjiangRegion / CountryAsia China and Tibet TagsUyghurs Protecting Rights, Saving LivesHuman Rights Watch defends the rights of people in close to 100 countries worldwide, spotlighting abuses and bringing perpetrators to justice Donate NowGet Updates On Rights Issues WorldwideLeave blankLeave blankLeave blankSign UpGet Daily Updates On Rights Issues WorldwideLeave blankLeave blankLeave blankSign UpConnect With UsTwitterFacebookYouTubeInstagramLinkedInTikTokFooter menuContact UsCorrectionsPrivacy PolicyPermissionsSite MapChild SafeguardingText Version© 2024 Human Rights WatchHuman Rights Watch | 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th Floor | New York, NY 10118-3299 USA | t 1.212.290.4700 Human Rights Watch is a 501(C)(3) nonprofit registered in the US under EIN: 13-2875808Human Rights Watch </div> </div> </div>  </div>  </div> </div>   <div class="related-posts" id="UFukzfXTw6"> <div class="related-posts-wrapper" id="DETcvLsjjT"> <div class="related-posts-inner" id="qDYefgW7BK"> <div class="container" id="x8BkU14VXF">  <div class="row" id="F63dOiVfA3"> <div class="col-lg-6 offset-lg-0 col-md-8 offset-md-2 col-10 offset-1" id="UrJBv0GY1w"> <div class="section-heading section-heading-1 c-white" id="46iN7KvGFE"> <div class="sub-heading upper ls-1" id="SbECMcvNIy"> <h5>最近的新闻</h5> </div> <div class="main-heading" id="GPlGjZ3dih"> <h1>您可能喜欢的文章</h1> </div> </div> </div> <div class="col-lg-6 offset-lg-0 col-md-8 offset-md-2 col-10 offset-1" id="UqiRylLOjK"> <div class="related-posts-slider-navigation slider-navigation" id="UhXNtTQBFK"> <div class="related-posts-slider-navigation-prev" tabindex="0" role="button" aria-label="Previous slide" aria-controls="swiper-wrapper-bf19141edd166f9b" id="i8zfwO7SHF"> </div> <div class="related-posts-slider-navigation-next" tabindex="0" role="button" aria-label="Next slide" aria-controls="swiper-wrapper-bf19141edd166f9b" id="i4mA4VQPAu"> </div> </div> </div> </div>  </div> <div class="container related-posts-slider-container" id="bGED7Tl3v1">  <div class="row" id="VeB5Dh1s1s"> <div class="col-lg-12" id="OHqWCLl2dp"> <div class="related-posts-slider" id="OsV0zR1LGW"> <div class="swiper-container swiper-container-initialized swiper-container-horizontal swiper-container-pointer-events" id="GcSrQOJNvv"> <div class="swiper-wrapper" id="swiper-wrapper-bf19141edd166f9b" aria-live="polite" style="transition-duration: 0ms; 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